Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-10-011-CG
Date Submitted: June 3, 2002
Date Decided: August 8, 2002
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. REMANDED.
Wayne A. Marvel, Esq., Maron Marvel, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellant.
William M. Chasanov, Esq., Brown, Shiels Chasanov, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Appellees.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing an action filed by Appellant, Raymond Pusey and his wife, Bertha Pusey, now deceased ("the Puseys").
The dispute resulting in the above-captioned appeal dates back to November 1994, when Sotiria Pappas, who is also now deceased, filed suit in Maryland to cancel and invalidate an irrevocable trust agreement. The details of the litigation in Maryland are detailed in the Court's decision dated September 23, 1999.
See Pusey v. Pappas, Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-01-010, Goldstein, J. (Sep. 23, 1999), Mem. Op. at 2-3. See also Pusey v. Pappas, Del. CCP, C.A. No. 1997-05-109, Smalls, J. (Jan. 15, 1999), Order at 4-5.
On January 15, 1997, the Maryland litigation concluded with a settlement agreement, which is also detailed in this Court's September 23, 1999 decision. The settlement agreement stipulated that Sotiria Pappas and her son, John Pappas, would convey all right, title and interest in a property located in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware to Sotiria Pappas' daughter, Bertha Pusey and Bertha's husband, Raymond. In return, also as provided for in the settlement agreement, Bertha and Raymond Pusey executed a license allowing Sotiria Pappas to reside in the downstairs apartment of the Rehoboth property. The license also specified that Sotiria Pappas would be responsible for the upkeep of the downstairs apartment during the term of the license and that she would pay one half of all reasonable and necessary expenses attributable to the property as a whole. The license was to be dissolved upon Sotiria Pappas' death. Again, the details of the of the conveyance of the Rehoboth property and the terms of the license are detailed in the Court's earlier decision.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
It is the Rehoboth property and the license granted to Sotiria Pappas which gave rise to the litigation filed in the State of Delaware. Briefly, on March 20, 1997, the Puseys presented Sotiria Pappas with a list of bills the Puseys alleged were due and payable for expenses for the Rehoboth property. Sotiria Pappas paid part of the enumerated expenses, but denied payment on others on the grounds that they were incurred prior to the settlement agreement and were therefore barred. Sotiria Pappas also refused to pay a bill for legal services incurred by the Puseys.
See Id. at 4-5 for a more detailed description of the events leading up to the Delaware litigation.
On May 9, 1997, the Puseys filed suit in Delaware in the Court of Common Pleas against Sotiria Pappas and her sons, John and Nicholas, alleging that the defendants owed $9,113.80 plus costs and interest for expenses occurred pursuant to the license agreement. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to amend their complaint to assert an additional claim and to demand an additional $30,000 in lost rental income for the property.
On January 15, 1999, the Court of Common Pleas issued an order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the action and to dismiss John Pappas as a party due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. The Court of Common Pleas found that the Rehoboth property was included in the terms of the settlement agreement and that the terms of the settlement agreement barred recovery for expenses incurred prior to the agreement. The court also found that, "to the extent [the expenses] are not barred in a subsequent proceeding, such determination involves interpretation of the settlement agreement which must be litigated in the Maryland Circuit Court." The court determined that the Maryland court retained jurisdiction at the final settlement and, because the dispute at issue in the Delaware action involves interpretation of that agreement, plaintiffs were required to present their claims to the Maryland court.
See Pusey v. Pappas, Del. CCP, C.A. No. 1997-05-109, Smalls, J. (Jan. 15, 1999).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
The court further held that there was no basis to conclude that John Pappas had minimum contacts necessary for the court to exercise jurisdiction over him. The court therefore dismissed John Pappas as a party. Finally, the court denied defendants' motion to amend their complaint on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
The Puseys subsequently appealed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas to this Court. The Puseys argued that the court below erred as a matter of law by interpreting the settlement agreement to include issues involving the Rehoboth property as claims arising out of the events underlying the Maryland litigation, that the court below erred by determining that John Pappas did not have minimum contacts necessary to maintain suit against him in Delaware, and that the court abused its discretion by failing to allow them to amend their complaint.
On September 23, 1999, this Court issued its decision on appeal. This Court determined that the Court of Common Pleas did not err as a matter of law in deciding that the action before it "necessarily involved interpretation of the settlement agreement and, as a result, must be presented before the Maryland Court which retained jurisdiction over the final settlement." This Court also ruled that the court below erred by interpreting the settlement agreement as precluding the Pusey's claims.
