228, 230, 20 Am.Dec. 518; New England Cotton Yarn Co. v. Laurel Lake Mills, 190 Mass. 48, 53, 76 N.E. 231; P.W. Brooks Co., Inc., v. North Carolina Public Service Co. (C.C.A.) 37 F.2d 220, 223; Green County, Kentucky v. Quinlan, 211 U.S. 582, 594, 29 S. Ct. 162, 53 L. Ed. 335. There can be little question as to what the purpose and intent of the parties was in entering into this agreement.
In a series of cases, the Eighth and other circuits have steadfastly held to the rule clearly stated by Judge Walter H. Sanborn, that where an agreement is fairly susceptible of two constructions, that one will be preferred which is rational and probable, and such as prudent men would naturally execute. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co. of Minnesota (C.C.A. 8) 121 F. 609; Choctaw, O. G.R. Co. v. Bond (C.C.A. 8) 160 F. 403; A. Leschen Sons Rope Co. v. May-flower G.M. R. Co. (C.C.A. 8) 173 F. 855, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1; Bayne v. United States (C.C.A. 8) 195 F. 236; Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Leahy (C.C.A. 8) 195 F. 731; Star-Chronicle Pub. Co. v. New York Evening Post (C.C.A. 2) 256 F. 435; Richardson v. Western Oil, Coal Investment Co. (C.C.A. 8) 3 F.2d 403; W.J. Foye Lumber Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (C.C.A. 8) 10 F.2d 437; P.W. Brooks Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co. (C.C.A. 4) 37 F.2d 220, certiorari denied 281 U.S. 741, 50 S. Ct. 347, 74 L. Ed. 1154. There is nothing in Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 52 S. Ct. 345, 76 L. Ed. 665, to the contrary.
Every pertinent rule for the interpretation of contracts demands such holding. The conditions existing and circumstances attending the making of a contract must always be considered in interpreting any doubtful provisions, Raleigh Lumber Co. v. Wilson Son, 69 W. Va. 598, 603, 72 S.E. 651; Bragg v. Lumber Co., 102 W. Va. 587, 135 S.E. 841; Knotts v. Bartlett, 83 W. Va. 525, 98 S.E. 590; Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Bridge Co., 4 Cir., 37 F.2d 695; Federal Surety Co. v. Bentley Sons Co., 6 Cir., 51 F.2d 24, 78 A.L.R. 1041; White v. Sayers, 101 Va. 821, 823, 45 S.E. 747; Cowan v. Radford Iron Co., 83 Va. 547, 551, 3 S.E. 120; every intendment is in favor of a reasonable; fair and equitable construction of a contract and against a harsh construction, or one that might operate as a snare, Carper v. Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 442, 89 S.E. 12, L.R.A1917A, 171; Cowan v. Iron Co., supra; United States v. Skinner Eddy Corp., D.C., 28 F.2d 373; White v. Sayers, supra; Brooks Co. v. Public Service Co., 4 Cir., 37 F.2d 220; where a contract is made for the accomplishment of one main purpose every provision must be read in the light of such provision, Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Co., 56 W. Va. 402, 49 S.E. 548; Wetterwold v. Woodall, 83 W. Va. 647, 98 S.E. 890; contracts optional in respect of one party are strictly construed against him, Williston on Contracts, Sec. 620; Martin v. Consolidated Coal Oil Corp., 101 W. Va. 721, 133 S.E. 626; construction of a particular provision will be against the party at whose instance it was inserted, Charlton v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 115 W. Va. 25, 174 S.E. 570; Epes' Adm'r v. Hardaway, 135 Va. 80, 115 S.E. 712; Centrosoyus-America Co. v. U.S., D.C., 30 F.2d 302; Calderon v. Atlas etc. Co., 170 U.S. 272, 18 S.Ct. 588, 42 L.Ed. 1033; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S. 133, 18 S.Ct. 552, 42 L.Ed. 977; agreements or options indefinite as to time require performance or acceptance within a reasonable time, McClung v. Railway Co., 110 W. Va. 621, 159 S.E. 521; Hum