Opinion
5:22-cv-01901-EJD
04-19-2022
PUTIAN AUTHENTIC ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT CO., LTD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. META PLATFORMS, INC., Defendant.
ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Re: Dkt. No. 25
EDWARD J. DAVILA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiffs Putian Authentic Enterprise Management Co., Ltd, Fuzhou Haina Hongyi Network Technology Co., Ltd, Fuzhou Baidai Network Technology Co., Ltd., Nanchang Huimeng Network Technology Co., Ltd., Suzhou Chenghe Network Technology Co., Ltd. filed this action asserting the following claims against Defendants Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”) and Does 1-10: (1) declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201; (2) intentional interference with a contract; (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) promissory estoppel; (5) breach of contract; (6) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (7) unlawful and unfair conduct in violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; and (8) negligence. Compl., Dkt. No. 1.
The Court previously denied Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction for failure to show irreparable harm. Order Denying Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. (“TRO Order”), Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiffs now renew their motion seeking a Court order enjoining Defendants from denying Plaintiffs access to their Facebook Business Manager accounts. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Plfs.' Renewed Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. (“Renewed Mot.”), Dkt. No. 25. Meta opposes. Def. Meta Platform Inc.'s Opp'n to Plfs.' Renewed Mot. for TRO (“Renewed Opp'n”), Dkt. No. 27.
The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Having considered the parties' moving papers, the Court DENIES the motion for a TRO with prejudice.
I.BACKGROUND
A. The Parties and Their Relationship
Plaintiffs are social media marketing companies whose businesses are based on providing clients access to Meta's marketing tools and audience on the Facebook social media platform. Decl. of Chen Xin in Supp. of Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. (“Chen Decl.”), Dkt. No. 6 ¶¶ 7-10. They act as “middlemen” for e-commerce vendors and Meta by purchasing ad space from Meta and then reselling it to the vendors, and as such, are “utterly reliant on the Meta advertising platform.” Id.; see also Second Decl. of Chen Xin in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for TRO and Prelim Inj. (“Second Chen Decl.”), Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 16 (“Under Plaintiffs' business model, Plaintiffs purchase ad space from resellers, who may work directly with Meta.”)
The parties agree that Meta's Terms of Service govern their relationship. See Renewed Mot. at 20; Renewed Opp'n at 4-5; Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Plfs.' Renewed TRO Mot. (“Renewed Reply”), Dkt. No. 30, at 12. The Terms of Service state in relevant part:
You therefore agree not to engage in the conduct described below (or to facilitate or support others in doing so):
1. You may not use our Products to do or share anything:
• That violates these Terms, our Community Standards, and other terms and policies that apply to your use of our Products.
• That is unlawful, misleading, discriminatory or fraudulent. . . .
We can remove or restrict access to content that is in violation of these provisions.
If we remove content that you have shared in violation of our Community Standards, we'll let you know and explain any options you have to request another review, unless you seriously or repeatedly violate these Terms . . . .Decl. of Raymond LaMagna in Supp. of Def. Meta's Opp'n to Renewed TRO Mot. (“LaMagna Decl.”), Dkt. No. 27-2, Ex. 1 at 5 (Section 3.2). The Terms of Service further state:
If we determine that you have clearly, seriously or repeatedly breached our Terms or Policies, including in particular our Community Standards, we may suspend or permanently disable access to your account. . . . Where we take such action, we'll let you know and explain any options you have to request a review, unless doing so may expose us or others to legal liability; harm our community of users; [or] compromise or interfere with the integrity or operation of any of our services, systems or Products . . . .Id., Ex. 1 at 7-8 (Section 4.2; emphases added).
The Terms of Service also expressly incorporate other terms and policies. Id., Ex. 1 at 9, 10 (Sections 4.5.2, 5). Relevant and applicable to Plaintiffs are Meta's Commercial Terms, Advertising Policies, and Self-Serve Ad Terms. Id., Ex. 1 at 10 (Section 5).
The Commercial Terms apply to access or use of Meta Products for the purpose of using ads. They state: “You agree that you will ensure that any third party on whose behalf you access or use any Meta Product for any business or commercial purpose will abide by the applicable terms of use, including these Commercial Terms, the Meta Terms of Service . . ., and any applicable supplemental terms . . . .” Id., Ex. 2 at 1.
