Opinion
No. 05-08-00663-CV
Opinion Filed July 1, 2009.
On Appeal from the 196th District Court, Hunt County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 71,167.
Before Justices RICHTER, LANG, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tony Pyles appeals the traditional summary judgment granted in favor of Loren and Louise Young on their affirmative defense of res judicata. In three issues, Pyles contends the district court erred in granting Youngs' motion for summary judgment because his fraud, unjust enrichment, and statutory damages claims were not compulsory counterclaims barred by res judicata. Youngs did not file a brief in this Court.
We affirm in part the summary judgment that Pyles take nothing on his claims of unjust enrichment, statutory damages, and fraud regarding the end date for installment payments under the contract for deed. We reverse the summary judgment that Pyles take nothing as to his claims of "fraud on the court," misrepresentation of the boundary line of the property, and misrepresentation of Youngs' ownership of the mobile home and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tony Pyles entered into a contract for deed with Youngs in 1998 to purchase approximately six acres of land and a mobile home in Hunt County, Texas. At that time, according to Pyles, Loren Young told Pyles the northern boundary of the property "included up to the fenceline." On May 18, 2005, Youngs brought suit in district court against Pyles for forcible entry and detainer (first suit). A copy of Youngs' version of the contract for deed was attached to the forcible entry and detainer petition. The contract for deed contained a typewritten end date for installment payments of April 1, 2001, but that date was crossed out and changed by handwriting to April 1, 2005. Only Loren Young's initials are shown next to the change. Pyles filed a general denial on June 21, 2005. Youngs filed their first amended petition on March 29, 2006, to bring a trespass to try title suit alleging Pyles failed to make installment payments for sixteen months. Pyles did not file a response to the amended petition, nor did he appear for trial on June 24, 2006. At trial, Youngs' version of the contract for deed was admitted into evidence. The district court granted a post-answer default judgment that canceled the contract for deed and awarded Youngs title to the property and damages. Pyles's motion for new trial was denied on July 3, 2006. He did not appeal that judgment.
According to Pyles, in July 2006 his brother, a surveyor for "the telephone company," remarked to him that part of the northern boundary of the property "looked to him like railroad property." Pyles attempted to "check into this," but could not determine the location of the property line after examining railroad documents and other property records. In August 2006, because Pyles had not vacated the property, Youngs filed a second suit for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court (second suit). On September 27, 2006, that court signed a judgment in favor of Youngs that ordered Pyles to vacate the property. Pyles appealed to the county court at law and filed a "Counterpetition" alleging, pursuant to section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, Youngs committed fraud by inducing him to enter into a contract for deed by misrepresenting the end date for installment payments, the boundary lines of the property, and their ownership of the mobile home. See Tex. Bus. Com. Code Ann. § 27.01 (Vernon 2002). Also, Pyles claimed Loren Young falsely testified during the second suit that he owned the mobile home on the property. Pyles asserted he did not discover Youngs' misrepresentations until sometime between July and September of 2006 and that he had "no reason to question . . . that the fenceline was not the boundary of the north side of the property" until August 2006. Youngs pleaded the affirmative defense of res judicata. The county court at law severed Pyles's fraud counterclaims and signed a judgment dated December 29, 2006 that awarded Youngs possession of the property. The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. See Pyles v. Young, No. 06-07-00066-CV, 2007 WL 4462738 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Dec. 21, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
On January 4, 2007, Pyles brought this suit against Youngs for unjust enrichment respecting improvements he made to the property and statutory damages resulting from Youngs' alleged failure to provide annual accounting statements pursuant to section 5.077 of the Texas Property Code (third suit). See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.077 (Vernon Supp. 2008). Pyles's severed fraud claims from the second suit in the county court at law were consolidated with his new unjust enrichment and statutory damages claims in the third suit. Youngs filed a general denial. Then, Youngs moved for traditional summary judgment, stating as their sole grounds Pyles's claims were barred by res judicata because the claims (1) arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first suit, the trespass to try title suit, or (2) were compulsory counterclaims in the first suit under Rule 97(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
The 1995 version of section 5.077 of the Texas Property Code was in effect when the parties entered into the contract for deed. See Act of June 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 994, § 3, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4983, 4987 (amended 2001) (current version at Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.077 (Vernon Supp. 2008)). Pyles asserted his statutory damages claims pursuant to the 2001 version of section 5.077. However, for reasons discussed herein, he would have been entitled to damages only under the 2005 version of that section.
