Opinion
570747/07.
Decided July 28, 2008.
Plaintiff, as limited by her brief, appeals from that portion of an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Lizbeth Gonzalez, J.), entered June 23, 2007, which denied her motion to dismiss defendant's second affirmative defense and for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Order (Lizbeth Gonzalez, J.), entered June 23, 2007, modified to grant plaintiff's motion to dismiss the second affirmative defense, and, as modified, affirmed, with $10 costs.
PRESENT: McKEON, P.J., SCHOENFELD, HEITLER JJ.
In this action arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Rhode Island, defendant's second affirmative defense, purporting to invoke New York's no-fault statute to bar plaintiff's recovery of personal injury damages, should have been dismissed. The plain language of Insurance Law § 5104(a) makes clear that the serious injury threshold requirement ( see Insurance Law § 5102[d]) applies solely to personal injury actions "arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in this state [emphasis added]" ( see Morgan v Bisorni, 100 AD2d 956).
On the merits, the motion court properly concluded that there are triable issues with regard to defendant's liability for negligence precluding summary judgment. "In a one-car accident where [as here] proof has been presented that the vehicle skidded out of control with a resulting collision with an object, the case is a proper one for jury determination" ( see Noia v DeRosa, 78 AD2d 789, affd 54 NY2d 631).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.