Opinion
No. 2:14-cv-00744 JAM CMK
06-30-2015
TYLER B. QUINN, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD ORTIZ, individually and in his official capacity; and CITY OF ALTURAS, ex rel. the ALTURAS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY
This case arises out of an incident between Plaintiff, Tyler Quinn, and Defendant, Richard Ortiz, an officer with the City of Alturas Police Department. Reporter's Transcript of Preliminary Hearing (12/17/2013), Pl.'s Ex. 1, at 5. On October 26, 2013, Plaintiff was a passenger in a car being driven by his friend. Id. at 5. Defendant Ortiz pulled the car over, on suspicion that a "dreamcatcher" hanging from the rearview mirror was obstructing the driver's vision. Id. at 21; Compl. ¶ 10. Upon speaking with the driver, Defendant Ortiz smelled alcohol and ordered the occupants out of the car. Id. at 21. Although the exact sequence of events is disputed, Defendant Ortiz ultimately arrested Plaintiff on a charge of public intoxication, and, in doing so, pushed Plaintiff's head through the rear window of his patrol car. Id. at 30-31. Plaintiff then allegedly threatened Defendant Ortiz and his family. Id. at 18.
As a result of this incident, Plaintiff was charged with public intoxication, resisting an executive officer, and making criminal threats. After these charges were dismissed, Plaintiff filed the instant action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights as well as several claims under California state law. Plaintiff's claims include allegations of false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution against Defendant Ortiz. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 59, 71.
Following the filing of Plaintiff's civil suit, the Office of the Attorney General of California filed a new criminal complaint, containing seven counts relating to the October 26, 2013 incident. Following a preliminary hearing, Plaintiff was arraigned on the following three criminal charges: (1) resisting an executive officer, namely Defendant Ortiz; (2) making criminal threats against Defendant Ortiz; and (3) resisting the corrections officer who booked him into custody. Tonon Declaration, Ex. C.
Defendants maintain (and Plaintiff does not dispute) that the Attorney General's commencement of a second criminal action against Plaintiff was proper, pursuant to the Article 5, Section 13 of the California Constitution and California Penal Code § 1387. Reply at 3. Based on the Court's review of California Penal Code § 1387, which imposes a "two-dismissal" rule, the Attorney General's action does not appear to be improper. See People v. Superior Court (Martinez), 19 Cal. App. 4th 738, 744 (1993).
In light of these pending criminal charges, Defendants ask the Court to abstain from hearing Plaintiff's civil suit under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Defendants argue that a verdict for Plaintiff in this civil suit would potentially conflict with an eventual conviction in Plaintiff's criminal case, a result which the doctrine of Heck abstention was designed to prevent. Mot. at 3; Reply at 5.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for June 17, 2015. --------
Under the Supreme Court's holding in Heck, "a § 1983 action that would call into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff's conviction or confinement is not cognizable[.]" Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, when a criminal defendant files a § 1983 action, courts must "determine whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed[.]" Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Conversely, "if the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed[.]" Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Plaintiff objects to the application of the Heck doctrine to this case, on the grounds that the criminal charges are still pending and there is no "conviction" to invalidate. Opp. at 5. The prevailing rule in the Ninth Circuit prior to 2007 was that "Heck applies to pending criminal charges, and [therefore] a claim, that if successful would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, does not accrue so long as the potential for a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist." Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1014. However, in 2007, the United States Supreme Court rejected the principle that "an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set aside," characterizing that approach as a "bizarre extension of Heck." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the Court provided the following guidance to district courts:
If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.Thus, if a judgment for Plaintiff on any of his civil claims would "necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction" on any of the pending criminal charges against him, the Court has discretion to stay Plaintiff's civil action until the resolution of that criminal charge. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Kato, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (internal citations omitted).
A pervasive theme in Plaintiff's complaint is that Defendant Ortiz lacked probable cause to arrest him. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, 20, 62, 64, 65. For Plaintiff to prevail on many of his claims - such as his state law claim for false arrest/false imprisonment - a fact finder would need to conclude that Defendant Ortiz lacked probable cause to make an arrest. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (noting that the "defense of good faith and probable cause" exists for both state law claims for false arrest and imprisonment, as well as actions under § 1983). However, such a finding would conflict with a conviction on the charge of "resisting an executive officer" during his arrest by Defendant Ortiz. As both the Ninth Circuit and California courts have explained, an individual cannot be guilty of resisting arrest if the arrest itself was unlawful. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that, "[i]f the officers could not lawfully arrest Arpin for battery, the officers could also not lawfully arrest Arpin for resisting arrest"); People v. Simons, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1100, 1109 (1996) (holding that a "[d]efendant cannot be convicted of an offense against an officer engaged in the performance of official duties unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time").
Accordingly, under Heck (and Kato), the Court finds that Plaintiff's civil action includes claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction and should be stayed pending the resolution of Count One in the criminal information against Plaintiff, for resisting Defendant Ortiz during his arrest. See Dominguez v. Shaw, 2011 WL 6297971, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2011) (granting summary judgment to defendants on false imprisonment claim, under Heck, because the plaintiff "cannot show that his arrest lacked probable cause without necessarily invalidating his adjudication of delinquency for resisting arrest"). All upcoming dates are vacated and the parties are ordered to file a joint status report within 30 days of the resolution of the criminal resisting an executive officer charge.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 30, 2015
/s/_________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE