{¶ 11} Generally, the duty to support one's child terminates when the child reaches the age of majority, which is eighteen; however, that duty is extended as long as the child continuously attends any recognized and accredited high school on a full-time basis. R.C. 3103.03(B); Quinn v. Quinn (Dec. 17, 1999), 11th Dist. No. 98-G-2185, 1999 WL 1313621, at 2. {¶ 12} Therefore, even though Carly turned eighteen on March 16, 2002, she was still in high school until her graduation on June 9, 2002.
{¶ 18} Contrary to appellee's assertion, the magistrate and the trial court were also acting within the scope of R.C. 3105.18(H) as this section is applicable to a post-divorce decree proceeding where a party is seeking attorney fees in a modification or enforcement of child support action. Quinn v. Quinn (Dec. 17, 1999), 11th Dist. No. 98-G-2185, 1999 WL 1313621, at 3 (holding that authority for the trial court to award attorney fees is found in R.C. 3105.18(H) where husband instituted an action to terminate child support and wife countered by seeking an increase in child support); Rose v. Rose (Apr. 27, 1999), 10th Dist. No. 98AP-877, 1999 WL 252665, at 4; Cox v. Cox (Apr. 8, 1997), 10th Dist. Nos. 96APF07-889 and 96APF08-990, 1997 WL 170303 at 7. {¶ 19} In the instant matter, appellee concedes to the fact that the purpose of her May 17, 2001 motion to show cause was to "enforc[e] child support obligations and the payment of attorney fees for such enforcement expenses."
Such an expedition would amount to a utilization of this court's resources on an exercise that was appellant's responsibility to complete, and would be manifestly unfair to the opposing parties. See Doody v. Centerior Energy Corp. (May 19, 2000), Lake App. No. 98-L-235, unreported, at 4, 2000 WL 655011, citing Quinn v. Quinn (Dec. 17, 1999), Geauga App. No. 98-G-2185, unreported, 1999 WL 1313621. In the ninth assignment of error, appellant states that the lower court erred in striking his pro se filings and prohibiting him from representing himself pro se. Appellant asserts that the trial court's decision caused him extreme prejudice. However, in advancing this assignment of error, appellant has failed to articulate how and why such a decision caused him extreme prejudice.
Because appellant has failed to set forth arguments to support his claimed error, we will not address it. See Quinn v. Quinn (Dec. 17, 1999), Geauga App. No. 98-G-2185, unreported, 1999 WL 1313621, at *3, In appellant's second assignment of error, he alleges that the trial court erred by granting appellees' motion for costs for defending depositions without a hearing on the matter.