" (pp. 333, 334.) A later statement of the rule is found in Purl v. Purl, 108 Kan. 673, 197 P. 185, where the court said: "When the will was executed and when the testator died, he resided in the state of Illinois.

In this jurisdiction the cardinal rule that a will speaks from the time of the testator's death unless it plainly shows a contrary intention, and is to be construed as operating according to the conditions and circumstances, has been adhered to consistently. See Reetz v. Sims, 177 Kan. 143, 276 P.2d 368; In re Estate of Works, 168 Kan. 539, 213 P.2d 998; and Purl v. Purl, 108 Kan. 673, 197 P. 185. It follows, therefore, that the question of whether or not a disposition by a testator of the subject matter of a specific bequest has worked an ademption of the bequest must be determined in the light of facts and circumstances existing at the time of testator's death. In the instant case at the time of testator's death we find the following facts existing with respect to testator's interest in the ranch.

tgaging or otherwise disposing of their interest, nor could the property be subjected to their debts by execution, garnishment or attachment, or be partitioned. The ablest English and American text-writers agree that a remainder of the character devised in items VIII, IX and X are contingent (Kales Estates, Future Interests, 2d ed., § 345, p. 364 — to A for life, remainder to such of his children as survive him; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3d ed. p. 86 — to A for life, remainder to such of his children as survive him; Leake on Property in Land, 2d ed., p. 235 — to A for life, with remainder to such children as he shall leave at his decease; Anno. 57 A.L.R.2d 202 — to A for life, remainder at his death to his children then surviving or then living [or expressed in equivalent words and without further language or features to modify the construction] gives the children interests which are wholly contingent until the life tenant's death), and this court is of the same opinion. ( Purl v. Purl, 108 Kan. 673, 676, 197 P. 185; Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 112 Kan. 314, 211 P. 146; McCartney v. Robbins, 114 Kan. 141, 217 P. 311; Martin v. Lassen, 122 Kan. 406, 251 P. 1083; Walker v. Row, 132 Kan. 564, 296 P. 699; Hickcock v. Skelly Oil Co., 197 Kan. 1, 10, 11, 414 P.2d 67.) Several estates may be limited in the alternative by way of contingent remainder after one particular estate in freehold, in such a way that one may take effect if the other does not. Such remainders are sometimes known as "alternative remainders," and sometimes as "remainders on a contingency with a double aspect."

(p. 581.) In Purl v. Purl, 108 Kan. 673, 674, 197 P. 185, the will gave land to a son "to have during his life, and at his death it goes to his children, if he has any living; if not, it goes to his brothers and sisters or their heirs," and this court held a contingent remainder was thereby created, approving the following statement of principle: "`. . . where a gift to survivors is preceded by a life or other prior interest, it takes effect in favor of those who survive the period of distribution, and those only, unless a special contrary intent is found in the will.'"

This court is committed to the rule of favoring vested rather than contingent remainders and no remainder will be construed to be contingent which may, consistently with the words used and the intention expressed, be deemed vested. Many of our decisions setting forth the above rule may be found in Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424, 21 P. 288; Purl v. Purl, 108 Kan. 673, 197 P. 185; Votapka v. Votapka, post; Buxton v. Noble, 146 Kan. 671, 73 P.2d 43; Johnson v. Muller, supra; Zabel v. Stewart, 153 Kan. 272, 109 P.2d 177; In re Estate of Schnack, 155 Kan. 861, 130 P.2d 591; In re Estate of Ellertson, 157 Kan. 492, 142 P.2d 724; In re Estate of Rinker, 158 Kan. 406, 147 P.2d 740; Cramer v. Browne, 159 Kan. 423, 155 P.2d 468; Calkin v. Wallace, 160 Kan. 760, 165 P.2d 224; Epperson v. Bennett, 161 Kan. 298, 167 P.2d 606. Anno. 166 A.L.R. 816; In re Estate of Johnson, 175 Kan. 82, 259 P.2d 176; In re Estate of Sheets, supra; In re Estate of Paulson, 188 Kan. 467, 363 P.2d 422. With these rules in mind we will carefully examine the provisions of paragraph 5. There are three somewhat separate provisions contained therein: First — Upon the death of Ernest there is a devise of the real estate to Roy and Grace upon their paying a granddaughter $1,500.

There can be no doubt under our decisions that it was within the power of the testators, so long as they did not violate the rule against perpetuities or some other rule of law of equal potency, to postpone the possession of the corpus of their estate by their beneficiaries even though the title thereto and the right to future possession was vested. Although the following cases may be distinguished on the facts, the rule above stated was recognized in Grossenbacher v. Spring, 108 Kan. 397, 195 P. 884; Purl v. Purl, 108 Kan. 673, 197 P. 185; and Wright v. Jenks, 124 Kan. 604, 261 P. 840. While there is no particular dispute thereon, for the reason that the words "trust" and "testamentary trustee" are used in the will, and that the matter in issue is the termination of a trust, we adopt for our purposes the definition of a trust as being a fiduciary relationship with respect to property subjecting the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, and arising as the result of an intention to create the relationship.

Consequently where there arises a grave doubt from the terms of a conveyance whether the remainder vested at the death of the testator, or should remain expectant and contingent until the happening of a future event, the doubt is resolved in favor of a vested remainder. ( Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424, 21 P. 288; Purl v. Purl, 108 Kan. 673, 197 P. 185; Votapka v. Votapka, 136 Kan. 224, 14 P.2d 732; Buxton v. Noble, 146 Kan. 671, 73 P.2d 43; Cramer v. Browne, 159 Kan. 423, 155 P.2d 468; Epperson v. Bennett, 161 Kan. 298, 167 P.2d 606, Anno. 166 A.L.R. 816.) So in the Bunting case, supra, it was held:

The purchase by them made their title no better, no stronger. That one who is under a duty to pay taxes cannot add to or strengthen his title by purchasing the land at tax sale is established as settled law. Winter v. City Council of Montgomery, 101 Ala. 649, 14 So. 659; Christy v. Fisher, 58 Cal. 256; Newmyer v. Tax Service Corp., 87 Colo. 474, 289 P. 365; Hurt v. Schneider, 61 Colo. 104, 156 P. 600, L.R.A. 1916F, 204; Griffin v. Turner, 75 Iowa 250, 39 N.W. 294; National Surety Co. v. Walker, 148 Iowa 157, 125 N.W. 338, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 333; Purl v. Purl, 107 Kan. 314, 191 P. 297; Gibson v. Hornung, 110 Kan. 211, 203 P. 730; Cooley v. Waterman, 16 Mich. 366; Toliver v. Stephenson, 83 Neb. 747, 120 N.W. 450; Brooks v. Garner, 20 Okla. 236, 94 P. 694, 97 P. 995; Burgess v. Peth, 79 Wn. 298, 140 P. 351; Callihan v. Russell, 66 W. Va. 524, 66 S.E. 695, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1176; Lamborn v. Board of Dickinson County Com'rs, 97 U.S. 181, 24 L.Ed. 926; Foley v. Kirk, 33 N.J. Eq. 170. There are especially strong reasons why in this case plaintiffs should not be permitted to set up their tax title and defeat the tax lien of the defendants. Drainage districts were organized under the laws of the state.