Opinion
C. A. 4:24-3071-JD-SVH
09-12-2024
Muhammad W.K.A. Qadir, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles; DMV Director Kevin Shwedo; Anna B. Wicker; Shirley Rivers; John Doe; and John Doe Officers, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Muhammad W.K.A. Qadir (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), DMV Director Kevin Shwedo, Anna B. Wicker, Shirley Rivers, John Doe, and John Doe Officers (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed without leave for further amendment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges he was given a traffic violation for littering in 1997. [ECF No. 10 at 9]. He claims the traffic ticket listed the place of hearing as a post office box and there was no hearing when he appeared at the post office. Id. He alleges he was tried in abstentia by an unknown magistrate judge and received notice of the suspension of his license from the DMV. Id. at 9. Plaintiff states that the DMV entered the indefinite license suspension based on false information. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges he requested a rehearing by letter to defendant Wicker, who he identifies as manager of records of the SCDMV, but Wicker responded that the DMV could not provide a hearing because the conviction was in a court of law. Id. at 12. Plaintiff claims that, based on the alleged unlawful suspension of his license, he has been unlawfully jailed several times in the Chesterfield County jail. Id. Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus directing Defendant to provide him a hearing or return his license.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
B. Analysis
1. Civil Rights
To the extent Plaintiff intended to state a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the undersigned analyzes his claims as follows. To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Plaintiff has not stated a valid § 1983 claim against SCDMV, as it does not qualify as a “person.” A state agency detention center, or task force is a group of officers or buildings that is not considered a legal entity subject to suit. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.
Further, Plaintiff makes no allegations of personal wrongdoing by Shwedo, Wicker, or Rivers. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts allowing the court to find any individual is potentially liable to him. To the extent Plaintiff has sued in their supervisory capacities, Shwedo, Wicker, or Rivers, he has failed to state a claim under § 1983. The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization).
Although Plaintiff used the form complaint for violation of civil rights, he also wrote in “and mandamus.”
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, federal district courts are granted “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Thus, on its face, § 1361 extends federal mandamus jurisdiction only to federal officers or employees. See United States v. Oncology Assocs., 198 F.3d 502, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the “all writs statute,” is limited to cases where federal courts are acting in aid of their respective jurisdictions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651; Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587-88 nn.2-4 (4th Cir. 1969). As Defendants are not federal employees, this court lacks jurisdiction under § 1361 and/or § 1651 to grant Plaintiff's requested relief. See In re Ridgway, No. 95-8002, 1995 WL 227268, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 18, 1995) (“This Court will not direct the action of state actors through mandamus.”); Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cnty. Sup.Ct., 474 F.2d 1275, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding federal courts do not have original jurisdiction over mandamus actions to compel an officer or employee of a state to perform a duty owed to the petitioner); see also In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (same; collecting cases). Therefore, the undersigned does not have jurisdiction under a writ of mandamus to compel a state agency to act.
3. Statute of Limitations
Even if Plaintiff were able to state a claim against any defendant, the actions he claims violated his civil rights occurred over 25 years ago. Any claim would be barred by all of the applicable statute of limitations. In Alvarado v. County of Tulare, C/A No. 3:17-40, 2017 WL 3129821, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 21, 2017), the court noted: “[I]n evaluating a complaint filed in forma pauperis, the court may raise a waivable defense sua sponte when the complaint plainly reveals the existence of such a defense.” Eriline Co. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953-54) (4th Cir. 1995)); Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 682-83 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that sua sponte dismissal may be appropriate if the existence of an affirmative defense is “apparent from the face of the complaint”). “As the Supreme Court has described: ‘Section 1915(d) [the precursor to § 1915(e) ] is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.'” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's action be summarily dismissed without further leave for further amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).