Meta's Advertising Policies prohibit certain kinds of ads, including those that violate the Community Standards; enable a user to engage in cheating or deceitful practices; contain deceptive, false, or misleading claims; or promote products, services, schemes or offers using deceptive or misleading practices, including those meant to scam people out of money. Id., Ex. 3 at 2-5 (Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.15, 4.22, 4.25). The Advertising Policies expressly state: “Beyond enforcing our policies on individual ads, violations of our terms and policies may result in further enforcement actions, such as disabling Ad Accounts, Business Managers and/or individual user accounts.” Id., Ex. 3 at 2 (Section 2). The Advertising Policies further state that Plaintiffs are responsible for ensuring that each advertiser complies with the Advertising Policies. Id., Ex. 3 at 11 (Section 12.5).
Similarly, Meta's Self-Serve Ad Terms require compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and guidelines, as well as the Advertising Policies, and “[f]ailure to comply may result in a variety of consequences, including the cancellation of ads you have placed and termination of your account.” Id., Ex. 4 at 1 (Section 2). Furthermore,
If you are placing ads on someone else's behalf, you must have permission to place those ads, and agree as follows:
a. You represent and warrant that you have the authority to and will bind the advertiser to these Self-Serve Ad Terms and the Terms of Service, and the Commercial Terms, to which you also agree.
b. If the advertiser you represent violates these Self-Serve Ad Terms, the Terms of Service, or the Commercial Terms, we may hold you responsible for that violation.Id., Ex. 4 at 3 (Section 14).
B. Deactivation of Plaintiffs' Accounts
On December 10, 2021, Plaintiffs became aware that Meta intended to “banhammer” their Facebook Business Manager accounts for “perpetuating misleading e-commerce, celeb bait and business impersonation via an abuse pattern we call agency scaling.” Chen Decl. ¶ 24; LaMagna Decl., Ex. 5 at 2. Plaintiffs retained counsel, who then served a demand letter on Meta regarding what Plaintiffs believed was arbitrary and capricious enforcement of Meta's Terms of Service and requesting “an opportunity for a hearing.” Chen Decl. ¶ 25; LaMagna Decl., Ex. 5 at 2. The demand letter further stated, “If we are not given an immediate opportunity to be heard by Facebook regarding this proposed ban, we will pursue all available legal rights and remedies, including but not limited to seeing a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief from the court, along with seeking damages for the harm caused to our Clients and related parties by Facebook's improper actions in this matter.” LaMagna Decl., Ex. 5 at 2.
Plaintiffs received no response from Meta until March 14, 2022, when Meta sent a letter to Plaintiffs' counsel stating: “Meta has completed its investigation into this matter and determined your clients have violated Meta's terms and policies. More specifically, each of your clients are responsible for deceptive and misleading advertisements on Facebook that violate Meta's terms and policies.” Id., Ex. 6 at 2. On March 22, 2022, Meta shut down Plaintiffs' Business Manager accounts. Chen Decl. ¶¶ 17-21.
C. Procedural Background
On March 24, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action and their first motion seeking a TRO. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. The Court denied the first TRO motion for failure to demonstrate irreparable harm. TRO Order, Dkt. No. 17. On March 28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed additional declarations and a renewed motion seeking a TRO, which the Court struck for non-compliance with the Civil Local Rule 7-2(b)'s page limits. Dkt. Nos. 19, 20, 21, 24. On March 29, 2022, Plaintiffs re-filed the amended renewed TRO motion now before the Court. Dkt. No. 29.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for a TRO is the same as for a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff seeking either remedy “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
To grant preliminary injunctive relief, a court must find that “a certain threshold showing [has been] made on each factor.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Assuming that this threshold has been met, “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court previously held that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm. TRO Order at 3-5. The factual and legal landscape have changed in the last few weeks. Plaintiffs have now offered additional evidence to bolster their assertions of irreparable harm in an attempt to cure what the Court previously found was an evidentiary deficiency. Specifically, Plaintiffs provide two additional declarations from their Chief Operating Officer, Chen Xin, and a declaration from their customer service representative, Jieli Liang. Additionally, on April 18, 2022, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., --- F.4th ---, 2022 WL 1132814 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2022). Plaintiffs rely on the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in that case, 938 F.3d 985, 993 (9th Cir. 2019), which the Supreme Court vacated in LinkedIn Corp. v. hiQ Labs, Inc., 141 S.Ct. 2752 (2021). Renewed Mot. at 14. Meta does not address hiQ at all.