Pyles responded to the motion for summary judgment, contending his claims were not barred by res judicata because they were not compulsory counterclaims. Further, he argued his claims were not compulsory counterclaims because they were not "mature" nor known by him until after he filed an answer in the first suit and his statutory damages claim did not involve the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first suit. Incorporated as "factual background," and attached to Pyles's response to the motion for summary judgment, were his affidavit and several exhibits he claimed evidence his claims. Then, Youngs amended their answer in the third suit to plead the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court specifically granted summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata, concluding Pyles did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Youngs' affirmative defense. This appeal followed.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA
On appeal, Pyles contends the trial court erred when it granted the motion for summary judgment because his claims were not compulsory counterclaims barred by res judicata as they were neither mature nor owned by him at the time he filed his answer in the first suit. Specifically, Pyles asserts his fraud claims were not compulsory counterclaims because "the frauds did not begin to come to light until additional facts" were discovered "over a year after filing his answer." Also, Pyles contends Youngs judicially admitted his fraud claims were not compulsory counterclaims "by moving the county court at law to sever Pyles' fraud claims from the [second] forcible detainer action" and that his statutory damages claims did not involve the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first suit.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review the granting of summary judgment de novo. See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. Motient Corp., 281 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. filed) (citing Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.)). Res judicata is an affirmative defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. Where a defendant moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense, it must prove all the essential elements of its defense as a matter of law. Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Dillard v. Parkland Hosp., 136 S.W.3d 16, 18-19 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.). Once the defendant establishes its right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979); Wesby v. Act Pipe Supply, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). An appellate court must take as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985); Motient Corp., 281 S.W.3d at 242.
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a finally-adjudicated claim and related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in a prior suit. See State County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. 2001); Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). Texas follows the transactional approach to res judicata. Miller, 52 S.W.3d at 696; Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630-31. The transactional approach mandates that a defendant bring as a counterclaim any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's suit. See Miller, 52 S.W.3d at 696; Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630; see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 208-10 (Tex. 1999) (res judicata bars assertion of claims that were compulsory counterclaims in an earlier suit).
According to Rule 97(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (1) it is within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) it is not at the time of the filing of the answer the subject of a pending action; (3) the claim is mature and owned by the defendant at the time of filing the answer; (4) it arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (5) it is against the opposing party in the same capacity; and (6) it does not require the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 97(a); see also Ray Ferguson Interests, Inc. v. Harris County Sports Convention Corp., 169 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co., 997 S.W.2d at 207). Appellate courts apply a "logical relationship" test to determine whether counterclaims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence under Rule 97(a). See Moore v. First Fin. Resolution Enters., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing Jack H. Brown Co. v. Nw. Sign Co., 718 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The "logical relationship" test is met when the same facts, which may or may not be disputed, are "significant and logically relevant to both claims." Id.
B. Application of the Law to the Facts 1. Fraud Claims
As part of his first issue, Pyles asserts he raised a material issue of fact, thereby defeating summary judgment on Youngs' affirmative defense of res judicata, because Youngs judicially admitted Pyles's fraud claims were not compulsory counterclaims "by moving the county court at law to sever Pyles' fraud claims from the forcible detainer action." Pyles concedes his fraud claims were pleaded as counterclaims for the first time in the county court at law on appeal from the second suit, the forcible entry and detainer action brought in the justice of the peace court. However, Rule 574a makes clear that in a county court a defendant may not plead on an appeal from a forcible entry and detainer order a counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive, that was not presented in the justice of the peace court below. Tex. R. Civ. P. 574a; see D'Tel Commc'ns v. Roadway Package Serv., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.). When a counterclaim is improperly pleaded on appeal to a county court at law, it is improperly joined and the proper remedy is severance. Tex. R. App. P. 41; D'Tel Commc'ns, 987 S.W.2d at 214; see also McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y., 431 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. 1968) (stating Rule 41 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows "any claim" to be severed, including a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 97(a)); Harrill v. A.J.'s Wrecker Serv., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (noting trial court should have severed claims from appeal of justice of peace court judgment if claims constituted new grounds of recovery under Rule 574a). Accordingly, the request for severance of Pyles's compulsory counterclaims did not amount to a judicial admission that Pyles's fraud claims were not compulsory counterclaims.
