Opinion
Case No. 01-3019-JWL.
October 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Wesley Purkey brings this action asserting a number of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants David McKune, Steve Laun, Dan Young, Carol Ward, Boyce Gunther, and Robert Chmilding. This matter is currently before the court on a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 39), joined by all defendants and a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 46), also joined by all defendants. Both motions ask for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6).
It should be noted that defendants do not make any individualized arguments regarding any of plaintiff's claims. Therefore, the court will not analyze the sufficiency of the facts in plaintiff's pleading as applied to individual defendants.
The court grants in part and denies in part both defendants' Motion to Dismiss and defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. More specifically, the court finds that plaintiff's allegation that he was denied drinking water for three days is sufficiently serious to implicate constitutional protection, and therefore the court denies defendants' motion to dismiss regarding this claim; and that plaintiff's claim that he was denied clean bedding, clean clothes, and cleaning supplies for weeks at a time could entitle plaintiff to relief, and therefore dismissal is inappropriate. The court grants defendants' other motions to dismiss, finding that plaintiff's complaint of a filthy, flooded, isolated boxcar cell without ventilation for a three day period while in segregation is not a sufficiently serious condition to implicate constitutional protection; and that plaintiff has not shown his First Amendment right to access the courts was violated because plaintiff cannot show an injury from any alleged restriction.
I. FACTS
At all relevant times, defendant was incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas. On August 1, 2000, plaintiff was placed in the C-1 Segregation Unit ("C-1") under investigation status. When he arrived at C-1, plaintiff was provided with two sheets, and nothing else. Plaintiff was denied legal materials and personal property of any kind.
The facts in this section are based upon the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations, which the court must accept as true for purposes of defendants' motions.
Plaintiff was placed in C-1 cell number 130, which is a boxcar cell, a solid steel structure. Plaintiff describes the cell as having an extended solid steel frame surrounding the outer perimeter of the inner cell. The door is made of solid steel. The door has a small sliding plexiglass window. Plaintiff claims that the plexiglass window was left open due to heat in C-1.
On August 2, 2000, plaintiff filed a request to defendant Laun requesting legal materials because he had a deadline for filing an appellate brief before the Tenth Circuit. He also requested his personal property, including his address book and stamps, hygiene items, and cups since such items were not provided. These materials were not provided by Defendant Laun nor anyone else.
On August 3, 2000, at approximately 1:45 PM, plaintiff alerted defendant Collins that the cold water faucet on his sink was stuck in the open position. He also told defendant Collins that he had been having problems with his faucet, and that he had informed other officers of the problem. Defendant Collins told plaintiff that someone from the plumbing shop would be called to resolve the problem.
After an hour and a half, plaintiff stopped defendant Gunther and showed him the stuck faucet. Defendant Gunther informed plaintiff that his problem was probably overlooked during the officers' shift change, but that he would call the plumbing shop to resolve the problem.
At approximately 5:00 PM, defendant Chmilding came to plaintiff's cell to inquire about the water that was running out of plaintiff's cell. Plaintiff told defendant Chmilding that his faucet was stuck in the open position, but defendant Chmilding did not believe this claim. At this time defendant Chmilding shut the plexiglass window on plaintiff's cell door, and shut off the water to plaintiff's cell. Plaintiff claims that defendant Chmilding returned ten or fifteen minutes later with a broom and swept water back into plaintiff's cell underneath the outside door.
Later that evening, defendant Gunther came to plaintiff's cell. Plaintiff requested to move to a different cell, noting the cell next door was empty. This request was denied. Plaintiff then requested drinking water and a mop to clean up the water on the cell floor. Both of these requests were denied. Also, Defendant Gunther informed plaintiff that defendant Chmilding reported plaintiff for disruptive behavior. Moments later, defendant Chmilding returned to plaintiff's cell and kicked the outside cell door shut on plaintiff's cell.
At approximately 8:00 PM, Officer Sota, whose first name is unknown to plaintiff, came to plaintiff's cell to bring the disciplinary report in which defendant Chmilding charged plaintiff with disruptive behavior in violation of K.A.R. 44-12-318, and plaintiff signed receipt of the report. During this visit Officer Sota opened the outer door to plaintiff's cell, citing heat. Plaintiff alleges, however, that five minutes later defendant Chmilding returned to plaintiff's cell where he once again closed the outer door, and also made sure the plexiglass window was closed.
At about 11:00 PM that same night during the inmate count, plaintiff asked Officer Hailh, whose first name is unknown to plaintiff, for drinking water, for his toilet to be flushed, and for the outside cell door to be left open. Officer Hailh responded that he would have to check with defendant Ward, the shift supervisor, before taking any action. After checking with defendant Ward, Officer Hailh told plaintiff that he could not have any water and that plaintiff would have to wait for the next shift for cleaning supplies to mop his floor. Officer Hailh did flush plaintiff's toilet. At this time, plaintiff filed a grievance for all the alleged improper actions that occurred while he was in C-1.