Regardless, even if Plaintiff's new evidence sufficiently demonstrates irreparable harm under hiQ, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits on any of their claims. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Intentional Interference with Contract
To succeed on a tortious interference with contract claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce breach or disruption of the contract; (4) actual breach or disruption; and (5) resulting damage.” Name.Space, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, 795 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 2008)). “[A] plaintiff must establish an underlying enforceable contract evidencing a formally cemented economic relationship.” Orchard Supply Hardware LLC v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 939 F.Supp.2d 1002, 1011-12 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated the existence of any valid contracts enforceable under California law. Plaintiffs do not provide copies of any formal contracts; they offer only screenshots of text message complaints from certain customers. Those screenshots indicate the existence of some kind of business relationship, but it is not clear which customers have relationships with which Plaintiffs. Three of these customers stated that they would “terminate cooperation” with Plaintiffs. Second Chen Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. I; Decl. of Jieli Liang in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for TRO and Prelim Inj. (“Liang Decl.”), Dkt. No. 21 ¶ 6, Ex. U. Plaintiffs assert that this phrase “refers to the existence of a contractual business relationship between the parties.” Renewed Reply at 11 n.4. However, they provide no support for that assertion from any source, not even the translator who certified translations of their exhibits. The Court is left to construe Plaintiffs' assertion as attorney argument. Even taking Plaintiffs at their word, they provide no details of those contracts beyond a general exchange of money for ad space. “The terms of a contract on paper, with no evidence that any parties agreed to those terms, do not prove the existence of a valid contract.” Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 2005).
In addition, an intentional interference claim will not arise if “the defendant's conduct consists of something which he had an absolute right to do.” Neal v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-04923-EJD, 2017 WL 4224871, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (citing Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal.App.3d 990, 996 (1977); internal quotation marks omitted). Meta's Terms of Service, Commercial Terms, Advertising Policies, and Self-Serve Ad Terms all make clear that fraudulent and misleading conduct is prohibited, that Plaintiffs are responsible for any fraudulent or misleading ads from its clients, and that repeated violations may result not only in the removal of the fraudulent or misleading ads but also termination of Plaintiffs' accounts. LaMagna Decl., Exs. 1-4. These are the grounds for account deactivation laid out in Meta's March 14, 2022 letter. Id., Ex. 6. Meta has submitted evidence that Plaintiffs' clients advertised in a fraudulent or misleading manner, that multiple accounts managed by Plaintiffs were deactivated as “business integrity scams, ” and that since December 2019, Meta disabled over 1, 400 accounts managed by Plaintiffs for policy or intellectual property violations. Decl. of Sam Winters in Supp. of Def. Meta's Opp'n to TRO Mot., Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶¶ 6-16. Plaintiffs effectively concede that the examples of problematic ads Meta submitted with its opposition were indeed potentially fraudulent or misleading and acknowledge that Meta disabled at least 1, 443 out of Plaintiffs' 21, 400 accounts since December 2019. Third Decl. of Chen Xin in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for TRO and Prelim Inj., Dkt. No. 20-1 ¶¶ 9-14, 26. Because Plaintiffs and many of their clients appear to have violated Meta's terms and policies, Meta was within its rights under the parties' agreement to terminate Plaintiffs' accounts.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim for intentional interference with a contract.
B. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
A tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim has the same elements as a claim for tortious interference with a contract (focusing instead on the existence and knowledge of a prospective economic relationship), but also requires that the defendant's conduct be ‘wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself.'” Name.Space, 795 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Kor. Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have made clear that “[t]he law precludes recovery for overly speculative expectancies by initially requiring proof” that it is “reasonably probable that the prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for defendant's interference.” AlterG, Inc. v. Boost Treadmills LLC, 388 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence of any specifically identified prospective business deal or relationship that Meta's deactivation of their Business Manager accounts thwarted. Plaintiffs assert that they “had prospective economic relationships with [current e-commerce vendor clients] and new clients” but do not cite to any such evidence. Renewed Mot. at 18. Instead, they point only to portions of Chen's first and second declaration that generally describe past customers, not future customers. The text message complaints from past or current customers do not refer to any particular future business deals that were cancelled as a result of the deactivation. See Second Chen Decl, Ex. I; Liang Decl., Exs. T, U, V, W.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
C. Promissory Estoppel
A claim for promissory estoppel requires the establishment of the following four elements: “(1) a promise that is clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) the reliance must be reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his or her reliance.” Cockrell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 13-cv-02072-SC, 2013 WL 3830048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013); see also Boon Rawd Trading Int'l Co., Ltd. v. Paleewong Trading Co., Inc., 688 F.Supp.2d 940, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Plaintiffs contend that they plead a claim for promissory estoppel in the alternative to their claim for breach of contract. Renewed Reply at 11; see also Renewed Mot. at 18 (“To the extent the Court concludes that certain parts of the parties' relationship were not governed by contract, the principle of equitable estoppel applies.”). Plaintiffs argue that because Meta “rarely substantiated any of the deactivation notices it sent to Plaintiffs . . . [t]his course of conduct reasonably led Plaintiffs to believe that deactivation notices were frequently erroneously distributed and only acted upon after substantial review and further notice.” Renewed Mot. at 19. But as Plaintiffs acknowledge, Meta's “deactivation notices referred to e-commerce vendor accounts, not the [Business Manager] Accounts, and Meta “not once took any action to deactivate or otherwise restrict access to the [Business Manager] Accounts.” Id. If that is true, it is difficult to understand how Plaintiffs could infer a course of dealing as to the Business Manager accounts when they purportedly relied upon a course of dealing that concerned only the vendor accounts.