Next, although Pyles concedes his fraud claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of Youngs' claim in the first suit, he asserts Youngs were not entitled to summary judgment on their affirmative defense of res judicata because his fraud claims were not mature at the time he filed an answer in the first suit.
Res judicata prevents relitigation of related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in a prior suit. See Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 628; see also Cont'l Casing Corp v. Siderca Corp., 38 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (appellant's fraud claim in second suit barred by res judicata because "concealed" facts were "indisputably disclosed" while first lawsuit was pending). However, res judicata may not bar a fraud claim when the failure to use "proper diligence" is caused by "fraud of the adverse party." See Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Tex. 132, 27 S.W. 97, 100 (Tex. 1894). Where fraud is alleged, the general rule is that accrual of a cause of action may be deferred "until the claimant discovered or should have discovered the fraud." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996).
To meet his burden, Pyles was required to adduce some evidence he did not discover and should not have discovered the alleged frauds prior to June 21, 2005, the date he filed his answer in the first suit. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 97(a); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 918 S.W.2d at 455; see also Kaiser v. Nw. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (claim for breach of continuing contract not barred by judgment in earlier suit if other breaches of same contract occurred after plaintiff in later suit filed answer in earlier suit (citing Ben C. Jones Co. v. Gammel Statesman Publ'g Co., 100 Tex. 320, 99 S.W. 701, 703 (1907))). In his consolidated pleadings, Pyles alleged Youngs induced him to enter into the contract for deed by misrepresenting (1) the date installment payments would end under the contract for deed, (2) the northern boundary line of the property, and (3) their ownership of the mobile home on the property. Further, Pyles alleged Youngs falsely testified they owned the mobile home on the property at issue "for the purpose of inducing the Justice Court to grant judgment on their petition for forcible detainer." On appeal, Pyles contends the evidence he offered in response to the motion for summary judgment shows that "the frauds did not begin to come to light until additional facts" were discovered "over a year after filing his answer" in the first suit. In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Pyles listed these "additional facts": (1) Pyles discovered the Youngs' misrepresentation of the boundary line of the property in August 2006, (2) he discovered the misrepresentation of Youngs' ownership of the mobile home in September 2006, and (3) he discovered a "previous buyer" of the property "who suffered a similar course of dealing with [Youngs]" in December 2006.
These "additional facts" were supported by Pyles's affidavit, which was "incorporate[d] by reference as though fully set forth" in the "factual background" of his response to the motion for summary judgment. In that affidavit, Pyles stated the following facts and allegations in relevant part: (1) in February 1998 Loren Young "specifically told" him the boundary line on the north side of the property "included up to the fenceline"; (2) based on Loren Young's representation, Pyles built a "large shed" near the fenceline on the north side of the property; (3) Pyles had "no reason to question [in February 1998], or until August of 2006, that the fenceline was not the boundary of the north side of the property"; (4) Pyles's copy of the contract for deed had a different end date for installment payments than the contract Youngs filed in the first trespass to try title suit; (5) "on information and belief" Loren Young "changed the date" on the contract for deed; (6) in July 2006 Pyles's brother, a telephone surveyor, mentioned he believed the property near the fenceline was railroad property; (7) in August 2006 Pyles attempted to research where the northern boundary of the property line was, but was unable to determine where the property line ended; (8) the title documents Youngs presented for the mobile home during the second forcible entry and detainer suit "do not match up with the plate that is in the mobile home"; and (9) Pyles discovered another buyer of the property "who suffered a similar course of dealing with [Youngs]" in December 2006. Several exhibits are referenced in Pyles's affidavit, including the two versions of the contract for deed, maps and diagrams of the property, and four exhibits related to the alleged mobile home ownership fraud.
We must take as true evidence favorable to Pyles and indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in Pyles's favor. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49. Further, Youngs did not challenge the validity of any of the statements in Pyles's affidavit at any point. However, on this record, we cannot conclude as Pyles urges that he did not discover or should not have discovered the alleged misrepresentation regarding the end date for installment payments under the contract for deed until after he filed his answer in the first suit. The record reflects Youngs filed the first suit on May 18, 2005, and attached a copy of the contract for deed to their first forcible entry and detainer petition. The attached copy of the contract for deed included the handwritten April 1, 2005 end date for installment payments Pyles claims is an alteration. Pyles answered the first suit with only a general denial. Accordingly, Pyles has not demonstrated on this record he discovered or should not have discovered this alleged fraud only after he filed his answer in the first suit. See Cont'l Casing Corp., 38 S.W.3d at 793 (summary judgment proper where appellant failed to raise fact issue as to why appellee should be barred from asserting res judicata when "concealed" facts were "indisputably disclosed . . . during pendency of the first lawsuit.").
