The plaintiffs understandably attempt to overcome the clarity of the durational clause. First, they rely upon Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks North America Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan, 651 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2011). They contend the decision stands for the broad proposition that "linking eligibility" for retiree healthcare benefits to "an event that would almost certainly occur after the expiration of the agreement signal[s] the parties' intent[ion] to continue retirement health benefits notwithstanding expiration" of the current CBA.
However, the dissent fails to recognize that these provisions are similar to provisions at issue in Tackett ; that Tackett rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that these provisions "indicate[ ] an intent to vest retirees with lifetime benefits," Tackett , 574 U.S. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 933 ; and that Reese , 583 U.S. at ––––, 138 S.Ct. at 765, 763, held that "the inferences that this Court rejected in Tackett " cannot be "used to render a collective-bargaining agreement ambiguous ...." The dissent also relies on Alday v. Raytheon Co. , 693 F.3d 772, 785 (C.A. 9, 2012), and Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks North America Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan , 651 F.3d 437, 441 (C.A. 4, 2011), for the proposition that an "ambiguity can arise ‘where a CBA links eligibility for a particular right "to an event that would almost certainly occur after the expiration of the agreement" ... [because] such linkage "signals the parties' intent to continue retirement benefits notwithstanding expiration." ’ " (Alteration in minority opinion.)
The Retirees resist this contention, asserting that it improperly reads a single phrase in isolation. See Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan , 651 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). They assert that the Cap Letters and other provisions of the CBA evince an intent to vest the retiree health benefits.
The Retirees resist this contention, asserting that it improperly reads a single phrase in isolation. See Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan , 651 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). They assert that the Cap Letters and other provisions of the CBA evince an intent to vest the retiree health benefits.
The Seventh Amendment provides: Although the Fourth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, it noted in a footnote to Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan, 651 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2011) that the defendants had argued on appeal that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial on their LMRA claim. 651 F.3d at 442. The court did not address the issue, and instead stated "because we have already determined that the retirees are entitled to the relief they received below as a matter of law based on their LMRA claim, and because we 'can affirm on any basis fairly supported by the record,' Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 222 (4th Cir. 2002), we see no reason to overturn the judgment."
When the Fourth Circuit interpreted a CBA that required the employer "to make a $1.585 million contribution to [a benefits trust] on the very last day of the 2005 CBA's term," the court determined that it would "require[] an overactive imagination" to contend that the trust expired with the CBA. Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan, 651 F.3d 437, 441 (4th Cir. 2011). The employer here committed to making a substantial payment to buy out an employee's retiree medical insurance up until the very day that the CBA expired.
In our view, the proper inquiry is whether Capitol failed to state a claim for breach of contract. See Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan, 651 F.3d 437, 442 n.* (4th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e can affirm on any basis fairly supported by the record." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
To give just one example, both the Ninth and the Fourth Circuits found ambiguity where a CBA linked eligibility for a benefit "to an event that would almost certainly occur after the expiration of the agreement." Alday v. Raytheon Co., 693 F.3d 772, 785 (9th Cir. 2012); Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan, 651 F.3d 437, 441 (4th Cir. 2011). We should not rush headlong past mile markers set up by our sister circuits.
When interpreting a contract, we look at the agreement's language to determine the parties' intent. Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan, 651 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). We must read the contract "to give effect to all its provisions and to render them consistent with each other."
To the extent that Evans sought to directly challenge the state court's judgment in federal court, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims. See Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., 827 F.3d 314, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2016) (discussing application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine). Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar Evans' due process claim, we affirm on the ground that Evans failed to state a viable claim as to the named defendants. See Quesenberry v. Volvo Trucks N. Am. Retiree Healthcare Benefit Plan, 651 F.3d 437, 442 n.* (4th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e can affirm on any basis fairly supported by the record." (internal quotation marks omitted)).