Opinion
15-cv-04869 (LDH) (RER)
09-09-2019
Kevin PURNELL, Plaintiff, v. John SCARGLATO, Mark D. Cohen, Lordes Martinez, Donald H. Silverman, and Franco Frantellizzi, Defendants.
Kevin Purnell, Amityville, NY, pro se. Lori L. Pack, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Kyle O Wood, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendant.
Kevin Purnell, Amityville, NY, pro se.
Lori L. Pack, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Kyle O Wood, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LaSHANN DeARCY HALL, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Kevin Purnell, proceeding pro se, brings the instant action against Franco Frantellizzi asserting a claim for unreasonable search and seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Frantellizzi moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.
By Order dated February 11, 2016, the Court dismissed Defendants Cohen and Scarglato pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b), as they are each entitled to judicial and prosecutorial immunity respectively. (ECF No. 9.) By Order dated February 27, 2017, the Court adopted a report and recommendation dismissing Defendant Martinez. (ECF No. 44.)
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
On or about April 9, 2014, Detective Frantellizzi, a detective with the Suffolk County Police Department, received information from an unspecified source concerning drug activity and the existence of a gun at Plaintiff's home. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ("Pl.'s 56.1") ¶ 1, ECF No. 75-3.) Detective Frantellizzi relayed that information to Plaintiff's parole officer, Lordes Martinez. (Id. at ¶ 2.) On June 10, 2014, members of New York State Parole Department of Corrections and Community Supervision conducted a search of Plaintiff's bedroom. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Detective Frantellizzi was present in Plaintiff's home during the search. (Def.'s 56.1 Stmt. ("Def.'s 56.1") ¶ 7, ECF No. 71-3.) As a result of the search, Parole Officer Martinez discovered heroin, crack cocaine, approximately $1,200 in cash, and five cell phones, which were turned over to Detective Frantellizzi to secure as evidence. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 3; Pl.'s Ex. A, Suppression Hearing Trans. 50:16-22.)
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with four counts in violation of his conditions of release by the New York State Division of Parole. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was later indicted on felony drug charges in New York State Supreme Court. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14.) The court held a hearing to determine whether the warrantless search of Plaintiff, in the presence of police officers, was consistent with his conditions of parole and reasonable under the circumstances. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The court determined that "[t]he mere presence of the police to assist parole agents in the performance of their duties does not vitiate an otherwise valid parole search." (Id. ) The court continued that "[t]he fact that the police had informed the parole department that they had received information the [d]efendant was in possession of a gun two months prior to the parole search, did not taint the efficacy of the search." (Id. ) On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to four narcotics felonies and was sentenced to six years in state prison. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be granted when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the evidence as to a fact that might affect the suit's outcome is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-movant at trial. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. At summary judgment, the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; see also Feingold v. New York , 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004). Once the movant meets that burden, the non-movant may defeat summary judgment only by adducing evidence of specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see also Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Davis v. New York , 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court is to view all such facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Still, to survive summary judgment, a non-movant must present concrete evidence and may not rely on mere conclusory or speculative claims or denials. Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp. , 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The litigant opposing summary judgment, therefore, ‘may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials’ as a vehicle for obtaining a trial.") (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp. , 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978) ).
"It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), including when facing a summary judgment motion, Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records , 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the "application of this different standard does not relieve plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Jorgensen , 351 F.3d at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Applicability of Heck v. Humphrey
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Supreme Court decision Heck v. Humphrey . The Court agrees. In Heck , the Supreme Court determined that when a verdict in a plaintiff's favor in a civil case would undermine the integrity of his criminal conviction, a plaintiff may not proceed with such an action until he succeeds in setting the conviction aside. 512 U.S. 477 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).
We hold that, in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
Here, Plaintiff's claims directly implicate his conviction in state court. There is no evidence that his conviction was reversed, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court. Indeed, as Plaintiff was forced to acknowledge, the validity of the search was addressed by the trial court and resolved against Plaintiff. That Plaintiff believes the trial court's finding was wrong is of no moment. See Channer v. Mitchell , 43 F.3d 786, 787-88 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a § 1983 claim against officers for allegedly coercing witnesses was properly dismissed where the plaintiff "offered no proof that his conviction had been independently invalidated"). Plaintiff's claim is not cognizable.
II. Qualified Immunity
Even on its merits, Plaintiff's claim still fails. Detective Frantellizzi argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for his role in the search of Plaintiff's bedroom because the search was consistent with Plaintiff's parole and the search was not otherwise invalid because of Detective Frantellizzi's presence. (Def. Frantellizzi's Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot.") at 7, ECF No. 71-15.) Again, the Court agrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability if their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). As the Second Circuit has noted, "[t]his doctrine is said to be justified in part by the risk that the ‘fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.’ " McClellan v. Smith , 439 F.3d 137, 147 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas v. Roach , 165 F.3d 137, 147 (2d Cir. 1999) ). "[Q]ualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’ " Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ). Accordingly, the availability of qualified immunity should be decided by a court "[a]t the earliest possible stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). In the context of this case, "[t]he relevant question ... is ... whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed." Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
"Under New York State law, as announced by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Huntley , the determination as to whether a warrantless parole search ‘was unreasonable and thus prohibited by constitutional proscription must turn on whether the conduct of the parole officer was rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty.’ " United States v. Barner , 666 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting People v. Huntley , 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d 794 (1977) ). The Second Circuit has held that this "New York rule is coextensive with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment ... because the doctrine of ‘special needs,’ permits those searches that are reasonably related to the special needs animated by management of a parole system." United States v. Grimes , 225 F.3d 254, 259 n.4 (2d Cir. 2000). There can be no question that the warrantless search by the parole officer was reasonably related to the parole officer's duty—the officer had been informed of contraband in Plaintiff's home. Nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that because Detective Frantellizzi provided the information to the parole officer and accompanied the officer to Plaintiff's home, the search was somehow unlawful and that Frantellizzi could not have reasonably believed otherwise. However, "the law permits cooperation between probation officers[, parole officers,] and other law enforcement officials so that they may work together and share information to achieve their objectives." United States v. Reyes , 283 F.3d 446, 471 (2d Cir. 2002). Indeed, the Second Circuit has acknowledged the need for parole and police officers to collaborate and observed that "it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a probation/parole officer who entered a residence with other law enforcement officials based on information about a supervisee's illegal activities ... would not be pursuing legitimate supervis[ion] objectives." United States v. Newton , 369 F.3d 659, 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Rodriguez , No. 10-cv-00891, 2013 WL 4779639, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013) ("[W]here a police officer accompanies a parole officer in performing a parole search, a warrant is not required, so long as the search is rationally and reasonably related to the parole officer's duties."). Where, as here, the parole officer was informed that Plaintiff possessed a gun, it was entirely reasonable for the parole officer to request police presence. Newton , 369 F.3d at 667 ("[B]ecause the information suggested criminal conduct in addition to that for which [defendant] had already been convicted ... it was entirely reasonable for the parole officers to solicit the assistance of the police in entering [the] residence."). And, "[t]he mere fact that [Detective Frantellizzi] was the first to suspect that [Plaintiff] was engaged in criminal activity and related this fact to the parole officer and was present at the subsequent investigation in no way alters the legality of the parole officer's presence." See United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole , 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2d Cir. 1971). Against this backdrop, no reasonable officer would have believed that the search, made in his presence, was violative of Plaintiff's rights. Detective Frantellizzi is entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.