Opinion
01 Civ. 10934 (LTS) (THK)
December 23, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this civil rights action, Plaintiff Miguel Quiles ("Quiles"), proceeding pro se, seeks damages for an alleged unlawful search and arrest, and for the use of excessive force during the arrest, by New York City detectives who are alleged to have been working in concert with the United States Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"). The action has been referred to this Court for general pretrial supervision.
In the original Complaint, filed more than one year ago, Plaintiff named as defendants a number of individuals and entities who had no apparent relationship to his claims and who, in some cases, were not suable entities (for example, the Superintendent of the New York City jails, the County of the Bronx, and the DEA). Moreover, plaintiff failed to effect timely service on most of the defendants. Numerous orders were entered regarding service of process, not just as a warning to Plaintiff about his obligations, but to provide assistance in effecting service. Moreover, at a conference held on October 4, 2002, the Court attempted to assist Plaintiff in focusing his claims. As a result, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint to name the United States as a defendant, in lieu of the DEA, and Plaihtiff withdrew his claims against the Superintendent of the New York City jails.
Service was finally effected on the defendants remaining in the action — the City of New York, Detectives Gilbert Lugo and Joseph Miraglia, and the United States. The New York City defendants have answered the Complaint, and the United States has been granted leave to move with respect to the Complaint. Pretrial discovery with respect to the claims against the municipal defendants has been proceeding; indeed, the deadline for the completion of that discovery was December 2, 2002.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff persists in obfuscating the proceedings, and causing undue delay, expense, and burden to all involved, by submitting vague and incomplete documents to the Court, making frivolous motions without filing and serving them, failing to serve defendant's counsel with documents that are submitted to the Court, and failing to comply with Court Orders. For example, the Court now has before it a Motion for a Default Judgment against the Bronx County District Attorney's Office ("DA's Office"). Plaintiff was never granted leave to file an Amended Complaint naming the DA's Office as a defendant, and Plaintiff did not file or timely serve the motion he submitted to the Court.
Similarly, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Court making reference to a discovery dispute and an attached exhibit that purportedly described discovery material he claimed to be seeking. See December 9, 2002 letter to the Court. No exhibit was actually attached to the letter to the Court or to defendant's counsel. Plaintiff is hereby directed to confer directly with defendant's counsel about the material he claims to have been denied, and if the dispute is not resolved, by January 6, 2003, shall set forth in a letter the specific information he seeks. Failure to do so shall result in a waiver of any remedies with respect to further discovery.
Plaintiff's Motion for a Default Judgment against the Bronx County District Attorney's Office is denied. The DA's Office is not a proper party in this action. It was not named as a defendant in Plaintiff's original Complaint. Although it was identified as a defendant in an Amended Complaint filed on October 9, 2002, that Complaint is a nullity, since Plaintiff never sought or received leave of Court to file it.
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend a pleading only once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading has been served. Otherwise, leave of court must be given. The Amended Complaint in which Plaintiff identified the DA's Office as a defendant was not filed until October 9, 2002. By that date, Plaintiff had already amended his Complaint once before. Moreover, a responsive pleading had been served by at least one of the defendants — the City of New York. See Answer, filed on July 9, 2002. Accordingly, Plaintiff was required to secure leave from this Court before filing his Amended Complaint. He did not do so. Indeed, in a Memorandum Endorsed Order dated October 30, 2002, this Court denied Plaintiff's ambiguous request to amend the Complaint once again, reminding him that a deadline had been set to complete pretrial discovery. See also Order, dated October 7, 2002 (all fact discovery with respect to claims against municipal defendants is to be completed by December 2, 2002).
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Bronx District Attorney's Office, and cannot do so now. The only mention of the District Attorney's Office in the Amended Complaint relates to a claim that in January 1999, Plaintiff had his bail revoked in response to evidence argued in state court by the DA's Office. See Amended Complaint ¶ 19. Plaintiff appears to contend that his bail was revoked without a proper hearing. The District Attorney's Office does not have responsibility for state court bail revocation procedures. Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits individuals from suing the District Attorney's Office, an arm of the state, for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from prosecutorial decisions. See Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908 (1984) (in absence of consent, suit against a state or one of its agencies is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1993); Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988). Even if Plaintiff had named as a defendant an individual district attorney, such individual would also enjoy absolute immunity from suit in his official capacity, see Ying Jing Gan, 996 F.2d at 529, as well as immunity from suit in his individual capacity, because prosecutorial actions in connection with a bail application are protected by absolute immunity. See Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1149 (2d Cir. 1995); cf. Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1209 (2d Cir. 1996). Finally, any claims against the DA's Office resulting from conduct in January 1999 is time-barred, as there is a three-year statute of limitations for actions brought under Section 1983. See Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1156.
In conclusion, Plaintiff's Motion for a Default Judgment against the Bronx DA's Office is denied, and any claims against the DA's office are dismissed.