Opinion
1:23-cv-31
11-30-2023
NICHOLE MONIQUE QUINONES., Plaintiff v. RONI IRVIN, et al, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ECF Nos. 16, 28, 38, 41
I. Recommendation
It is respectfelly recommended that Plaintiffs Motions for Temporary Restraining Order [ECF Nos. 16, 28, 38, 41] each be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Background
In the underlying complaint, Nichole Monique Quinones, a transgendered inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI Forest), generally alleges that officials at her prior place of incarceration, SCI Albion, violated her constitutional rights by failing to protect her from the sexual advances, assaults, harassment, and abuse directed at her by several other inmates. See, generally, ECF No. 14. Plaintiff also accuses prison officials of charging her with a false misconduct that resulted in her parole being denied. Id. Each of the claims in her amended complaint relate entirely to these two issues.
B. Standard
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed under the same standard. The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court should issue the injunction only if the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 192 (citing ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The facts clearly must support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a “clear showing of irreparable injury.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief.
Moreover, because the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claims on their merits, “the injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiff's complaint.” James v. Varano, 2017 WL 895569, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017). In other words, “there must be a connection between the underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. (citing Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010)). A district court “should not issue an injunction when the injunction in question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).
Finally, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” . . Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Analysis
In the instant case, Plaintiff has filed four separate motions for temporary injunctive relief, none of which relate to the underlying claims in her complaint. In her first motion [ECF No. 16], she avers that one of the Defendants issued a false misconduct against her in retaliation for filing the instant lawsuit and that one of her family members sent her money that she never received. In her second motion [ECF No. 28], she maintains that staff members at SCI Albion, including one Defendant, cancelled her scheduled family visits, altered her visitation list, and fabricated a charge that her family members had violated visiting procedures during a prior visit, all in retaliation for the instant lawsuit. Her third and fourth motions [ECF Nos. 38 and 41] raise similar claims of retaliation based on the instant lawsuit, including retaliatory transfers and additional false misconducts.
Critically, none of the factual allegations in Plaintiffs motions for injunctive relief bear any relationship to her underlying sexual assault claims. Because the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to prevent irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claims on their merits, “the injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiffs complaint.” James, 2017 WL 895569, at *3. In other words, “there must be a connection between the underlying complaint and the relief requested in the motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. (citing Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 837). This is not an arbitrary distinction or a technicality; rather, the Court completely “lacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief' that are “unrelated to the underlying complaint.” Stewart v. Verano, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2015) (citing Raupp v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2006 WL 3332089, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2006)).
Because the injunctive relief requested in Plaintiffs motions is wholly disconnected from the underlying claims in the complaint, injunctive relief is plainly inappropriate. Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 837; Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of injunction where plaintiffs' alleged harm was “insufficiently related to the complaint and [did] not deserve the benefits of protective measures that a preliminary injunction afford”); Stewart, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2 (“In sum, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief where those matters are wholly unrelated to the underlying complaint.”). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue claims based on these unrelated matters, she must do so by filing a separate civil action against the appropriate defendants.
III. Conclusion
For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order [ECF Nos. 16, 28, 38, 41] be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).