It follows that Bell’s claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel was waived. See Pye v. State , 274 Ga. 839, 839-840 (1), 561 S.E.2d 109 (2002). Further, although Bell’s appellate brief makes a scant reference to certain claims he may wish he had raised in the trial court, that does not change the fact he did not do so.

That being so, he may not raise the issue on appeal.Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 842(6), 561 S.E.2d 109 (2002). Further, even if Coe had moved to sever his trial from Mingledolph's,

However, this latter language is included in the phrase “deadly weapon” when that phrase is used as a general reference to the aggravating circumstance in OCGA § 16–5–21(a)(2). Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 841(4), 561 S.E.2d 109 (2002). In charging that Appellant strangled the victims “with his hands, instrumentalities which, when used offensively against a person, are likely to result in serious bodily injury,” “[t]he indictment thus alleged that [Appellant] used his hands as deadly weapons.

Although Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously failed to sever the Birmingham murder charges from the Patterson murder charges, there is no motion to sever in the record. Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 842(6), 561 S.E.2d 109 (2002). Because Appellant failed to request a severance of counts, this issue has been waived.

But many other items are not deadly weapons per se. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730, 732 ( 571 SE2d 788) (2002) (hands and feet); Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 841 ( 561 SE2d 109) (2002) (bottle); Gough v. State, 236 Ga. App. 568, 569 ( 512 SE2d 682) (1999) (hammer); Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 571-572 ( 314 SE2d 235) (1984) (ceramic statue); Talley v. State, 137 Ga. App. 548, 550 ( 224 SE2d 455) (1976) (lamp); Williams v. State, 127 Ga. App. 386, 387-389 ( 193 SE2d 633) (1972) (shoes). For those items, the issue must be submitted to a properly instructed jury, and the failure to do so is error.

"[T]he proper reading of [ Hardrick] is `that an indictment charging aggravated assault is fundamentally flawed when the essential elements of aggravation and intent to assault are not contained therein.' [Cit.]" Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 841 (4) ( 561 SE2d 109) (2002). Thus, because the indictment alleged that the lamp is "an object which when used offensively against a person, is likely to and actually does result in serious bodily injury," an allegation that it is a deadly weapon was not required.

In light of the evidence, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal. Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 840 (2) ( 561 SE2d 109) (2002) (appellate court applies "sufficiency of the evidence" test when reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict). 2. Appellant maintains the trial court erred when it denied her motion to quash the accusation for alleged prosecutorial misconduct.

Accordingly, the claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness as to those instances is waived. Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839 (1) ( 561 SE2d 109) (2002) (failure of post-conviction counsel to raise ineffective assistance in new trial motion); Ray v. State, 259 Ga. 868 (12) ( 389 SE2d 326) (1990) (no request for evidentiary hearing). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the remaining allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel and found no merit in any of Moore's claims.

Agreeing with Wilson's appellate counsel that the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel cannot be raised on appeal, appellees oppose the request that the case be remanded for consideration of that issue by the trial court. The Attorney General relies on Reed v. State, 275 Ga. 660 (3) ( 571 S.E.2d 767) (2002), Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839 (1) ( 561 S.E.2d 109) (2002), and Ray v. State, 259 Ga. 868 (12) ( 389 S.E.2d 326) (1990), and the District Attorney relies on Jones v. State, 254 Ga. App. 863 (5) ( 564 S.E.2d 220) (2002), for the proposition that the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been entirely waived by post-trial counsel's waiver of a hearing on motion for new trial. A careful reading of those cases, however, reveals that two of the cited cases are distinguishable on the facts and the other two represent an error which has crept into our case law involving consideration on appeal of claims of ineffective representation subsequent to our decision in Dawson v. State, 258 Ga. 380 ( 369 S.E.2d 897) (1988).

Because Count Seven is a separate count which contains all of the essential elements of the predicate offense, "the felony murder count was also valid. [Cit.]" Pye v. State, 274 Ga. 839, 842 (5) ( 561 S.E.2d 109) (2002). Therefore, Count Three complies with the requirements of due process and is sufficient to support the conviction for that crime.