Quick v. E. B. Kintner & Son

8 Citing cases

  1. Tokash v. General Baking Co.

    349 Mo. 767 (Mo. 1942)   Cited 18 times
    In Tokash, a baking company regularly employed a painter who, at the direction of the baking company manager, hired a second painter to assist in painting the exterior of the baking company building.

    (2) If plaintiff was in the employ of General Baking Company, the work of painting the exterior woodwork of the bakery building was of such casual nature as to exclude the employee from the provisions of the compensation law. Sec. 3693, R.S. 1939; McFall v. Barton, Mansfield Co., 333 Mo. 111, 61 S.W.2d 911; Sonnenberg v. Berg's Market, 227 Mo. App. 391, 55 S.W.2d 494; March v. Bernardin, 229 Mo. App. 246, 76 S.W.2d 706; Chamberlain v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 100 Vt. 284, 137 A. 326; Ray v. Commercial Acid Co., 227 S.W. 851; London Accident Co. v. Ind. Comm., 173 Cal. 642, 161 P. 2; Blood v. Ind. Comm., 30 Cal.App. 274, 157 P. 1140; Aurora Brewing Co. v. Ind. Board, 277 Ill. 142, 115 N.E. 207; Baer's Express Co. v. Ind. Board, 282 Ill. 44, 118 N.E. 412; Gibbons v. Roller Estates, 163 Tenn. 373, 43 S.W.2d 198; Lamont v. Intermountain Realty Co., 48 Wyo. 56, 41 P.2d 497; Orr v. Boise Cold Storage Co., 52 Idaho, 151, 12 P.2d 270; Quick v. Kintner Son, 113 Pa. Super. 108, 172 A. 189; Klumpp v. Ind. Comm., 107 Cal.App. 733, 291 P. 456. (3) The work of painting the exterior woodwork of the bakery building was not incidental to the business of baking bread.

  2. Pope v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

    54 Wyo. 266 (Wyo. 1939)   Cited 13 times

    See also Rabideau v. Cramer (Ida.) 81 P.2d 403; Williams v. Baptist Church (Pa.) 186 A. 168; Gaines v. Traders and General Ins. Co. (Tex.) 99 S.W.2d 984; Caldwell v. George Sproull Co., Inc. (La.) 164 So. 651; Quick v. E.B. Kintner Son (Pa.) 172 A. 189; Dancy v. Abraham Bros. Packing Co. (Tenn.) 102 S.W.2d 526. For the respondent there was a brief by Wm. O. Wilson and James O. Wilson of Cheyenne, and oral argument by Wm. O. Wilson.

  3. Jackson v. Cathcart Maxfield, Inc.

    276 N.W. 22 (Minn. 1938)   Cited 11 times

    " In addition to the cases cited and relied upon in the Billmayer case, the following are helpful: Lauzier v. Industrial Acc. Comm. 43 Cal.App. 725, 185 P. 870; Ford v. Industrial Acc. Comm. 53 Cal.App. 542, 200 P. 667; Edwards v. Industrial Acc. Comm. 129 Cal.App. 447, 18 P.2d 979; Oliphant v. Hawkinson, 192 Iowa, 1259, 183 N.W. 805, 33 A.L.R. 1433; Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 37 P.2d 50; Kaplan v. Gaskill, 108 Neb. 455, 187 N.W. 943; Fedak v. Dzialdowski, 113 Pa. Super. 104, 172 A. 187; Quick v. E. B. Kintner Son, 113 Pa. Super. 108, 172 A. 189; Sturman v. Industrial Comm. 203 Wis. 190, 232 N.W. 864, 234 N.W. 494; Vaudervort v. Industrial Comm. 203 Wis. 362, 234 N.W. 492. The Illinois cases cited by claimant such as Storrs v. Industrial Comm. 285 Ill. 595, 121 N.E. 267, and other cases, are not of help here.

  4. Plankinton v. Schurr et ux

    137 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958)   Cited 3 times

    Whether he had then completed all of the work to be done by him is of no moment, for even if there was other work for claimant which would have required two additional weeks, as he contends, the term of the employment was still of very limited duration. Claimant's employment was casual in character as a matter of law and he therefore may not be permitted to recover. Cf. Magalski v.Olyphant Boro., 150 Pa. Super. 216, 27 A.2d 280; Fedakv. Dzialdowski, 113 Pa. Super. 104, 172 A. 187; Quick v.E.B. Kintner Son et al., 113 Pa. Super. 108, 172 A. 189. Judgment reversed and here entered for the defendants.

