No court may interfere with [the district attorney general's] discretion to prosecute, and in the formulation of his decision, he or she is answerable to no one." Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tenn. 1978); see Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1995). Even though the legislature may enact procedures for the formation and operation of grand juries, neither it nor the courts, which themselves enable the activities of the grand juries, may "impede the inherent discretion and responsibilities of the office of district attorney general without violating Article VI, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution."
Indeed, to find otherwise would be to imply that the prosecuting official has little discretion. See State v. Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tenn. 1994) (noting that a district attorney general has, with constitutional limitations, "virtually unbridled discretion" and that "he or she is answerable to no one") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996) ("[T]he district attorney general's discretion in charging determinations is practically unbridled."); see also Linda, R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1149-50, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973) ("[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another."). The district court in Lott v. Burning Tree Club, a case mentioned above, addressed this agency question in a case with very similar facts:
"The District Attorney General’s discretion to seek a warrant, presentment, information, or indictment within its district is extremely broad and subject only to certain constitutional restraints." Id. (citing Superior Oil , 875 S.W.2d at 660 ; Dearborne v. State , 575 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tenn. 1978) ; Quillen v. Crockett , 928 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ). This Court observed in Superior Oil :
If the public was displeased with Hicks' choice of special prosecutor and events stemming therefrom, voters could voice their opinion at the polls. See Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (“If voters are in disagreement with a prosecutor's charging determinations, they have the ultimate veto at the ballot box.”). {30} Under the facts of this case, we conclude that District Attorney Martwick, as the duly appointed special prosecutor, stepped into the shoes of elected District Attorney Hicks for all matters relating to the prosecution of this specific case in accordance with Section 36–1–23.1.
The District Attorney General's discretion to seek a warrant, presentment, information, or indictment within its district is extremely broad and subject only to certain constitutional restraints. Superior Oil, 875 S.W.2d at 660; Dearborne v. State, 575 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tenn. 1978); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1995). The District Attorney General and only the District Attorney General can make the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution for an offense committed within his or her district.
Similarly, in Quillen v. Crockett, this court noted that "[i]f voters are in disagreement with a prosecutor's charging determinations, they have the ultimate veto at the ballot box." 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Nothing about these cases supports Defendant's assertion that he "has a right under Article VI, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution to have the locally elected [district attorney] evaluate his claims of newly discovered evidence" more than four decades after his conviction became final.
The State is represented by the district attorney general, who "is not an advocate for the victim of a crime or the witnesses for the State but is instead the representative of the sovereign state of Tennessee charged with 'safeguarding and advocating the rights of the people.'" State v. Johnson, 538 S.W.3d 32, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). The district attorney general and his staff "are expected to be impartial in the sense that they must seek the truth and not merely obtain convictions."
State v. Skidmore, 15 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)). However, if a prosecutor has probable cause to believe the accused committed the underlying offense, the decision to prosecute the accused rests entirely within the prosecutor's discretion, subject to certain constitutional limitations. Id. (citing State v. Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tenn. 1994); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). Here, we conclude that the facts before us do not create a rebuttable presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness because there is no "reasonable likelihood" of prosecutorial retaliation.
The prosecutor is not an advocate for the victim of a crime or the witnesses for the State but is instead the representative of the sovereign state of Tennessee charged with "safeguarding and advocating the rights of the people." Quillen v. Crockett , 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). "District attorneys general are officers of the executive branch, who are entrusted by the citizens of this state with the duty to seek justice."
However, if a prosecutor has probable cause to believe the accused committed the underlying offense, the decision to prosecute the accused rests entirely within the prosecutor's discretion, subject to certain constitutional limitations. Id. (citing State v. Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tenn. 1994); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). We review the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness for abuse of discretion.