Opinion
No. CV03 0284533-S
June 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #110
On January 23, 2004, The plaintiff, Quality Auto Body, Inc., filed a revised two-count complaint against the defendant, Progressive Insurance. This action arises out of monetary damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's refusal to pay the plaintiff's posted hourly labor rate for services rendered to an individual involved in an automobile accident with one of the defendant's insured.
The plaintiff initiated this action on April 3, 2003, as a small claims proceeding. Upon motion of the defendant pursuant to Practice Book § 24-21, this matter was transferred to the regular docket of the Superior Court.
In count one, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On February 27, 2003, Edward Ouellette brought his automobile to the plaintiff for repairs following an accident with one of the defendant's insured, Ruth Hall. The defendant, through its duly authorized agents, advised Ouellette that it would pay for the necessary repairs. At the direction of Ouellette, the plaintiff completed the authorized repairs. On February 27, 2003, the plaintiff's posted hourly labor rate was $65. The defendant refused to pay the plaintiff's posted hourly rate for the work performed on Ouellette's automobile, and unilaterally cut the plaintiff's posted hourly rate to $42. The plaintiff alleges an out-of-pocket loss of $392.74, plus tax of $23.56, for a total claimed loss of $416.30. Count two incorporates the allegations in count one and further alleges that the defendant's conduct is in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).
On February 9, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to strike both counts one and two, supported by a memorandum of law, on the ground that both counts fail to state a legally sufficient cause of action and, further, that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit. "If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 485, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). Although the issue of standing has been raised in the defendant's motion to strike, rather than as typically raised in a motion to dismiss, the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may "be raised at any stage in the proceedings." Id., 486 "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 552, 698 A.2d 245 (1997).
"Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy . . . The requirement of directness between the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim at issue." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 486. A plaintiff is not the proper party when the injuries claimed are "remote, indirect, or derivative with respect to the defendant's conduct." Ganim v. Smith Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 347, 780 A.2d 98 (2001).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring a direct cause of action in counts one and two because there is no allegation that the defendant breached any contract or agreement between it and the defendant. The defendant further maintains that the plaintiff is neither an insured of the defendant, a party to any contract of insurance that may have existed between the defendant's insured and the defendant at the time of the loss, nor a third-party beneficiary thereto. The defendant also points to the absence of an allegation in the complaint that Ouellette assigned any of his rights or claims to the plaintiff and that, "even if he had, the plaintiff would still be unable to maintain a direct cause of action against the defendant because Edward Ouellette was never an insured of the defendant and cannot himself maintain a direct cause of action against the defendant."
Additionally, in support of its motion to strike the plaintiff's second count for a violation of CUTPA, the defendant argues that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring a CUTPA claim. Specifically, the defendant maintains that, in light of the plaintiff's decision to incorporate into count two all of the allegations underlying count one, the only theoretical basis on which count two may be premised is an alleged unfair settlement practice on the part of the defendant. Because the plaintiff is a third-party claimant rather than an insured, the defendant contends that the plaintiff cannot establish a direct cause of action under CUTPA.
"A motion to dismiss [for lack of standing] tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442, 804 A.2d 152 (2002). In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. Brookridge District Ass'n v. Planning Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 611, 793 A.2d 215 (2002). Reading the instant complaint in the light most favorable to the pleader, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiff's standing to bring this action is implicated. "Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 485. The plaintiff has alleged it, individually, sustained injury, in the sense of damage or loss, as a result of the defendant's conduct. The court is not without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's complaint.
Whether the plaintiff, however, has sufficiently stated a cause of action to overcome the defendant's motion to strike is another matter. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498. "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 667, 748 A.2d 834 (2000). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003).
The plaintiff alleges in both counts of its complaint that it repaired Ouellette's automobile "pursuant to the direction of [Ouellette]." It further alleges that the defendant advised Ouellette that the defendant would pay for the repairs to Ouellette's car. There is no allegation in the plaintiff's complaint, however, that any agreement or relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant. As the defendant points out in its supporting memorandum of law, the plaintiff does not allege that it is an insured of the defendant or that it was a party to any contract of insurance that may have existed between the defendant's insured and the defendant at the time of the loss. There is no allegation nor can one be implied that the defendant owed any duty to plaintiff. Moreover, the plaintiff's complaint lacks any allegation that Ouellette or the defendant's insured assigned his or her rights or claims to the plaintiff. A broad reading of the complaint indicates only that any damage the plaintiff may have suffered is damnum absque iniuria.
The plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action in either count one or count two of its revised complaint. The motion to strike both counts is granted.
BY THE COURT
Tanzer, Judge