Pusey v. Pappas, Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-01-010, Goldstein, J. (Sep. 23, 1999), Mem. Op.
Id. at 10.
The Puseys appealed this Court's September 23, 1999 decision to the Delaware Supreme Court. On September 13, 2000, the Supreme Court remanded the action to this Court to determine whether the Maryland Court retained jurisdiction over the Maryland case by virtue of the settlement agreement and whether, "as a matter of comity, forum non conveniens, or otherwise, the Delaware action that is the subject of this appeal should be dismissed without prejudice of the filing of a similar action in Maryland." The Supreme Court reserved jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 19(c).
On October 4, 2000, this Court issued its Findings Upon Remand. In response to the Supreme Court's first query, the Court stated that the Maryland Court did not specifically retain jurisdiction over the Maryland action or over the settlement agreement that arose out of that suit. As to the second issue, the Court stated that, upon further review of the record, the Court found that, "the Delaware action need not necessarily be dismissed as a matter of comity, forum non conveniens, or otherwise." The Court concluded that it could not find that the defendants would suffer overwhelming hardship if the Delaware case was not dismissed.
Pusey v. Pappas, Del. Super., p. 3.
Id. at 4.
On December 15, 2000, the Supreme Court issued its Order on appeal. The Order states, "This 15th day of December, 2000, upon consideration of the supplemental briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that the judgment of Superior Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons set forth in its Findings upon Remand dated October 4, 2000."
Pusey v. Pappas, Del. Supr., No. 493, 1999, Berger, J. (Dec. 15, 2000) (ORDER).
On remand, the Court of Common Pleas again dismissed the case in conformity with its January 15, 1999 opinion. At a October 12, 2001 hearing, the Court of Common Pleas explained, "As I read the opinions of both Judge Goldstein and the Supreme Court affirmants, it does not reverse this Court's decision dismissing this case. It does not also reinstate the case, therefore, this matter is dismissed. My original order's reinstated."
Transcript, CCP hearing, p. 4-5.
The Puseys have now appealed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas to this Court. Pusey argues that the Court of Common Pleas erred by dismissing Plaintiff's suit on October 12, 2001. The Puseys argue that the Supreme Court's December 15, 2000 Order affirms the finding of the Superior Court on remand. Because the Superior Court found that there was no evidence that the Maryland court specifically retained jurisdiction over the settlement in that action and concluded that neither comity, forum non conveniens, or any other reason required dismissal of Plaintiffs' case, the court below erred by dismissing the case.
Appellees respond that the Supreme Court's Order of December 15, 2000 affirmed this Court's decision of September 23, 1999, which remanded the case to the Court of Common Pleas to dismiss without prejudice. As a result, Appellees argue, the court below did not err by doing so.
The Court finds that the Pusey's interpretation of the Supreme Court's December 15, 2000 opinion is correct. Although this Court determined in its August 23, 1999 decision that the Court of Common Pleas was required to dismiss the case, the Court's decision on remand in essence reversed those findings. Although the Court initially determined that the Maryland Court retained jurisdiction over the final settlement, on remand the Court determined that the Maryland Court had not specifically retained jurisdiction, and that, as a result, it was not necessary as a matter of comity, forum non conveniens, or otherwise, that the Delaware action be dismissed. The Supreme Court specified that it affirmed the Superior Court based upon its findings upon remand.
As a result, this Court finds that the Court of Common Pleas misinterpreted the Supreme Court's December 15, 2000 opinion, which affirmed the Superior Court. However, the Court notes that such a misinterpretation is understandable given the somewhat unusual procedural posture of the case. Therefore, the Court must again remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas with instructions that the court below has the jurisdiction to interpret the terms of the settlement agreement executed in Maryland in order to determine the merits of Plaintiffs' claims in Delaware. In essence, the parties are back to square one with their litigation concerning the Rehoboth property.
The Court must take note of the fact that, as set forth above, the dispute between these parties goes back to November 1994, over seven and a half years. Both Bertha Pusey and her mother, Sotiria Pappas, are deceased. The amount of money at stake is relatively small. It is clear from the record in the Maryland and Delaware actions that the dispute between Bertha and Raymond Pusey and Bertha's mother and brothers involves deeply personal family conflicts, rather than simple monetary claims. This Court strongly urges the parties to negotiate some sort of amicable conclusion to their disputes, rather than continue to litigate these issues before a court of law.
In conclusion, the Court hereby REMANDS the above-captioned proceedings to the Court of Common Pleas in accordance with the findings set forth above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.