Opinion
02-04-1902
QUINN v. LE DUC et al.
Henry R. Coulomb and William J. Kraft, for complainant. Samuel W. Shinn, for defendant W. H. Reeves. G. M. Hillman, for defendant Le Duc and pro se.
Suit by John A. Quinn against Constant Le Duc and others. Decree for complainant.
Henry R. Coulomb and William J. Kraft, for complainant.
Samuel W. Shinn, for defendant W. H. Reeves.
G. M. Hillman, for defendant Le Duc and pro se.
GREY, V. C. (orally). The complainant has, on the whole case, shown himself to be entitled to equitable relief within the out-bounds of his bill of complaint, although the proofs vary considerably from the case alleged in the bill. The variance has not however, in any way misled or interfered with the defendant Le Duc (the principal defendant) in presenting his defense. Considering all the evidence, it has been shown that the relation of principal and agent touching the collection of a debt due the complainant from one Fitzhugh Smith existed between the complainant, as principal, and the defendant Le Duc, as agent The complainant employed Le Duc to collect by attachment the debt which Smith owed him. All that Le Duc did in and about the business was as agent for the complainant Le Duc's own testimony is to the same effect He was therefore bound by every principle of good faith to act for the interest of his employer, and not for his own advantage to his employer's injury. The complainant's attachment against Smith came to a sale. The testimony satisfies me that the defendant Le Duc knew that the complainant expected to attend that sale for the purpose of bidding on the property to protect his claim. He could safely have bid at least $900 for the property, with no obligation to pay any more than about $80 in cash. With this knowledge, Le Duc so arranged matters by his misleading statements to the complainant that, believing in Le Duc, he was kept away from the sale until after the hour when it took place; and meanwhile the property had been put up, and sold to the defendant Reeves for $80. On the morning of the sale Le Duc appears to have visited a lawyer, who shortly after instructed Reeves to buy. Le Duc's money paid for the purchase, and, shortly after Reeves had taken the deed from the sheriff, he conveyed the property to Le Duc for a named consideration of $1,000, which was in fact falsely stated; for Le Duc paid only the expenses and a $20 fee to the lawyer. Le Duc swears he arranged with the lawyer that they two should share the benefits of the purchase. The lawyer on the day of the sale wrote to the complainant's wife a reassuring note, evidently to prevent any action adverse to the sale until the whole plan could be carried into effect The result of the success of the scheme has been that the defendant Le Duc has obtained at the expense of his employer, the complainant, all of the benefits which could have been derived from the application of Smith's property to pay the complainant's debt This condition is wholly inequitable, and operates as a fraud upon the complainant. All the witnesses agree that the property was worth many times the amount at which it was sold. Le Duc himself admits it was worth $400. Other witnesses say $800. Le Duc's own testimony proved his employment by the complainant to obtain this property, to be applied in payment of the complainant's claim. After accepting this employment he betrayed his employer, and secured for himself the benefits to which his employer was entitled. Mr. Le Duc testifies to advances which he says he made to the complainant, and to bargains for a large share of the money to be recovered. These are wholly dependent on his testimony, for the complainant denies his statements. The burden is upon Mr. Le Duc to prove by the weight of the evidence these alleged obligations of the complainant to him, and he has not carried it. The complainant admits another and widely different agreement for Mr. Le Duc's compensation, but the latter has clearly forfeited this by his bad faith. It would be a great injustice to direct that the complainant should pay him the agreed compensation for work to be done, when all the proof shows that he has not only not done the work, but has defeated the complainant's recovery in the very matter in which he undertook to protect and advance his interests.
I will advise a decree directing that the defendant Le Duc convey the property to the complainant upon payment by the latter of the purchase sum and expenses, $100, and the cost of subsequent improvements, $40,— the sum of $140 in all.