The issues raised on appeal from that portion of the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment entered January 9, 2009 ( see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]). To vacate their default in opposing the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for their default and a meritorious claim ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Francis v Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 45 AD3d 529, 530; Quintero v Kim, 43 AD3d 895, 895; Faga v Harrison Cent. School Dist., 40 AD3d 690, 690; Costanza v Gold, 12 AD3d 551, 552). Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs presented a reasonable excuse for their failure to oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and demonstrated that they had a meritorious cause of action ( see Quintero v Kim, 43 AD3d at 896; Faga v Harrison Cent. School Dist., 40 AD3d at 690; Costanza v Gold, 12 AD3d at 552).

Here, although the plaintiffs proffered a reasonable excuse for their default in failing to appear ready to proceed at the trial conference, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Sutton had a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Addison v Avshalumov, 153 A.D.3d 477, 478; see also Shah v Uh, 184 A.D.3d at 697). No medical evidence was submitted to demonstrate that Sutton sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Santiago v Santana, 54 A.D.3d 929, 930; cf. Quintero v Kim, 43 A.D.3d 895, 896).

Here, although the plaintiffs proffered a reasonable excuse for their default in failing to appear ready to proceed at the trial conference, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Sutton had a potentially meritorious cause of action (seeAddison v. Avshalumov, 153 A.D.3d 477, 478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 746 ; see alsoShah v. Uh, 184 A.D.3d at 697, 123 N.Y.S.3d 832 ). No medical evidence was submitted to demonstrate that Sutton sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (seeSantiago v. Santana, 54 A.D.3d 929, 930, 864 N.Y.S.2d 122 ; cf. Quintero v. Kim, 43 A.D.3d 895, 896, 841 N.Y.S.2d 629 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate so much of the order dated November 20, 2017, as directed dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted by Sutton and to restore the action to the calendar insofar as asserted by her.

Here, although the plaintiffs proffered a reasonable excuse for their default in failing to appear ready to proceed at the trial conference, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Sutton had a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Addison v Avshalumov, 153 A.D.3d 477, 478; see also Shah v Uh, 184 A.D.3d at 697). No medical evidence was submitted to demonstrate that Sutton sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Santiago v Santana, 54 A.D.3d 929, 930; cf. Quintero v Kim, 43 A.D.3d 895, 896). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate so much of the order dated November 20, 2017, as directed dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted by Sutton and to restore the action to the calendar insofar as asserted by her.

In the present action, the physician affidavit submitted by plaintiffs in support of the motion demonstrates that plaintiffs have a meritorious cause of action (see Quintero v Kim, 43 AD3d 895 [2d Dept 2007]). Therein, plaintiffs' expert cardiologist opined that defendants departed from good and accepted medical practice when they discontinued plaintiff's use of Warfarin on November 3, 2008 and placed her on aspirin.