Quillen v. State of New York

21 Citing cases

  1. Lacey v. Albany Cnty

    38 A.D.3d 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 12 times

    While this protection "is not always sacrosanct, and upon the basis of a proper showing . . . may be released upon court order after an in camera inspection" ( People v McFadden, 178 Misc 2d 343, 345, affd 283 AD2d 1030), the statutory confidentiality accorded to these records will be safeguarded until after a hearing is held by Supreme Court with "all interested persons" (Social Services Law § 372 [a]). While the "parameters of the term 'all interested persons' has not been 'definitively defined'" ( Matter of Michelle HH., 18 AD3d 1075, 1076, quoting Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31, 33), we have stated that notice will be required "to . . . individuals, if they have attained majority" ( Quillen v State of New York, supra at 33). With John having attained majority at the time of the request, but having defaulted in this action, we decline to use the shield of CPLR 3105 as a sword to find a waiver of his rights under Social Services Law § 372 (4) (a); a finding of waiver must be "predicated on intent" ( Matter of Carla L., 45 AD2d 375, 381).

  2. In re Michelle HH.

    18 A.D.3d 1075 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 14 times

    The legal authority for petitioner to provide access to its confidential foster care records is provided in and limited by Social Services Law § 372 (4) (a). Specifically, that statute states that foster care records maintained by the Department of Social Services "shall be deemed confidential and shall be safeguarded from coming to the knowledge of and from inspection or examination by any person other than one authorized, by the department . . . or by a judge of the family court when such records are required for the trial of a proceeding in such court, after a notice to all interested persons and a hearing, to receive such knowledge or to make such inspection or examination" (Social Services Law § 372 [a] [emphasis added]). While the parameters of the term "all interested persons" has not been "definitively defined[,] . . . it seems clear that notice must be given, at the very least . . . to the Commissioner of Social Services" ( Quillen v. State of New York, 191 AD2d 31, 33). Moreover, the "disclosure of the type of records sought herein, in whatever court it is afforded, should be limited to what is shown to be necessary and should be accompanied by adequate safeguards to limit as much as possible the unnecessary loss of confidentiality" ( Matter of Carla L., 45 AD2d 376, 382).

  3. Wheeler v. Social Servs Commr

    233 A.D.2d 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 18 times
    Finding that "it is for the patient and no one else to decide whether to waive confidentiality"

    In the decisional law relating to the discovery of these records, it has often been the agencies and institutions that have sought to safeguard the confidentiality of the records of their residents/patients from the reach of various third persons such as litigants ( see, Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31; Matter of Wasserstein v Warwick State Training School for Boys, 54 Misc 2d 948), and even foster parents ( Matter of Louis F., 42 NY2d 260). Here, the question is complicated by the stance of Graham Windham, which has raised this claim of confidentiality not against third persons, but against the resident/patient herself.

  4. Apholz v. State

    # 2021-041-501 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Apr. 29, 2021)

    In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by correction officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2nd Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2nd Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]).

  5. Jones v. State

    # 2019-041-503 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jul. 9, 2019)

    In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by correction officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2d Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]). Claimant's trial testimony, as it described the identity of the officers involved in the events of July 16, 2013 and as it described the conduct/actions of specific officers that day, was inconsistent with and/or contradicted by previous representations he had made.

  6. Thompson v. State

    # 2019-041-501 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 26, 2019)

    In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by corrections officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2d Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]). The Court further notes that "[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees only if those acts were committed in furtherance of the employer's business and within the scope of employment" (N.X. v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 97 NY2d 247, 251 [2002]; see Riviello v Waldron, 47 NY2d 297, 302 [1979]).

  7. McFadden v. State

    # 2018-041-505 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Nov. 30, 2018)

    In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by correction officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2d Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]). CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL AND POST TRIAL DATE PROCEEDINGS

  8. Panezo v. State

    # 2016-041-508 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Sep. 30, 2016)

    In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by corrections officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2d Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]). A correctional facility superintendent has discretion to "provide for such measures as he may deem necessary or appropriate for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities" (see Correction Law § 137 [2] and § 18 [2]; see Matter of Shabazz v Portuondo, 260 AD2d 733 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 756).

  9. Strickland v. State

    # 2016-041-507 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Sep. 28, 2016)

    In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by corrections officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2d Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]). A correctional facility superintendent has discretion to "provide for such measures as he may deem necessary or appropriate for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities" (see Correction Law § 137 [2] and § 18 [2]; see Matter of Shabazz v Portuondo, 260 AD2d 733 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 756).

  10. Strickland v. State

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 32891 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2016)

    In claims involving inmate allegations of excessive force by corrections officers, the credibility of the witnesses is generally the dispositive factor (Davis v State of New York, 203 AD2d 234 [2d Dept 1994]). To determine whether the use of force was necessary and, if so, whether the force used was excessive or unreasonable, a court must examine the specific circumstances confronting the officers (see Wester v State of New York, 247 AD2d 468 [2d Dept 1998]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Quillen v State of New York, 191 AD2d 31 [3d Dept 1993]; Arnold v State of New York, 108 AD2d 1021 [3d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 723 [1985]). A correctional facility superintendent has discretion to "provide for such measures as he may deem necessary or appropriate for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities" (see Correction Law § 137 [2] and § 18 [2]; see Matter of Shabazz v Portuondo, 260 AD2d 733 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 756).