In his grievance, plaintiff complained that his sink was not fixed in a timely fashion; that he was denied cleaning supplies; that his cell lacked ventilation, drinking water, and water to flush the toilet.
On August 4, 2000, plaintiff appeared before the Segregation Review Board/Committee with Administrative Officials. This meeting was presided over by defendant Laun. During this meeting, plaintiff attempted to have defendant Laun improve the conditions that plaintiff complained about in his grievance, but defendant Laun refused to take action.
Plaintiff alleges that he remained in the boxcar cell in its uncleaned condition without legal materials until August 7, 2000, when he moved to an open front cell and was given tissue paper, hygiene items, and drinking cups. Up until this time, plaintiff's consumption of liquids while in C-1 was limited to two cartons of milk per day.
On August 21, 2000, plaintiff's disciplinary hearing regarding defendant Chmilding's charge of disruptive behavior was held. In this hearing plaintiff was found not guilty.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied cleaning supplies, clean clothing and clean bedding for weeks at a time while incarcerated.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his [or her] claims which would entitle him [or her] to relief," Poole v. County of Otero, 271 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)), or when an issue of law is dispositive. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff. Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is "not whether [the] plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
When, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes his or her pleadings liberally and holds the pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001); accord Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). In other words, "[n]ot every fact must be described in specific detail, . . . and the plaintiff whose factual allegations are close to stating a claim but are missing some important element that may not have occurred to him should be allowed to amend his complaint." Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). The liberal construction of the plaintiff's complaint, however, "does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based." Id. (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). "Conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based." Id. (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110).
III. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
Plaintiff claims that in August 2000, he was housed in unconstitutional conditions of confinement in C-1, the segregation unit at the Lansing Correctional Facility. To prevail on a "conditions of confinement" claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that (1) the condition complained of is "`sufficiently serious'" to implicate constitutional protection, and (2) prison officials acted with "`deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) ( quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302-03 (1991)). "Only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities . . . are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation and alteration omitted). In order to satisfy the first requirement, "the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. With regard to the second requirement, the Supreme Court has explained that "deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm will result." Id. at 835. The Court defined this "deliberate indifference" standard as equal to "recklessness," in which "a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware." Id. at 836-37.
Here, plaintiff alleges that for three days he was forced to dwell in a flooded boxcar cell without ventilation, where temperatures reached over one hundred and twenty degrees. He also claims that he was denied water for drinking, washing, and to flush his cell's toilet, which he claims omitted a strong and overpowering foul odor in the stagnate conditions of his cell.
The Eighth Amendment "does not mandate comfortable prisons," and conditions imposed may be "restrictive and even harsh." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). An important factor in determining whether conditions of confinement meet constitutional standards is the length of the incarceration. Thus, a "filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of `grue' might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978).
"Grue" is a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture in a pan. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 683.
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of drinking water for three days, and therefore the court finds that plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently serious condition to implicate constitutional protection. In general, the severity and duration of deprivations are inversely proportional, so that minor deprivations suffered for short periods would not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, while substantial deprivations of shelter, food, drinking water, and sanitation may meet the standard despite a shorter duration. DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 973 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[i]t is important to consider the conditions of confinement as a whole" and citing cases where deprivation of human needs found to be Eighth Amendment violation).
The court, however, does not find that plaintiff's complaints of a filthy, flooded, isolated boxcar cell without ventilation are sufficiently serious conditions to implicate constitutional protection. The Tenth Circuit has held that situations involving filthy cells, poor lighting, inadequate ventilation or air cooling, and unappetizing food do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation where prisoners were exposed to the conditions for only a short period of time. See, e.g., Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (deplorably filthy and patently offensive cell with excrement and vomit not unconstitutional because conditions lasted only for 24 hours); White v. Nix, 7 F.3d 120, 121 (8th Cir. 1993) (eleven day stay in unsanitary cell not unconstitutional because of relative brevity of stay and availability of cleaning supplies); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1988) (five day stay in "filthy, roach-infested cell" not unconstitutional); see also Ogbolu v. McLemore, 1997 WL 49449, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb.7, 1997) (cold, wet, drafty, and unsanitary solitary cell for two days does not violate Eighth Amendment).
Having found a sufficiently serious condition to implicate constitutional protection regarding plaintiff's allegation of being denied drinking water for three days, the court will now examine the second prong, whether prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's health or safety. Plaintiff alleges having requested drinking water, and that his requests where denied by prison officials. The courts finds that this allegation is sufficient to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's health because defendants knew or should have known that denying drinking water for multiple days possessed a risk of harm to plaintiff.