As to the remaining fraud claims, Pyles asserted Youngs misrepresented the boundary line on the property, their ownership of the mobile home on the property, and that Loren Young falsely testified Youngs owned the mobile home, committing a "fraud on the court" during the second suit. Pyles was entitled to rely on Loren Young's alleged misrepresentation as to the boundary line and Youngs' ownership of the mobile home. See Schonrock v. Taylor, 212 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tex.App.-Austin 1948, writ ref'd). Pyles provided unchallenged evidence he had "no reason to question" the fenceline was not the northern boundary line of his property and that he did not discover or should not have discovered the alleged boundary line fraud until July 2006, when his brother's comment "put him on his guard." See id. Also, Pyles provided unchallenged evidence showing he did not discover or should not have discovered the alleged mobile home ownership fraud until September 2006, during the second suit, when title documents admitted into evidence did "not match up with the plate that is in the mobile home." Finally, Pyles's claim for "fraud on the court" was based on an action subsequent to the first suit. Loren Young's allegedly false testimony occurred during the second suit, and therefore, could not be a compulsory counterclaim barred by res judicata because it did not occur or "mature" until Loren Young testified. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 97(a); Marino v. State Farm Fire Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990) ("[R]es judicata is not a defense in a subsequent action if there has been a change in the material facts"); Ben C. Jones Co., 99 S.W. at 703; Kaiser, 587 S.W.2d at 457.
On this record, a reasonable juror could find that Pyles did not discover and should not have discovered the alleged frauds until after he filed his answer in the first suit on June 21, 2005. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 97(a); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 918 S.W.2d at 455; Ben C. Jones Co., 99 S.W. at 703; Kaiser, 587 S.W.2d at 457. Accordingly, we conclude Pyles met his burden to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Pyles's "fraud on the court" claim and his misrepresentation claims regarding the boundary line of the property and Youngs' ownership of the mobile home were compulsory counterclaims barred by res judicata.
2. Unjust Enrichment Claim
In his second issue, Pyles asserts his unjust enrichment claim for improvements he allegedly made to the property did not mature until he was evicted from the property in December 2007, when the county court "affirmed the justice court's forcible detainer order." However, Pyles does not cite any applicable authority supporting his contention that a claim for unjust enrichment cannot accrue until after a suit determining the right to possession is affirmed on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude Pyles's argument presents nothing for this Court's review. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (appellant's brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to record).
Further, even were we to consider Pyles's unsupported contentions as to his unjust enrichment claim, that claim did not survive the motion for summary judgment because he failed to raise a material issue of fact to avoid the bar of res judicata. Pyles asserts that his unjust enrichment claim was not mature because it could not accrue until after the second suit was affirmed on appeal. However, Pyles did not expressly present this reason to the trial court in his response to the motion for summary judgment, nor did he present summary judgment proof to establish a fact issue as to whether Youngs were unjustly enriched. He cannot defeat summary judgment by raising a fact issue for the first time on appeal that was not presented to the trial court. See Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d at 678-79; see also Ochoa v. Craig, 262 S.W.3d 29, 32-33 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
3. Statutory Damages Claims
In his third issue, Pyles asserts his statutory damages claims pursuant to section 5.077 of the Texas Property Code are not compulsory counterclaims barred by res judicata for two reasons: (1) these claims do not meet the "logical relationship" test for compulsory counterclaims because they did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of Youngs' first suit and (2) the claims had not matured when he filed his answer in the first suit.
As to his first assertion, Pyles acknowledges Youngs' first suit, the trespass to try title action, arose out of his "alleged failure to perform the Contract for Deed." Under the "logical relationship test," the facts concerning Pyles's claim for statutory damages were significantly and logically relevant to the contract for deed and therefore, Youngs' first suit. See Moore, 272 S.W.3d at 516-17. We conclude all of Pyles's statutory damages claims meet the "logical relationship test" and those claims arose out of the same transaction that was the subject matter of the first suit.
As to Pyles's second assertion, in his response to Youngs' motion for summary judgment, Pyles states "further investigation and research [after Pyles filed an answer in the first suit] disclosed Plaintiff's right to statutory damages under Texas Property Code § 5.077 for the years between February 1, 2002 and July 3, 2006." Pyles asserted his claims accrued through the date his motion for new trial in the first suit was denied on July 3, 2006.