  5. Butera v. Western Ice & Utilities Co.

    14 A.2d 219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940)   Cited 7 times
    In Butera v. Western Ice and Utilities Company, 140 Pa. Super. 329, 14 A.2d 219 (1940), the Superior Court held that where a carpenter was originally hired to perform work by one corporation and was thereafter engaged by a second corporation, both corporations having common stockholders and being under the same management with a common superintendent, the relationship between the corporations did not affect the nature of employment with the first corporation and change the casual character of that employment.

    It is equally clear from the terms of the original hiring, that the employment at the outset was casual in character, for claimant was engaged to work by the day and for one particular job of limited duration and was injured within one month from the date of hiring. Quick v. E.B. Kintner Son et al., 113 Pa. Super. 108, 172 A. 189. Conceding this, it is contended by claimant that the scope of the employment as originally agreed upon, was later enlarged from casual to regular employment and that while claimant was working in the plant at Fredricktown, he was engaged to do additional similar work in other plants operated by his employer in Fredricktown and neighboring communities, the employment to follow the completion of the work under the original contract of hiring. The controlling question, therefore, is narrowed to this: Is there substantial evidence, sufficient to sustain the conclusion that there was a continuing agreement to serve defendant corporation, with a fair prospect of additional employment for a reasonable period in the future after the completion of the work under the original hiring? If the scope of the employment was so extended, the employment was not casual in character.

  6. Ronan v. Eddy

    136 Pa. Super. 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939)   Cited 3 times

    No reason can be found for concluding that the owner of a hotel is pursuing his business, within the meaning of the law, when he causes the rooms to be occasionally painted and decorated, although it is usual to have work of that nature done from time to time." See, also, Quick v. E.B. Kintner Son et al., 113 Pa. Super. 108, 172 A. 189. In Dunlap v. Paradise Camp, 101 Pa. Super. 339, affirmed by the Supreme Court ( 305 Pa. 516, 158 A. 265), the defendant conducted a summer camp and the claimant was engaged in work that was "part of the normal operations which constituted it."

  7. Williams v. Baptist Church

    186 A. 168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936)   Cited 22 times

    Such circumstances establish the relation of master and servant, but it does not follow that the injuries were compensable. By section 104 of the Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, 77 P. S. § 22, an employee is excluded from the benefits of the act "whose employment is casual in character and not in the regular course of business of the employer." An employment is casual in character where it is occasional, irregular or incidental as distinguished from regular and continuous, and an employment is in the regular course of the business of the employer only where it has reference to the normal operations which constitute the habitual or regular occupation that the employer is engaged in with an end to winning a livelihood or some gain, excluding incidental or casual operations arising out of the transaction of that business: Fedakv. Dzialdowski, 113 Pa. Super. 104, 107, 172 A. 187; Quickv.E.B. Kintner Son et al., 113 Pa. Super. 108, 172 A. 189; Passarelli v. Monacelli et al., 121 Pa. Super. 32, 183 A. 65. Applying these rules we find claimant's employment to be both casual and not in the regular course of the business of the employer. He was hired only when the work was necessary, on irregular occasions, and the repairing or improving of properties, owned by a church from which it receives income, in no way associated with the church work, cannot be regarded as work done in the course of the employer's business.

  8. Passarelli v. Monacelli

    183 A. 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936)   Cited 10 times

    In the recent case of Fedak v. Dzialdowski, supra, in an opinion by Judge BALDRIGE, we find a resumé of authorities dealing with this question which we deem unnecessary to cite in this opinion. On the same day that the opinion in the Fedak case was filed, Judge BALDRIGE filed an opinion in the case of Quick v. E.B. Kintner Son et al., 113 Pa. Super. 108, 172 A. 189, wherein it was held that where defendants engaged in the butcher business employed a carpenter to enlarge their storeroom and to construct for renting purposes two apartments on the second floor of their building and the carpenter sustained an injury, he was not entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act because his work was casual and not in the regular course of the defendant's business. The work of repairing or replacing a curbstone on the street abutting defendant's business premises undoubtedly was an improvement to the premises but was not within the regular course of defendant's business of trucking and warehousing.