Opinion
23-2302
06-20-2024
TERRY L. PYLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACOB DAILY, Defendant-Appellee.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Submitted June 14, 2024 [*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 19-cv-1067-JPG J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.
Before MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
ORDER
Terry Pyles sued Jacob Daily, a police officer, accusing Daily of violating his constitutional rights during a traffic stop and subsequent arrest. The district court entered summary judgment for the officer. Because Pyles's claims, if successful, would undermine a still-valid criminal conviction, they are barred by Heck. v Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), so we affirm.
Because we are reviewing a summary judgment adverse to Pyles, the non-moving party, we recite the facts with all reasonable inferences construed in his favor. Morgan v. Schott, 914 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 2019). One early afternoon, Pyles was riding his bike down a street in Granite City, Illinois when a car began tailing him closely-so close that it bumped into his back tire. Distracted by the car, Pyles accidentally ran a stop sign. At that moment, the car flashed its emergency lights, sped ahead of Pyles, and swerved to cut him off. Officer Daily pointed his taser through the window at Pyles and ordered him not to move. Pyles raised his hands and complied. Daily then exited his vehicle and asked Pyles why he ran the stop sign. Daily next asked Pyles whether he was involved with drug dealing and patted him down. Daily found a cigarette packet in Pyles's pocket, pulled it out, and inside discovered methamphetamine. Daily arrested Pyles and took him to the city jail.
Pyles later pleaded guilty to running a stop sign in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-1204(b). He was also charged with possession of methamphetamine, though that charge was later dismissed.
Pyles then sued Daily under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the stop, search, and arrest violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Pyles also advanced Illinois state-law claims of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The district court granted Daily's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Pyles's claims with prejudice. The court concluded that because Pyles had pleaded guilty to running the stop sign, his claim that Daily lacked probable cause to arrest him was barred under Heck v. Humphrey. And because Pyles could not dispute the basis for his arrest, the court determined that the pat down was a valid search incident to that arrest. Finally, regarding Pyles's state-law claims, the court issued two rulings that appear to be incompatible-on one hand, relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over the claims and, on the other, concluding that the claims were defeated by the existence of probable cause to arrest.
On appeal, Pyles challenges the district court's application of Heck and maintains that Daily lacked adequate justification to seize him. Pyles argues that Daily's tailgating induced him to run the stop sign, akin to a form of entrapment or provocation to effectuate a pretextual traffic stop. Because he was not culpable for running the stop sign, Pyles maintains that Daily could not have probable cause to stop and arrest him.
But Heck holds that a § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages on a theory that implies the invalidity of his conviction must first show that the conviction has been set aside. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. And here, Pyles's assertion of innocence with regard to running the stop sign is irreconcilable with his still-valid conviction. See Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) (claim that police planted drugs was barred by Heck where plaintiff was convicted for possessing drugs).
Running a stop sign is a petty offense under Illinois law, see 625 ILCS 5/11-202, 1204(b), meaning a sentence of imprisonment is not authorized, see 730 ILCS 5/5-1-17. But police can still arrest individuals for such offenses. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); United States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-1204(b) is an arrestable offense).
Pyles invokes a footnote in Heck to argue that a suit premised on a Fourth Amendment violation can lie despite a still-outstanding conviction where the suit does not "necessarily imply" that the conviction was unlawful. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (emphasis in original). Without elaboration, he asserts that his search-and-arrest challenge could not possibly impugn the stop-sign conviction. True, Heck does not preclude a wrongful-arrest claim just because the § 1983 plaintiff was convicted of the offense that led to the arrest. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007); Johnson v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2019). But here, Pyles's version of the facts necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction because he asserts that he was not guilty of the offense (and that Daily therefore lacked probable cause to arrest). See Tolliver v. City of Chicago, 820 F.3d 237, 241-43 (7th Cir. 2016).
Pyles relatedly argues that because there was no probable cause justifying an arrest, there could not have been a valid search incident to the arrest. But, again, Pyles may not challenge his arrest by claiming he did not actually commit the arrestable offense. See Okoro, 324 F.3d at 490. And because Daily had probable cause to arrest Pyles for the stop-sign violation, Daily was authorized to search Pyles incidental to that arrest. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382-84 (2014). That Daily searched Pyles before arresting him is of no moment because the arrest occurred right after the search. United States v. Paige, 870 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980)).
We close with two matters of housekeeping. First, the district court should not have dismissed Pyles's Heck-barred claims with prejudice. A suit barred by Heck must be dismissed without prejudice as premature, until the plaintiff has succeeded in having his conviction set aside. Johnson, 944 F.3d at 968.
Second, regarding the state-law claims, the district court delivered contradictory messages when stating that it was relinquishing jurisdiction over them and then rejecting them on the merits. To the extent the court concluded that it "does not have jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims," the court had to dismiss the claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. See McHugh v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 55 F.4th 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2022) (having concluded the defendant state agency had sovereign immunity from suit, district court was "obligated" to dismiss agency for lack of jurisdiction).
We therefore MODIFY the judgment of the district court so that the dismissal is without prejudice. The modified judgment reflects that jurisdiction over the state-law claims was relinquished, and the dismissal is for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We AFFIRM the judgment as modified.
[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).