Opinion
CV 04-07532-RSWL(MLGx)
10-13-2011
Alvaro Quezada, Petitioner, v. Al K. Scribner, Respondent.
ORDER re: Respondent's
Motion for Review of
United States Magistrate
Judge's Partial Denial
of Respondent's Motion
to Depart From Mandate
[98]
On October 4, 2011, Respondent Al K. Scribner's ("Respondent") Motion for Review of United States Magistrate Judge's Partial Denial of Respondent's Motion to Depart From Mandate came on for regular calendar before the Court [98]. The Court having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion and having considered all arguments presented to the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
The Court hereby OVERRULES Respondent's Motion and AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge's order.
I. BACKGROUND
This Action stems from a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Alvaro Quezada ("Petitioner") on September 10, 2004 [1]. This Court originally denied Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 21, 2007. However, on August 18, 2010, the Ninth Circuit remanded Petitioner's Writ back to this Court and issued a mandate for an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of new evidence pertaining to Petitioner's Brady violation claim [65]. In response, Respondent filed a Motion with Magistrate Judge Marc L. Goldman to stop the hearing and depart from the Ninth Circuit's Mandate pursuant to Supreme Court precedent [92]. Magistrate Judge Goldman, however, issued an Order partially denying Respondent's Motion, finding that Pinholster does not apply to Petitioner's Brady violation claim because the Superior Court did not reject the Brady violation claim on the merits [97]. On September 2, 2011, Respondent filed this present Motion for Review of the Magistrate's Partial Denial of Respondent's Motion to Depart from Mandate [98].
Cullen v. Pinholster, ---- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (Apr. 4, 2011) and Walker v. Martin, ---- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (Feb. 23, 2011).
The Supreme Court in Cullen v. Pinholster held that a federal court's review of a state court's habeas corpus decision is "limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." 131 S. Ct. at 1398. The Pinholster Court explicitly noted that its holding only applied to habeas corpus claims that "fall within the scope of § 2254(d)," meaning claims adjudicated on the merits of the federal claim in state court proceedings. Id. at 1400-01.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim or defense is referred to a magistrate judge" and the magistrate judge issues an order stating the decision, a party may object to the magistrate judge's order by filing a motion for the district judge to overrule the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(a). In reviewing the order from the magistrate judge, "[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(a).
To conclude that a magistrate judge is "clearly erroneous, the district court must arrive at a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1998)(quoting Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 130 F.R.D. 507 (D.D.C. 1990)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not clearly err in concluding that the Superior Court disposed of Petitioner's Brady violation claim solely on procedural grounds.
Upon review, the Court finds that the language of the Superior Court's decision is in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's ruling that the Superior Court did not rule on the merits. More specifically, the Superior Court was explicit in rejecting Petitioner's Brady violation claim as untimely and hence procedurally barred. At the beginning of its ruling, the Superior Court stated in pertinent part that:
Petitioner contends that he has met a timeliness exception by virtue of recent discovery of new evidence. . . . As discussed subsequently, [Petitioner] fails to demonstrate the 'constitutional magnitude' necessary to be granted an exception. This petition is not timely."Resp. Mot. at Ex. B. at 22 (emphasis added). The Court finds that this excerpt makes it clear that the Superior Court denied Petitioner's Brady habeas claim as untimely and not within the "constitutional magnitude" exception to timeliness.
The constitutional magnitude exception requires that the "error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner." In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998).
Respondent argues that the Superior Court's decision should be viewed as containing two alternate rulings, one on procedural grounds and one on the merits. To support its argument, Respondent highlights various passages that allegedly indicate that the Superior Court made a ruling on the merits. When read in isolation, the passages highlighted by Respondent may be misinterpreted as an analysis on the merits given that the standard for proof for the "constitutional magnitude" exception to timeliness is similar to a discussion of the merits of a habeas claim. The Court finds, however, that when read in the context of the Superior Court's decision as a whole, these passages can only be interpreted to be a discussion of the "constitutional magnitude" exception to timeliness. More specifically, all these passages follow the Superior Court's explicit statement that the "constitutional magnitude" exception will be "discussed subsequently." Resp. Mot. at Ex. B. at 22
To prove an error of constitutional magnitude occurred, "the petitioner would have to persuade the court that had the excluded evidence been presented, he would have been acquitted or convicted of a lesser offense. As is required when newly discovered evidence is the basis for a habeas corpus petition, the evidence must be such that it would 'undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.'" Clark, 5 Cal.4th at 797, n.32 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246 (1990)).
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In sum, the Court finds that the language of the Superior Court's decision supports the Magistrate Judge's ruling.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge was not clearly erroneous in deciding that the Superior Court made a ruling solely on procedural grounds and that Pinholster does not apply. As such, the Court OVERRULES Respondent's objections to the Magistrate Judge's order and AFFIRMS the Magistrate Judge's order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior, U.S. District Court Judge