Pyles sued under the 2001 version of section 5.077 of the Texas Property Code, which required a seller to provide a purchaser with an annual accounting statement by January 31 of each year for the term of an executory contract. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.077 (Vernon 2004). A seller who failed to provide an annual accounting statement by January 31 was "liable to the purchaser for: (1) liquidated damages in the amount of $250 a day for each day after January 31 that the seller fails to provide the purchaser with the statement; and (2) reasonable attorney's fees." Id. The 2001 version of section 5.077 "appl[ied] to an executory contract on or after September 1, 2001, regardless of when the contract was entered into." See id. Section 5.077 was amended in 2005 and did not include a savings provision. See id. (Vernon Supp. 2008); see also McGee v. Caulfield, No. 01-07-00055-CV, 2009 WL 1161819, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2009, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (explaining why a purchaser cannot sue for statutory damages under the 2001 version of section 5.077 after September 1, 2005). Pursuant to the 2005 version of section 5.077, a seller "who conducts two or more transactions in a 12-month period" who failed to provide an annual accounting statement to the purchaser by January 31 is liable for liquidated damages of $250 a day, "not to exceed the fair market value of the property," and reasonable attorney's fees. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.077(d) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
Pyles's claims against Youngs for annual accounting statements accrued annually each year beginning on February 1, 2002, through February 1, 2006, before the district court awarded Youngs title to the property in the first suit on June 24, 2006. Accordingly, Pyles's statutory damages claims for annual statutory penalties from February 1, 2002 to February 1, 2005, had matured prior to the time he filed his answer in the first suit on June 21, 2005. His admitted lack of diligence does not allow him to raise these compulsory counterclaims in a subsequent suit. See Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1992).
However, subsequent to Pyles's answer in the first suit, another claim accrued on February 1, 2006. Section 5.077 of the Texas Property Code allows a separate claim for each year an annual accounting statement is not provided to the purchaser, subject only to a liquidated damages cap that cannot exceed the fair market value of the property. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5.077(d). Accordingly, a separate cause of action was maintainable for each year an annual accounting statement was not provided to Pyles. The February 1, 2006 claim was not mature at the time Pyles filed his answer in the first suit. However, Youngs filed their first amended petition in the first suit, asserting a new claim for trespass to try title, on March 29, 2006. Pyles did not file a responsive pleading to Youngs' amended petition, although pursuant to Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure the original general denial extended to all matters pleaded in Youngs' amended petition. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 92 (original denial by defendant "shall be presumed to extend to all matters subsequently set up by the plaintiff" in an amended pleading). The statutory damages claim accruing on February 1, 2006 had matured when Youngs' amended petition was filed. Accordingly, the February 1, 2006 statutory damages claim became a compulsory counterclaim that should have been filed in response to Youngs' first amended petition and is barred in a subsequent action. See Kaiser, 587 S.W.2d at 457 (date of filing pleading controls whether claim for breach of continuing contract barred by res judicata) (citing Ben C. Jones Co., 99 S.W. at 703)).
We conclude Pyles's claims regarding violations occurring from February 1, 2002, through February 1, 2005, were compulsory counterclaims because they had matured prior to the time Pyles filed his answer in the first suit. Further, we conclude Pyles's statutory damages claim that matured on February 1, 2006, became a compulsory counterclaim when Youngs filed their first amended petition on March 29, 2006, and Pyles's general denial was extended. Accordingly, Pyles did not raise a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment on his statutory damages claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Pyles did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his claims of unjust enrichment, statutory damages, and the fraud regarding the end date for installment payments under the contract for deed. However, Pyles raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the application of Youngs' affirmative defense of res judicata to the fraud claims asserting Youngs committed a "fraud on the court," misrepresented the boundary line of the property, and misrepresented their ownership of the mobile home. Accordingly, Youngs were not entitled to summary judgment on those fraud claims of Pyles. We affirm in part the summary judgment that Pyles take nothing on his claims of unjust enrichment, statutory damages, and fraud regarding the end date for installment payments under the contract for deed. We reverse the summary judgment that Pyles take nothing as to his claims of "fraud on the court," misrepresentation of the boundary line of the property, and misrepresentation of Youngs' ownership of the mobile home and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.