A tenant who has agreed to pay rent on certain specified dates during the term of a lease becomes obligated thereto when the day of each such payment arrives. See Quinn v. Madigan, 65 N.H. 8. The owner of the property, or the person having the status of landlord, on the date the rent becomes due, is the one entitled to the rent. Russell v. Fabyan, 28 N.H. 543; 52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, ss. 512, 516, pp. 318, 320. He is the person to whom the tenant becomes obligated.
Currier v. Perley, supra, 224; Hazeltine v. Colburn, 31 N.H. 466, 470. No apportionment of the rent in respect to time could be made except by agreement. Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N.H. 343, 347, 350; Currier v. Perley, supra, 224; Russell v. Fabyan, 28 N.H. 543, 545; Quinn v. Madigan, 65 N.H. 8. The common law as to tenancies at will prevails in this state, except so far as it has been modified by statute.
* * The question as to apportionment has also arisen where annuities have been given in lieu of dower, and while a sharp conflict of authority exists on this point, some courts vigorously supporting the common law rule that there can be no apportionment of an annuity in respect of time, except where it is payable by way of maintenance to an infant or feme covert ( Tracey v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659; Mower v. Sanford, 76 Conn. 504, 63 L.R.A. 625; Irving v. Rankine, 79 N.Y. 636: Chase v. Darby, 110 Mich. 314; note, 21 Ann. Cases, 315); it would seem that the weight of authority is in favor of numbering among the exceptions to the general rule an annuity created and accepted in lieu of dower. Brown v. Keech, supra, 21 Ann. Cas. 308, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 775; 63 L.R.A. 629, note; Blight v. Blight, 51 Pa. 420; Gheen v. Osborne, 17 S. R. (Pa.) 171; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Harris, 20 R.I. 160; In re Cushing, 58 Vt. 393; Lynch v. Huston, 138 Mo. App. 167; Parker v. Seely, 56 N.J. Eq. 110; Quinn v. Madigan, 65 N.H. 8. The extension of the doctrine of apportionment to include an annuity given to a widow in lieu of dower is based upon the ground that the annuity is necessary for the support of the widow until her death, or that that which is given in the place of dower should last as long as that for which it is given. Moreover, the inequity and arbitrariness of the general rule has been so generally conceded that modern legislation and judicial decisions have steadily tended to narrow the rule and enlarge the exceptions. Wilson's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 346. (Acts 1929, ch. 495, sec. 305C, article 93 of Maryland Code, applies to instruments executed after July 1st, 1929).
McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N.Y. 179; Ashhurst v. Field's Adm'r, 26 N. J. Eq. 1; Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368; Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 344; Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545; Hite's Devisees v. Hite's Ex'r, 93 Ky. 257, 264; Pritchitt v. Trust Co, 96 Tenn. 472. If the decision in Quinn v. Madigan, 65 N.H. 8, so far as it relates to this question, cannot be supported on other grounds than those suggested in the opinion, it is conflict with Lord v. Brooks and with the decision in this case, and is overruled. In 1903, the Park National Bank increased its capital stock one half, and gave its stockholders the right to subscribe, at $300 a share, for one share of new stock for every two shares of the old owned by them.