Opinion
2d Crim. B324416
04-23-2024
MAUREEN QUINN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CARLOS MARTINEZ BELTRAN III et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Maureen Quinn, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo No. 22CVP-0084 Donald G. Umhofer, Judge
Maureen Quinn, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
GILBERT, P. J.
Maureen Quinn appeals a judgment entered following an order granting a special motion to strike and an award of attorney fees and costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 [strategic lawsuit against public participation ("anti-SLAPP") statute].)
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
This appeal concerns a 2022 lawsuit brought by Quinn against her neighbors for excessive noise caused by their roosters and dogs over a four-year period. Quinn alleges that the animal noises caused her emotional and psychological distress. Prior to Quinn filing this lawsuit, neighbors Carlos Martinez Beltran III and codefendant Regina Puckett (collectively Beltran) obtained restraining orders against Quinn for conduct they considered harassment. Then, in response to Quinn's 2022 lawsuit, Beltran filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted the motion and later awarded Beltran attorney fees and costs. Quinn, in propria persona, now appeals and contests these orders. We reject her contentions and affirm.
Beltran has not appeared in this appeal and has not responded to Quinn's brief. Quinn appeared in propria persona in the trial court and Beltran was represented by counsel.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
"First Lawsuit"
On September 29, 2021, Quinn filed a lawsuit against Beltran alleging causes of action for nuisance, violation of duty, and defamation, among other allegations. She sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and declaratory relief for her emotional distress caused by the rooster and dog noises. Quinn asserts that the first lawsuit is currently pending trial. "Present Lawsuit"
On April 4, 2022, Quinn filed this lawsuit against Beltran, alleging causes of action for abuse of process and conspiracy to commit abuse of process. Quinn seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.
Quinn alleges that following the obtaining of the restraining orders in 2019 and 2020 against her, Beltran allowed his animals to make excessive noise to provoke her into reacting and violating the restraining orders. Quinn was later convicted by nolo contendere plea of violating the restraining orders and placed on probation. She alleges that the provocation was intended to give defendants "a collateral advantage" in the first lawsuit.
On June 20, 2022, Beltran filed a motion to strike Quinn's complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motion, dismissed the lawsuit, and later awarded Beltran $17,200 attorney fees and costs.
Quinn appeals and contends that: 1) she established the probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims; 2) the trial court's judicial notice rulings were erroneous; 3) section 425.16 does not immunize illegal conduct; 4) the trial court misconstrued her complaint; and 5) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $17,200 attorney fees and costs.
DISCUSSION
I.
Quinn argues that she established the probability of prevailing on the merits of her abuse of process claims because she alleges that Beltran improperly used the restraining orders to harass her with excessive animal noise and provoke her psychological responses. (Booker v. Roundtree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370 [abuse of process claim alleging misconduct in the underlying litigation falls within the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute].) Quinn states that "defendants worked together and conspired to inflict [her] with panic attack symptoms and then use the [restraining order] to complain that a violation of the restraining order occurred."
"The anti-SLAPP statute enables defendants to quickly terminate meritless actions against them that are based on their constitutionally protected rights to speak freely and petition for redress of grievances." (Dziubla v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 147.) Litigants may use the special motion to strike at an early stage of the litigation. (Id. at pp. 147-148.)
To determine if the anti-SLAPP statute applies, the trial court follows a two-step process. The defendant must establish that the claims in the complaint arise from protected activity, and the plaintiff must then establish a probability of success on the merits of the claims. (Dziubla v. Piazza, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 148.)
In the first step, defendants must show that the claims they challenge are based on conduct arising from an act that furthers their speech or petition rights. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) This includes any "writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body." (Id., subd. (e)(2).) In the second step, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to establish minimal merit to defeat the motion to strike. (Dziubla v. Piazza, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 148.) Appellate courts independently review orders granting or denying a special motion to strike. (Ibid.)
Quinn did not establish the probability of prevailing on the merits of her abuse of process claims. Obtaining the restraining orders and seeking contempt orders for their violation are constitutionally protected acts "made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body." (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) Beltran obtained the 2019 and 2020 restraining orders prior to the filing of the first lawsuit in 2021. Thus the orders could not have given Beltran "a collateral advantage" in a lawsuit not yet filed.
II.
Quinn contends the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of her nolo contendere plea but not taking judicial notice of the evidence, documents, and pleadings in her first lawsuit.
The trial court did not err. Judicial notice of the nolo contendere plea has only contextual relevance to the anti-SLAPP motion here. It tends, however, to support Quinn's allegation that Beltran used the excessive animal noises to provoke her into violating the restraining orders. But the matter does not end there.
The first lawsuit concerns personal injury caused by excessive animal noises and is pending trial. The present lawsuit alleges an abuse of process based upon misuse of restraining orders to obtain "a collateral advantage" in the first lawsuit. The contents of the court file in the first lawsuit bear no relevance to proving the allegations of misuse of restraining orders in the present lawsuit. Quinn's arguments regarding judicial notice are without merit.
III.
Quinn argues that section 425.16 does not immunize Beltran's illegal acts of causing excessive animal noises. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060-1061 [discriminatory or retaliatory conduct not protected activity within anti-SLAPP law]; Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320 [illegal conduct not protected activity within anti-SLAPP law].)
A defendant may be precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike plaintiff's action if the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal "as a matter of law." (Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, 320.) The illegality as a matter of law requires a concession by defendant or conclusive evidentiary proof. (Ibid.) Quinn's argument is meritless because Beltran has not conceded his actions were illegal and conclusive evidentiary proof of illegality does not exist.
IV.
Quinn asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing her action because the complaint "mix[ed] allegations of tort" with complaints about restraining orders and police reports.
We independently review an order granting or denying a special motion to strike. (Dziubla v. Piazza, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 148.) As discussed, Quinn's complaint allegations relating to abuse of process fail to demonstrate a prima facie case that would enable her to prevail on the challenged claim. The restraining orders were issued by a court as were the contempt violations based upon Beltran's evidentiary proof. Obtaining the restraining orders and the contempt orders, of course, are protected activities within the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
V.
Quinn contends that the $17,200 award of attorney fees and costs is unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. She asserts that Beltran did not pay his attorney the amount of fees awarded, but a significantly lesser amount.
The trial court awarded Beltran mandatory attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c). This subdivision provides for mandatory attorney fees for a successful SLAPP defendant. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.) The trial court has broad discretion as the" 'experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.'" (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)
Here the trial court awarded attorney fees based upon the lodestar method: a base amount calculated from time reasonably spent and reasonable hourly compensation of the attorney, adjusted by various factors. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394-395.) The court considered that Beltran's attorney expended 40.8 hours filing an answer, appearing in court, consulting with his client, performing legal research, and preparing the anti-SLAPP motion. The attorney declared his hourly rate was $395, and submitted a detailed invoice describing the work performed, the time expended, and his legal experience. The court found the hourly rate and number of hours expended reasonable and we agree. (Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 22 [section 425.16, subdivision (c) is" 'broadly construed as to effectuate the legislative purpose of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit' "].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: YEGAN, J., CODY, J.