Where, as here, a written contract is signed in the name of a party who happens to be acting as an agent, but the contract gives no indication that any agency exists or that the party is signing other than as a principal or with any qualifications, the agent is bound even though the other contracting party knows the identity of his principal. Queiroli v. Whitesides, 206 S.W. 122, 123 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ); American Nat. Bank v. American Loan and Mortgage Co., 228 S.W. 169, 171 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); American Petrofina Company of Texas v. Bryan, 519 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1975, no writ). See also John Minder Son v. L.D. Schreiber Co., 73 F. Supp. 477, 480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).

The distinction between the two types of provisions (arbitration and appraisement) has been considered in Texas in the case of Huntington Corporation v. Inwood Construction Co., Tex.App., 348 S.W.2d 442, as follows: "`A provision in an executory contract that any disputes arising out of the contract are to be settled by arbitration is against public policy in attempting to oust the courts of jurisdiction, and when such a provision is invoked for that purpose it will be held void.' 6 Tex.Jur.2d § 20, et seq., pp. 56, 57, 58; citing Scottish Union National Insurance Co. v. Clancy, 71 Tex. 5, 8 S.W. 630; American Central Insurance Co. v. Bass, 90 Tex. 380, 38 S.W. 1119; Queirali v. Whitesides, Tex. Civ.App., 206 S.W. 122; Dozier v. City of Gatesville, Tex.Civ.App., 4 S.W.2d 131; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 59, A.F.L. v. Whitley Elec. Service Co., Tex.Civ.App., 278 S.W.2d 560; Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 276. * * * And in this connection see 135 A.L.R., p. 79 headed `Validity of agreement to submit all future questions to arbitration'.

The fact that a person is under an agency relation to another which is disclosed does not prevent him from becoming personally liable where the terms of the contract clearly establish the personal obligation. Queiroli v. Whitesides, 206 S.W. 122 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1918, no writ) . Something else would be presented if the Appellees had pled, proved and sought equitable relief. We hold that the parol evidence or exclusionary rule prohibited the evidence offered which varied and contradicted the terms of this guaranty.

`A provision in an executory contract that any disputes arising out of the contract are to be settled by arbitration is against public policy in attempting to oust the courts of jurisdiction, and when such a provision is invoked for that purpose it will be held void.' 6 Tex.Jur.2d Sec. 20, et seq., pp. 56, 57, 58; citing Scottish Union National Insurance Co. v. Clancy, 71 Tex. 5, 8 S.W. 630; American Central Insurance Co. v. Bass, 90 Tex. 380, 38 S.W. 1119; Queiroli v. Whitesides, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W. 122; Dozier v. City of Gatesville, Tex.Civ.App., 4 S.W.2d 131; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 59, A.F.L. v. Whitley Elec. Service Co., Tex.Civ.App., 278 S.W.2d 560; Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 276.

Dozier v. City of Gatesville (Tex.Civ.App.) 4 S.W.2d 131; Queiroli v. Whitesides (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 122 Moreover, the record shows that the reason Cocke did not submit to arbitration was because he had sold his business to Nelson Simpson before the matter of arbitration came up for consideration. The third issue inquiring whether, if the films had been tendered to Nelson Simpson, to whom defendant had sold his picture show, before the complaint was filed, would said films have been accepted by Nelson Simpson, was a matter foreign to the rights of either party, and that issue, together with issue No. 4, are immaterial.

"We are convinced that it is utterly against public policy to permit bargaining in this state about depriving courts of jurisdiction. In Queiroli v. Whitesides (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 122, 123, where the contract contained a clause to the effect that any dispute arising out of such contract is to be settled by arbitration, the San Antonio court held that "such a provision is contrary to public policy and will not oust the jurisdiction of the courts. Ruling Case Law, vol. 2, p. 360; Corpus Juris, vol. 5, p. 42, §§ 68, 69; Elliott on Contracts, § 726.

"It has become thoroughly settled at English law that a provision in a contract that the entire subject-matter of disputes thereunder shall be submitted to arbitration cannot be interposed as a defense to an action on the contract, and the same view has been taken by the American courts." The rule so announced is also supported by the following authorities: American Central Insurance Co. v. Bass Bros., 90 Tex. 380, 382, 38 S.W. 1119; Florida Athletic Club v. Hope Lumber Co., 18 Tex. Civ. App. 161, 44 S.W. 10, 14, and authorities there cited; Bell v. Campbell (Tex.Civ.App.) 143 S.W. 953, 956 (writ refused); Queiroli v. Whitesides (Tex.Civ.App.) 206 S.W. 122, 123; El Paso S.W. R. Co. v. Eichel (Tex.Civ.App.) 130 S.W. 922, 946, par. 21 (writ refused); 2 R.C.L. p. 360, § 11.

This court has recently held that a citation returnable to the term fixed by the law in force at the time of its issuance is valid, and that the clause of an act changing the term of court which provides that all process returnable to the term theretofore fixed by law should be returnable to the new term had the effect of making the citation returnable to the new term. Queiroli v. Simon Dunlap, 206 S.W. 123; Queiroli v. Whitesides, 206 S.W. 122. The act under consideration in this case contains a similar clause, but none purporting to validate process invalid at the time of its issuance because it stated a time for holding court not fixed by any law then in force.

We conclude that the court did not err in overruling the demurrer. Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 796; Queiroli v. Whitesides, 206 S.W. 122, and cases therein cited; McMurray v. McMurray, 67 Tex. 665, 4 S.W. 357. It is contended in the second assignment that the facts do not support the judgment, and the proposition is to the effect that, as the failure of appellee to appear and answer was not chargeable to fraud or misrepresentation on the part of appellant, the judgment should be reversed. For statement, reference is made to that under the first assignment, which, however, does not contain any of the testimony adduced on the issue of diligence, nor state that appellee's testimony was not in accordance with the allegations contained in his petition.

The only questions remaining for us to consider are: Did defendants show a sufficient excuse for the failure to file an answer by October 13, 1917, and did they plead such a meritorious defense as would require the trial court to vacate the default judgment? The facts and pleadings presented that concern these two questions are precisely the same as those fully stated in the opinion disposing of the case of Joe Queiroli et al. v. II. R. Whitesides, 206 S.W. 122, to-day rendered by this court, and, as therein held, we hold that there was sufficient excuse for the delay, but that the motion failed to present a meritorious defense, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgment is affirmed.