Opinion
No. CV02-0003671
August 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On June 18, 2002, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to overturn a disciplinary report issued by the respondent warden. The petitioner's sole basis for challenging the disciplinary report is the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the disciplinary report.
The matter came before this court on August 1, 2003, for a trial on the merits. The petitioner and Lieutenant Melissa Murray, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer, testified at the trial, and a copy of the disciplinary report at issue was admitted into evidence. The court has reviewed all of the testimony and documentary evidence and makes the following findings of fact. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the petition is dismissed.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The petitioner is a sentenced prisoner confined to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction pursuant to a properly court-issued mittimus.
2. On May 8, 2002, the Intelligence Office at Northern Correctional Institution concluded an investigation initiated as a result of an April 24, 2002 incident. As a result of the investigation, the petitioner received a disciplinary report on May 8, 2002, for a charge of security risk group affiliation.
3. The petitioner received a copy of the disciplinary report at 9:45 A.M. on May 8, 2002.
4. The petitioner was assigned an advocate to assist him in responding to the disciplinary report. The advocate interviewed the petitioner and obtained his version of the events.
5. The disciplinary report was investigated. The investigator interviewed the petitioner and obtained his version of the events. The petitioner did not request any witnesses. The investigator concluded that the petitioner should be found guilty of the charge of security risk group affiliation.
6. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. On May 28, 2002, a hearing was conducted before Hearing Officer Lieutenant Murray. The petitioner and his advocate appeared before the hearing officer.
7. Based on both the facility investigation that resulted in the disciplinary report and the documentation submitted to the hearing officer, all of which was confidential and which the hearing officer indicated was "very reliable," the petitioner was found guilty of security risk group affiliation.
8. The petitioner was sanctioned with twenty days punitive segregation, ninety days loss of phone privileges and ninety days loss of commissary privileges.
9. The petitioner did not forfeit any previously earned good time credits.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
The petitioner in this matter does not raise a claim that any of his constitutionally protected rights were violated. Instead, the petitioner alleges, by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the disciplinary report, that he is innocent of the charge of security risk group affiliation.
Habeas corpus provides a special and extraordinary legal remedy for illegal detention. The deprivation of legal rights is essential before the writ may be issued. Questions which do not concern the lawfulness of the detention cannot properly be reviewed on habeas corpus. When a habeas petition is properly before a court, the remedies it may award depend on the constitutional rights being vindicated. Further, any remedy must be commensurate with the scope of the constitutional violations that have been established. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Vincenzo v. Warden, 26 Conn. 132, 137-38 (1991).
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 87 (1991), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). "Under the federal constitution, it is well settled that inmates completely forgo certain of their constitutional rights and may be restricted in their exercise of certain other rights. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security." (Internal citations omitted.) Washington v. Meachum, 238 Conn. 692, 716 (1996), citing Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 555.
"Prison disciplinary proceedings . . . take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so. Some are first offenders, but many are recidivists who have repeatedly employed illegal and often very violent means to attain their ends. They may have little regard for the safety of others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly and reasonably safe prison life . . . Although there are very many varieties of prisons with different degrees of security, we must realize that in many of them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities controlled around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.
"It is against this background that disciplinary proceedings must be structured by prison authorities[.] . . . The reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those who would charge or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal antagonisms on the important aims of the correctional process." Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 561-62.
"In order to prevail on a due process claim, [a petitioner] must show that [he has] been deprived of a legally recognized liberty interest, and that [he has] been deprived of liberty without due process of law." Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 39 Conn. App. 674, 680 (1995). "The Moody court established the . . . proposition that not every state action that carries adverse consequences for prison inmates automatically implicates or effectuates a due process right. Prison classification and eligibility for various rehabilitation programs, wherein prison officials have full discretion to control those conditions of confinement, do not create a statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke due process." Wheway v. Warden, 215 Conn. 418, 431 (1990), citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88-89 n. 9 (1976).
In Abed v. Commissioner of Correction, 43 Conn. App. 176, 180, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937 (1996), the petitioner had claimed that "as a result of his custodial classification, he ha[d] been prohibited from accumulating good time credits that would automatically accelerate his release date." The Appellate Court held that "the decision to deny inmates classified as safety threats the opportunity to earn the good time credits . . . does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected liberty interest." Abed v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 43 Conn. App. 181-82. See also Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, 50 Conn. App. 421, 438 (1998), aff'd, 249 Conn. 499 (1999).
"Due process is satisfied if the prison disciplinary board shows some evidence that supports the revocation of good time credit. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Jolley v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 Conn. App. 560, 561 (2000).
"[I]n identifying the safeguards required by due process, the [United States Supreme] Court has recognized the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners, avoiding burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation, and preserving the disciplinary process as a means of rehabilitation. Requiring a modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue administrative burdens . . . Because the written statement mandated by Wolff requires a disciplinary board to explain the evidence relied upon, recognizing that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision to revoke good time credits will not impose significant new burdens on proceedings within the prison. Nor does it imply that a disciplinary board's factual findings or decisions with respect to appropriate punishment are subject to second-guessing upon review." (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations omitted.) Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985).
"To support a finding based on confidential information, . . . an informant's testimony will suffice at least where there has been some examination of indicia relevant to an informant's credibility. Requiring an independent credibility assessment ensures not only a fair hearing and discipline based on reliable evidence, but also places a minimal burden on prison officials conducting such hearings, with the assurance that judicial review is available." (Internal citation omitted.) Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 194 (2nd Cir. 2001).
A review of the disciplinary proceedings shows that all due process requirements were fully satisfied. Furthermore, the "some evidence" requirement was met through the investigation that culminated in the disciplinary report and the confidential information, which together formed the bases for the hearing officer's guilty finding. The hearing officer indicated that the reliability of the confidential information was "very reliable." The hearing officer's factual findings or decision with respect to appropriate punishment are not subject to second-guessing upon review, via a habeas corpus petition.
In conclusion, the petitioner has failed to allege and show that he was deprived of a legal right.
Accordingly, judgment shall enter dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
S.T. FUGER, JR., JUDGE