“A plaintiff may not state a claim for promissory estoppel where a valid contract, supported by consideration, governs the same subject matter as the alleged promise.” Funai Electric Co., Ltd. v. LSI Corp., No. 16-CV-01210-BLF, 2017 WL 1133513, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017) (citing Horne v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 660 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). Here, Meta's Terms of Service and accompanying terms and policies are the express contract that governs the parties' relationship and the manner and method in which Meta could terminate Plaintiffs' Business Manager accounts. Plaintiffs' attempt to plead in the alternative necessarily fails. Walker v. KFC Corp., 728 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984) (“In sum, either KFC was in breach of contract or it was not. That should be the end of the matter. Promissory estoppel is not a doctrine designed to give a party to a negotiated commercial bargain a second bite at the apple in the event it fails to prove a breach of contract.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their promissory estoppel claim.
D. Breach of Contract
Under California law, a plaintiff asserting a breach of contract claim must plead the following elements: (1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant's breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach. CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado, 158 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1239 (2008), as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 5, 2008) (citing Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas. Co., 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1391, nn.6, 11 (2004)).
Plaintiffs assert that Meta's Terms of Service create a contractual relationship, but that nothing in the Terms of Service permits Meta to “arbitrarily revoke access to the Meta platforms.” Renewed Reply at 12. Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish between the Terms of Service and the Self-Serve Ad Terms is unavailing, as the Terms of Service incorporate the Self-Serve Ad Terms and Advertising Policies-both of which expressly contemplate the possible termination of Plaintiffs' Business Manager Accounts. LaMagna Decl., Ex. 1 at 10 (Section 5); id., Ex. 3 at 2 (“Beyond enforcing our policies on individual ads, violations of our terms and policies may result in further enforcement actions, such as disabling Ad Accounts, Business Managers and/or individual user accounts.”); id. Ex. 4 at 1 (“Failure to comply may result in a variety of consequences, including the cancellation of ads you have placed and termination of your account.”). At any rate, the Terms of Service themselves explicitly address account suspension or termination and permit Meta to suspend or terminate accounts without notice or review in certain circumstances. Id., Ex. 1 at 7-8 (“If we determine that you have clearly, seriously or repeatedly breached our Terms or Policies, including in particular our Community Standards, we may suspend or permanently disable access to your account. . . . Where we take such action, we'll let you know and explain any options you have to request a review, unless doing so may expose us or others to legal liability; harm our community of users; [or] compromise or interfere with the integrity or operation of any of our services, systems or Products . . . .”). As described above, Meta has submitted evidence of repeated violation of the Terms of Service and Meta's other terms and policies by Plaintiffs' customers, for whom Plaintiffs are also responsible under those same terms and policies. See supra Section III.A. The evidence the parties have provided tends to show that it is Plaintiffs who have apparently breached the parties' contract, not Meta.
Plaintiffs also assert a claim for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that “declaration that they have not violated any policy articulated within any of Defendant's various TOS or Advertising Guidelines.” Compl. ¶ 48. Plaintiffs chose not to address this claim for relief in their motion. Renewed Mot. at 16 (“Because Plaintiffs' first claim is for declaratory relief, that claim is not addressed here.”). However, because the Court finds that there is evidence suggesting that Plaintiffs did breach the parties' agreement, Plaintiffs have also failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their declaratory judgment claim.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their breach of contract claim.
E. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing [is] implied by law in every contract, [and] exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 349 (2000). “[T]he factual elements necessary to establish a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are: (1) the parties entered into a contract; (2) the plaintiff fulfilled his obligations under the contract; (3) any conditions precedent to the defendant's performance occurred; (4) the defendant unfairly interfered with the plaintiff's rights to receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's conduct.” Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F.Supp.2d 952, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
For the reasons described above, it does not appear that Plaintiffs fulfilled their obligations under the parties' contract, and that Meta's purported “interference” with Plaintiffs' rights to receive the benefits of the parties' agreement by terminating their accounts was expressly contemplated by the contract itself. See supra Section III.D. Furthermore, while a plaintiff may bring claims for both breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant, when both claims rely on the same alleged acts and seek the same relief, the Court may disregard the breach of the implied covenant claim as superfluous. Landucci v. State Farm Ins. Co., 65 F.Supp.3d 694, 716 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 327).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their implied covenant claim.
