Opinion
No. CV 04 5000008
March 23, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE #110 MOTION TO DISMISS
FACTS
On September 20, 2004, the plaintiff, Quality Distribution Transplastics, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, filed a three-count complaint alleging negligence against the defendants, Central Construction Industries, LLC (Central Construction), Today's Construction, LLC and Impact Superior Plastics. This action arises out of injuries and losses allegedly sustained by one of the plaintiff's former employees, a Massachusetts resident, from an accident that occurred during his employment. Subsequently, the plaintiff alleges that it has become obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits to said former employee pursuant to Massachusetts law. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleges that it is entitled to reimbursement from all three defendants for amounts it has paid or will become obligated to pay to its former employee as a result of the accident.
Counts one, two and three allege negligence against Central Construction Industries, LLC (Central Construction), Today's Construction, LLC and Impact Superior Plastics, respectively.
The plaintiff alleges that on September 6, 2002, its employee, Dwayne Deed, sustained serious bodily injury when he fell down a twelve-foot shear edge/hole while delivering plastic pellets to a customer in Putnam, Connecticut.
On December 21, 2004, Central Construction filed a motion to dismiss the first count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging negligence, accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law, on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Central Construction argues that the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act, § 31-293, by its terms, limits recovery to the payment of Connecticut workers' compensation benefit payments. Furthermore, Central Construction maintains that although the Massachusetts statute governing workers' compensation benefits, namely, Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 152, Section 15, provides for recovery from third parties, the remedy is available exclusively to the insurer or employee, not the employer. The plaintiff has not filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
It is well-settled that "[a] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442, 804 A.2d 152 (2002). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 264 Conn. 766, 774, 826 A.2d 138 (2003). "A possible absence of subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed and decided whenever the issue is raised. The parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent . . . Ordinarily, a challenge to the court's jurisdiction is raised by the filing of a motion to dismiss. However, [w]henever a lack of jurisdiction to entertain a particular proceeding comes to a court's notice, the court can dismiss the proceeding upon its own motion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 192-93, 676 A.2d 831 (1996).
Central Construction moves to dismiss count one of the plaintiff's complaint alleging negligence. In support of its motion, Central Construction argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits because the plaintiff cannot recover under Connecticut law. Central Construction specifically maintains that the plaintiff is not eligible for reimbursement under the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act because the plaintiff did not pay benefits under said statute. Moreover, Central Construction contends that the plaintiff, as an employer, is not entitled to recover from a third party for payments paid under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation statute.
Pursuant to the Connecticut General Statues § 31-293, the plaintiff cannot recover any amount that it has paid or will become obligated to pay under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation statute. Section 31-293 explicitly restricts recovery to those employers that have paid benefits under the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has determined that "[t]his statute is applicable only to Connecticut employers obliged to pay benefits under the Connecticut Workmen's Compensation Act." (Emphasis in original.) Greene v. Verven, 203 F.Sup. 607, 611 (D.Conn. 1962). The court further highlighted that "[t]he Connecticut statute is for the benefit and protection of Connecticut employers and workmen's compensation insurers operating under the Connecticut Workmen's Compensation Act. It is inapplicable to non-Connecticut employers operating under non-Connecticut workmen's compensation laws." Id. The Superior Court also dismissed a claim where a party brought an action seeking reimbursement for benefits paid pursuant to New Hampshire law because "[S]ection 31-293a only provides an employer the right to intervene where the benefits paid were made through the Connecticut State Workers' Compensation Act . . . [The] court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the intervening complaint so that it must be dismissed." (Citations omitted.) Stoker v. Marriott Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 89 0369701 (February 3, 1994, Corradino, J.) ( 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 47).
General Statutes § 31-293 provides in relevant part: "(a)When any injury for which compensation is payable under the provisions of this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in a person other than an employer who has complied with the requirements of subsection (b) of Section 31-284, a legal liability to pay damages for the injury, the injured employee may claim compensation under the provisions of this chapter, but the payment or award of compensation shall not affect the claim or right of action of the injured employee against such person, but the injured employee may proceed at law against such person to recover damages for the injury; and any employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, having paid, or having become obligated to pay, compensation under the provisions of this chapter may bring an action against such person to recover any amount that he has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to the injured employee."
In the present case, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff made payments pursuant to the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act. Based on prior case law and the unambiguous language of § 31-293, the plaintiff is not permitted to recover from Central Construction because the plaintiff did not pay benefits under the provisions of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act.
Notwithstanding that the plaintiff does not properly raise a claim under Massachusetts law as delineated in Practice Book § 10-3, it is noted that the plaintiff would not be entitled to reimbursement pursuant to the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act. Under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 152, Section 15, an employer cannot recover from a third party for compensation benefits paid to an employee. Alternatively, the statute only provides that employees and insurers can seek said reimbursement from third parties. As such, the plaintiff, as an employer, would not be eligible to recover from Central Construction according to the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act.
Practice Book § 10-3 provides:
(a) When any claim made in a complaint, cross complaint, special defense, or other pleading is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number.
(b) A party to an action who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this state shall give notice in his or her pleadings or other reasonable written notice.
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 152, Section 15 provides in relevant part: "Where the injury for which compensation is payable was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the insured to pay damages in respect thereof, the employee shall be entitled, without election, to the compensation and other benefits provided under this chapter. Either the employee or insurer may proceed to enforce the liability of such person, but the insurer may not do so unless compensation has been paid in accordance with Sections seven, eight, ten A, eleven C, twelve or nineteen nor until seven months following the date of such injury."
For the foregoing reasons, Central Construction's motion to dismiss count one of the plaintiff's complaint is granted.
Riley, J.