An employee must exhaust her administrative remedies before a court has jurisdiction to consider an employee's claim that the school board breached its contract. Cf.Quintana v. State Bd. of Ed. , 1970-NMCA-074, ยถยถ 2-3, 8, 81 N.M. 671, 472 P.2d 385 (holding that, where school district did not re-employ school principal as principal for following year, and where employee appealed decision directly to State Board, neither State Board nor court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider employee's appeal because no hearing was held before local board; mandamus relief is available to employee to test right to hearing before local board if one is not provided). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required prior to filing suit unless the school district's own actions thwarted the employee's abilities to invoke and exhaust those administrative remedies.
New Mexico appellate courts have expressly considered a court's power or authority to decide the particular matter presented only where a statute created the claim at issue and specifically empowered a court to adjudicate that class of claim. See Heckathorn , 1967โNMSCโ017, ยถยถ 10โ11, 77 N.M. 369, 423 P.2d 410 (concluding that the trial court lacked the power to grant a divorce because the parties had not satisfied the statutory condition of being New Mexico residents for at least one year); Field's Estate , 1936โNMSCโ060, ยถยถ 32โ34, 40 N.M. 423, 60 P.2d 945 (concluding that the probate court, under statute, had power or authority to classify certain claims filed against an estate); Quintana v. State Bd. of Educ. , 1970โNMCAโ074, ยถยถ 7โ8, 81 N.M. 671, 472 P.2d 385 (concluding that, under statute, the Court of Appeals lacked authority to review a decision of a state administrative board because that board lacked authority of review where the local administrative board never conducted a hearing). Accordingly, the power or authority to decide the particular matter presented is not a separate element of a court's jurisdiction, but rather a formulation we have used to refer to a court's subject matter jurisdiction over claims created by statute when the statute makes a court's power of review dependent upon certain prerequisites.
Since Rule 2-B is not applicable to Hayden as administrator, he was properly terminated. Cf. Black v. Board of Ed. of Jemez Mountain Sch. D. No. 53, 87 N.M. 45, 529 P.2d 271 (1974); Quintana v. State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 671, 472 P.2d 385 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 668, 472 P.2d 382 (1970). Supervision and correction procedures.
Ordered that petition for writ of certiorari be and the same is hereby denied. Further ordered that the record in Court of Appeals Cause No. 417, 81 N.M. 671, 472 P.2d 385, be and the same is hereby returned to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
We have previously held, and our Supreme Court has confirmed, that mandamus is properly available where there has been no hearing before the local school board. See Quintana v. State Bd. of Educ., 1970โNMCAโ074, ยถยถ 8โ9, 81 N.M. 671, 472 P.2d 385; see also Brown v. Romero, 1967โNMSCโ057, ยถ 8, 77 N.M. 547, 425 P.2d 310 (concluding that a teacher's breach of contract claim, arising out of employment contract and challenging denial of hearing, was premature where she had not brought a mandamus action to โpursue and exhaustโ her remedies). Respondents' briefs do not present any suggestions as to what alternative, speedy remedies are available to Petitioner, and instead seek to foreclose the only option available for review; absent this information, we do not review the argument. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005โNMCAโ045, ยถ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (โWe will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [a party's] arguments might be.โ); see also Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 1992โNMSCโ044, ยถ 11, 114 N.M. 103, 835 P.2d 819 (stating that we have no duty to entertain arguments when no authority is presented in support of an argument).
1. Franco was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because the District's actions deprived him of due process. {10} Citing Shepard v. Board of Education, 81 N.M. 585, 587, 470 P.2d 306, 308 (1970), Sanchez v. Board of Education, 68 N.M. 440, 441, 362 P.2d 979, 980 (1961), and Quintana v. State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 671, 672, 472 P.2d 385, 386 (Ct.App. 1970), the District contends that Franco was required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in NMSA 1978, ยงยง 22-10-14 and 22-10-14.1 (1994) before seeking relief in the district court. In our view, however, these authorities lend little support to the District's contentions on appeal.
See Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Plan Commission v. Fair Employment Practices Commission. Cf. Quintana v. State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 671, 472 P.2d 385 (Ct.App. 1970) (State Board and court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal until a local hearing had been held). The regulation states that the time limits may be waived by the parties in writing.
We do not reach the merits of the teacher's claim because we do not have jurisdiction. Our decision in this matter is controlled by the decision of this court in Quintana v. State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 671, 472 P.2d 385 (Ct.App. 1970), cert. denied 81 N.M. 668, 472 P.2d 382 (1970). In Quintana this court refused to decide an appeal from a decision of the State Board because the Local Board had not held a hearing.