Opinion
CLAIM NO. E209211
OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 15, 1996
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by JAY TOLLEY, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by MICHAEL MASHBURN, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Full Commission on remand from the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Claimant's spouse originally appealed our order wherein we found that claimant's death constituted new evidence to be considered in determining the propriety of awarding a lump sum payment pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-804 (1987). On appeal to the Court of Appeals, claimant alleged, first, that the Commission abused its discretion in remanding a case to the Administrative Law Judge for the taking of additional evidence and, second, that Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-201 (1987) which provides for the appointment of three members of the Workers' Compensation Commission is unconstitutional.
In its original opinion in this case, Quinn v. Webb Wheel, 52 Ark. App. 208, 915 S.W.2d 740 (1996), the Court upheld our decision remanding the case to the Administrative Law Judge to take additional evidence regarding the claimant's death, however, the Court declined to address the claimant's constitutional argument on the basis that claimant did not obtain a ruling on this issue from the Full Commission. Claimant filed a petition for rehearing. On June 5, 1995, the Arkansas Court of Appeals granted claimant's motion for rehearing based upon the Court's recent holding in Green v. Smith Scott Logging, 54 Ark. App. 53, 922 S.W.2d 746 (1996) and remanded the case to the Commission. The only issue on remand is the constitutional issue which involves the makeup of the Commission. When this matter was first appealed to the Full Commission, claimant stated in his letter brief filed September 1, 1994:
The Workers' Compensation Commission is unconstitutionally comprised in violation of the Arkansas and U.S. Constitutions in that it is composed of representation by appointment based upon social and political factors and deprives this claimant of due process and equal protection of law.
"There is a presumption of constitutionality attendant to every legislative enactment and all doubts concerning it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. The party challenging a statute has the burden of proving it unconstitutional." Lambert v. Baldor Elec., 44 Ark. App. 117, 868 S.W.2d 513 (1993); Holland v. Willis, 293 Ark. 518, 793 S.W.2d 529 (1987). In the case now before the Commission, we find that the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proving that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated for two reasons.
First, we note that the Court of Appeals affirmed out decision to remand the case to the Administrative Law Judge to take additional findings. Claimant contends that the decision of this Commission to remand the case and to deny benefits was predicated upon the composition of the Commission and not the facts of this case. This argument has been proven false by the finding of the Court of Appeals in its original opinion which upheld our decision, stating: "From our review of the record, we cannot say that the Commission abused its discretion in remanding the case for the taking of additional evidence." Quinn v. Webb Wheel, 52 Ark. App. 208, 915 S.W.2d 240 (1996). If we did not abuse our discretion in arriving at our conclusion, then there is no basis to claimant's argument that he was deprived of due process. The same correct and proper decision would have been reached regardless of the Commission composition.
Second, we find that the claimant has failed to prove that the composition of the Commission is unconstitutional. We point out that we previously addressed this constitutional issue in our order filed July 12, 1995 in Kathryn Stewart v. Med. Tech., ( E020924). In Stewart, we specifically held that the composition of the Full Commission does not violate or deny a party due process of law.
"The Commission acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and its awards are in the nature of judgments. The Act provides a symmetry for the composition of the tripartite commission." Webb v. WCC, 292 Ark. 349, 730 S.W.2d 222 (1987). Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-201 (a) (1) (1987) provides that one member of the three members appointed by the Governor "shall be a person who, on account of his previous vocation, employment, or affiliation, has had at least five (5) years of experience as an employer and can be classed as a representative of employers." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-201 (a) (2) (1987) provides that a second member of the Commission appointed by the Governor "shall be a person, who on account of his previous vocation, employment or affiliation, has had at least five (5) years of membership in a bona fide labor organization and can be classed as a representative of employees." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-201 (a) (3) (1987) provides that the third member appointed by the Governor "shall be an attorney, who shall be Chairman of the Commission and who shall have been engaged in active practice of law in the State of Arkansas for not less than five (5) years next preceding the date of his appointment." Act 546 of 1995 amended subsection (a) (1) and (a) (2) to allow, as an alternative qualification, the labor and management representatives to be attorneys with at least five years experience in workers' compensation matters representing members of the class for whom they are to represent as a Commissioner. (See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-202 (a) (1) and (a) (2) (Repl. 1996). The Chairman represents the public.
We feel compelled to point out that nothing in the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law obligates the designated representatives of the Commission to always rule in favor of, or be an advocate for any particular party. On the contrary, each member of the Commission is statutorily charged with the duty of deciding cases "impartially and without giving the benefit of the doubt to either party." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704 (4) (1987). Consequently, no Commissioner is free to act in a capricious fashion with disregard for the facts and the law, regardless of his or her statutory designation. Furthermore, the law is well-settled that public officers, such as the members of this Commission, are presumed to act lawfully, sincerely, and in good faith in the execution of their duties. U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1940); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1974) and Jones v. Scheduled Skyways, Inc., 1 Ark. App. 44, 612 S.W.2d 333 (1981). Therefore, it must be presumed that each member of this Commission will impartially decide the cases on the basis of the facts elicited, without giving the benefit of doubt to either party, in conformance with the law.
The mere designation of members of a quasi-judicial tribunal as representatives of specified groups does not violate due process. Board of Education v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 262 A.2d 426 (1970). Such designations based upon individual's background and experience are obviously created to assure fair consideration of the varying philosophies, points of view, and policies inherently unique to each of the interests involved in the workers' compensation system. Id. Such "policy biases" are not constitutionally disqualifying. See, K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 19. 1 (2nd Ed. 1980 Supp. 1993). A constitutionally impermissible bias only occurs if the adjudicator's direct and personal interests or relationship with the party, subject matter, or adjudicated facts of a particular case create a constitutionally impermissible probability that the adjudicator will be incapable of rendering a fair decision on the facts presented. See, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), Withrow v. Larkin, supra, and Lambert v. Baldor Electric, 44 Ark. App. 117, 868 S.W.2d 513 (1993). A Commissions background, philosophy and point of view do not rise to the level of a constitutionally impermissible probability since each Commissioner must review each case impartially. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704.
Furthermore, the composition of this Commission does not result in a denial of due process. By vesting the duty to determine claims in a balanced tripartite Commission composed of members representing labor, management and the public, the Arkansas General Assembly established a scheme for resolving contested workers' compensation claims which assures fundamental fairness and minimizes the risk of erroneous deprivation of the parties' interests. In our opinion, the composition of this Commission reduces the risk of erroneous deprivation by assuring that the viewpoints of both labor and management are considered in each decision making process.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we find that claimant has failed to prove that the composition of this Commission is unconstitutional or that he was denied due process and equal protection of the law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.