4. Appellant Jarrett next asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment on appellees' claim for assault and battery. Although there is no allegation or evidence of reasonable apprehension of "violent injury from the unlawful act of [Jarrett]," Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 57 ( 115 S.E.2d 699) (1960), "`[i]n the interest of one's right of inviolability of one's person, any unlawful touching is a physical injury to the person and is actionable.' [Cit.]" Irwin v. Arrendale, 117 Ga. App. 1, 5 (4) ( 159 S.E.2d 719) (1967).

" Under Code Ann. § 105-602: "Any violent injury or attempt to commit a physical injury illegally upon a person is a tort for which damages may be recovered." In Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 56 ( 115 S.E.2d 699) (1960), this court examined the definition of assault and held: "It seems to be a preferable correlation, and one completely compatible with the expressions of our own courts to say that where all the apparent circumstances, reasonably viewed, are such as to lead a person reasonably to apprehend a violent injury from the unlawful act of another, there is an assault." (Emphasis supplied.)

See the preceding factual summation for the allegations which obviously are sufficient to state a cause of action for assault and battery within the following rules: ". . . Where all the apparent circumstances, reasonably viewed, are such as to lead a person reasonably to apprehend a violent injury from the unlawful act of another, there is an assault." Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 56 (1) ( 115 S.E.2d 699). "Any act of physical violence (and the law will not draw a line between different degrees of violence), inflicted on the person of another, which is not necessary, is not privileged, and which constitutes a harmful or offensive contact, constitutes an assault and battery." Brown v. State, 57 Ga. App. 864, 867 ( 197 S.E. 82).

Halpern v. Strickland, 98 Ga. App. 890, 891 ( 107 S.E.2d 227). However, where a verdict is demanded for one party and the trior of facts finds for the other party a new trial will be granted, Wardlaw v. Frederick, 13 Ga. App. 594 ( 79 S.E. 523); Wright v. Bell, 26 Ga. App. 710 ( 106 S.E. 812), or, on proper motion, a judgment non obstante veredicto will be granted. Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53 ( 115 S.E.2d 699); Kicklighter v. Kicklighter, 217 Ga. 54 (1) ( 121 S.E.2d 122); Hearn v. Leverette, 213 Ga. 286 ( 99 S.E.2d 147); Minor v. Fincher, 213 Ga. 365 ( 99 S.E.2d 78); Bullard v. Bullard, 214 Ga. 122 ( 103 S.E.2d 570). Where the testimony of a party who offers himself as a witness is self-contradictory, vague or equivocal it must be construed most strongly against him, Steele v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 123 Ga. 237 (1) ( 51 S.E. 438); Shepard v. Chappell, 29 Ga. App. 6 ( 113 S.E. 23); Clifton v. Dunn, 92 Ga. App. 520, 522 ( 88 S.E.2d 710), and the appellate court, under such circumstances, will decide that a verdict is demanded against such party if that version of his testimony most unfavorable to him shows that he is not entitled to recover.

1. For the reasons hereinafter given, the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 55 ( 115 S.E.2d 699). Neither was there error in overruling the motion for new trial on the general grounds.

"As we understand the opinion in the case of Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co. v. Brackin, 215 Ga. 225 ( 109 S.E.2d 782), the Supreme Court held in substance that the purpose of the provision for judgments notwithstanding verdicts is to bring an end to litigation where under the pleadings and evidence the verdict for the party moving for such a judgment is demanded as a matter of law." Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53 ( 115 S.E.2d 699). We turn, then, for initial consideration to the petition, and particularly to its specifications of negligence.

When the record clearly reveals that the decedent was engaged in conduct which precludes coverage under a policy exclusion, there is no question for the jury. Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 58, 115 S.E.2d 699 (1960). Under the civil, preponderance of evidence standard, a reasonable jury could not find otherwise.

There was even more than a controversy, a wrangle or a wordy contest. In Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 115 S.E.2d 699, the Georgia Court of Appeals had before it an accident policy excluding coverage if death resulted from an 'altercation.' A reference to this case appears in 86 A.L.R.2d 443, 465, wherein it is stated, '* * * so that taking the language of the insured spoken to the third party, and considering her words both profane and abusive, there appeared to be no possible conclusion other than there was not only an altercation, but a heated altercation, in which the insured was the most active participant until such time as she sustained two gunshot wounds by one of the other parties to the wrangle, this clearly being an altercation.'