For the above reasons the court denies in part and grants in part defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's "conditions of confinement" claim under the Eighth Amendment.
IV. CLEAN CLOTHING, BEDDING AND CLEANING SUPPLIES
Plaintiff claims that by denying him clean sheets and other bedding supplies, clean clothes, and cleaning supplies for weeks at a time, he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment.
"Under the Eighth Amendment, jail officials must provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety." McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001). As explained above, to prevail on a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that (1) the condition complained of is "`sufficiently serious'" to implicate constitutional protection, and (2) prison officials acted with "`deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Here, plaintiff complains of being denied clean sheets and other bedding supplies, and clean clothes for weeks at a time. The court cannot say that it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that his Eight Amendment rights were violated based upon this allegation.
As explained above, when determining if a condition is sufficiently serious to implicate constitutional protection, the severity and duration of deprivations are inversely proportional. See DeSpain 264 F.3d 965, 973; Mitchell, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442-43. Here plaintiff claims a minor depravation, but it was a deprivation that lasted for an extended period of time. It is unclear exactly how long the deprivation lasted since plaintiff only alleges that it occurred for "weeks at a time," but the court cannot say beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that his Eight Amendment rights were violated.
Plaintiff also alleges fact to show that defendants' acted with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff alleges having requested clean bedding, clean clothing, and cleaning supplies. The courts finds that this allegation is sufficient to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's health because defendants knew or should have known that denying clean bedding, clean clothing, and cleaning supplies for an extended period of time possessed a risk of harm to plaintiff.
The court denies defendants' motion to dismiss this claim. Having examined the record, the court finds it does not appear beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Plaintiff may not ultimately prevail on the merits, but his allegations are sufficient for him to go forward.
V. RETALIATION
Plaintiff argues that he was improperly issued a disciplinary action by defendant Chmilding in an effort the conceal Eight Amendment violations. He further argues that this action deprived him of substantial due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
"The existence of an improper motive for disciplining a prisoner which results in interference with a constitutional right also may give rise to a second and separate cause of action under section 1983." Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990). To prevail, a prisoner must show that the challenged actions would not have occurred "but for" a retaliatory motive. Id. at 949-50; Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998).
Here, the plaintiff does not state, nor is the court able to find, a constitutional right with which there has been interference because plaintiff was not disciplined. While a disciplinary report was filed accusing plaintiff of disorderly conduct, a hearing was held on August 21, 2000 where plaintiff was found not guilty of the accusations.
The court, therefore, dismisses plaintiff's claim that a disciplinary action was issued on an "improper motive" violating his Fourteenth Amendment Rights because there was no punishment to interfere with any constitutional right.
VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated by defendants' refusal to allow him to obtain property at his own expense while he was in segregated housing. The court disagrees.
It is clear that inmates enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). The protection of this right obligates corrections officials to assure prisoners effective access to the courts by providing inmates the opportunity and resources to prepare and file meaningful legal papers. Id. at 829-30. The access guaranteed is "meaningful", not total or unlimited, access. Id. at 823.
Here, plaintiff argues that he suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights while held in segregated housing when defendants would not allow him to purchase law books at his own expense. Plaintiff states that for the three days that he was without legal materials he was denied the opportunity to pursue legal theories, do legal research, and present arguments in his Appellate Brief to the Tenth Circuit. Plaintiff does not, however, allege any harm that came of this deprivation such as missing a deadline in his pending case, or the opportunity to appeal any judgment. Where an inmate alleges a lack of access to legal materials or assistance during a limited period of time, a court must consider whether the plaintiff has shown an actual injury. See Howell v. Roberts, 1992 WL 132504 at *2 (D. Kan. May 4, 1992) (citing Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (lack of access to prison law library during brief quarantine was not actionable where plaintiff did not allege specific harm)).
Because plaintiff has not shown an actual injury, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim regarding violation of his First Amendment rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The court finds that plaintiff's allegation that he was denied drinking water for three days is sufficiently serious to implicate constitutional protection, and the court denies defendants' motion to dismiss regarding this allegation. The court also finds that denying plaintiff clean sheets and other bedding supplies, clean clothes, and cleaning supplies for weeks at a time while he was incarcerated could be a violation of the Eight Amendment, and therefore dismissal is inappropriate. The court grants defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's other claims, finding that plaintiff's complaints of being confined in a filthy, flooded, isolated boxcar cell without ventilation for three days are not sufficiently serious conditions to implicate constitutional protection; and that plaintiff has not shown his First Amendment right to access the courts was violated because plaintiff cannot show an injury from any alleged restriction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 39) and defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 46) are granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.