F.UCL
California Business and Professions Code § 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Plaintiffs' briefing is somewhat unclear on whether they are asserting a UCL claim under the unlawful prong or the unfair prong. Compare Renewed Mot. at 22-23 (discussing “unlawful” acts “in violation of antitrust laws”) with Renewed Reply at 14 (“Plaintiffs' claim related to antitrust principles arises under the unfairness prong . . . .”). The Court looks to the allegations in the complaint, which plead the unfair prong based on antitrust principles and the unlawful prong claim based on Plaintiffs' tortious interference and implied covenant claims. Compl. ¶¶ 100-101. As to the unlawful prong claim, the Court has already determined that, based on the record before it, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their tortious interference and implied covenant claims, and therefore they are correspondingly unlikely to success on a UCL claim based on the unlawful prong as pled. See supra Section III.A, B, E.
As to the unfair prong claim, Plaintiffs assert, “Meta is using its dominant position and presence as the operator of the world's largest social media platform in order to assume exclusive proprietary control over public data not owned by the Defendant, and to arbitrarily and capriciously deactivate business manager accounts for [its] own benefit.” Renewed Mot. at 22. It is unclear what “public data” is at issue here-presumably Plaintiffs' clients have ownership over the information in their ads. Additionally, it is difficult to understand how Meta can exercise “monopolistic control” when only Meta's products are at issue, much less how Facebook qualifies as “a facility . . . that is essential to competitors.” Id. at 22-23. Most significant, Plaintiffs do not cite to a single piece of evidence to support their claims of antitrust activity. See Renewed Mot. at 22-23; Renewed Reply at 14. To the extent Plaintiffs' allegations about Meta's deactivation of accounts “for [its] own benefit” is based on Paragraphs 33-34 of Chen's first declaration, those paragraphs are nothing more than Chen's opinion. Chen Decl. ¶¶ 33-34 (“In my opinion and based on my personal knowledge . . . .”). Chen does not explain the basis of any purported personal knowledge, and therefore these opinions amount to nothing more than speculation unsupported by any factual evidence.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their UCL claim.
G. Negligence
Plaintiffs allege a claim of negligence under California law. To prevail on a claim for negligence, Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) Meta owed Plaintiffs a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). The general rule in California is that all persons have a duty “to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct.” Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112 (1968). In determining whether to impose a legal duty, courts consider the factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian, including:
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.Id. at 113. Plaintiffs also invoke California Civil Code § 1714(a). Renewed Mot. at 23. Section 1714 primarily concerns providing alcoholic beverages to minors, but subsection (a) states in relevant part: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a).
Plaintiffs assert that “Meta owed the Plaintiffs a duty of ordinary care and skill by virtue of [a] special relationship between them created by the position of power enjoyed by the Defendant's control of Facebook and the BM Account generally.” Renewed Mot. at 23. Despite repeatedly referring to a “special relationship, ” Plaintiffs cite no case law or evidence supporting the existence of any such special relationship in these circumstances outside the Terms of Service and other applicable terms and policies. Id. at 22-23; Renewed Reply at 14. The California Supreme Court has noted that “the special relationship test”-which arises in an insurance context-“has been criticized as illusory and not sufficiently precise . . . .” Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal.4th 543, 552-53 (1999). “[C]ourts will generally enforce the breach of a contractual promise through contract law, ” and “the mere negligent breach of a contract” will not ordinarily sound in tort. Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Even if Meta owed Plaintiffs a duty beyond the confines of the parties' written agreement, Plaintiffs do not substantiate a breach of that duty. According to Plaintiffs, “Meta breached this duty to exercise ordinary care and skill with regards to their administration of the Plaintiffs' [Business Manager] Accounts when they arbitrarily, capriciously, and willfully encouraged employees to falsify pretenses with which to deactivate mature [Business Manager] Accounts as part of the Defendant's pervasive profit driven culture.” Renewed Mot. at 23-24. As with Plaintiffs' UCL claim under the unfair prong, Plaintiffs fail to provide any evidence to support that contention beyond Chen's opinion and conjecture. See supra Section III.F.
In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims. When a plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court need not consider the remaining Winter factors. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Mandatory injunctions such as the one Plaintiffs seek are disfavored, and they therefore must satisfy a higher burden of “establish[ing] that the law and facts clearly favor [their] position . . . .” Id. (emphasis original). Plaintiffs have not done so here.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for a TRO with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.