The time-computation [in] . . . § 2006(A) applies to `any period of time prescribed or allowed by this title.'"). See also Dudley v. Major Constr. Co., 345 P.2d 881, 884 (Okla. 1959); Bendelari v. Kinslow, 136 P.2d 918, 922 (Okla. 1943); McCallum Forber v. Owens, 85 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1938); Pure Oil Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 72 P.2d 779 (Okla. 1937). The cited cases afford a rich source of authority for the principle that rules of pleading and practice in the district courts have no place in intra-court stages of a compensation proceeding.

District court rules of pleading and practice have no place in compensation proceedings. Camps, supra note at 638 (Opala, J., concurring); Dudley v. Major Construction Company, Okla., 345 P.2d 881, 884 (1959); Bendelari v. Kinslow, 192 Okla. 390, 136 P.2d 918, 922 (1943); McCallum Forber v. Owens, 184 Okla. 66, 85 P.2d 411 (1938); Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779, 781 (1937). District court rules are inapplicable to proceedings upon a compensation claim.

Our jurisprudence affords a rich source of authority for the principle that rules of pleading and practice in the district courts have no place in compensation proceedings. Dudley v. Major Construction Company, Okla., 345 P.2d 881, 884 (1959); Bendelari v. Kinslow, 192 Okla. 390, 136 P.2d 918, 922 (1943); McCallum Forber v. Owens, 184 Okla. 66, 85 P.2d 411 (1938); Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779, 781 (1937). The cited cases hold that unlike district court suits, compensation claims may not be terminated by the trial court's involuntary dismissal.

We have many times held that where an award for temporary total disability has been made which was paid and the case closed, such an order did not preclude the claimant from thereafter having permanent partial disability determined, although the time within which an application for review on the ground of a change of condition could be filed had elapsed. See Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779, and authorities therein cited. Also, Pauly Jail Building Co. v. Akin, 184 Okla. 249, 86 P.2d 796.

This court has repeatedly held that under the provisions of 85 O.S. 1941 § 1[ 85-1] et seq., it is the duty of the State Industrial Commission to make or deny an award after hearing upon the merits. Marland Refining Co. v. Bivins, 135 Okla. 14, 273 P. 212; Royal Mining Co. v. Murray, 167 Okla. 460, 30 P.2d 185; Nelson v. Carter Oil Co., 191 Okla. 388, 130 P.2d 289; McCallum Forber v. Owens, 184 Okla. 66, 85 P.2d 411; Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779; Kansas Explorations, Inc., v. Blaine, 195 Okla. 428, 158 P.2d 907; Higgs v. State Industrial Commission, 197 Okla. 281, 170 P.2d 240. In Marland Refining Co. v. Bivins, supra, we said:

We are inclined to the view of petitioners on this issue, but in this respect the order made on November 17, 1943, is not clear. We have held that after the temporary disability has ended an injured employee is entitled to a clear and concise ruling upon the question of whether or not he has any permanent disability as the result of the accidental injury (Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779); and the State Industrial Commission at any hearing to determine the disability cannot adjudge that there will be no further disability. Gardner Petroleum Co. v. Poe, 166 Okla. 169, 26 P.2d 743.

It was stipulated by the parties that the evidence taken at the hearings should be introduced in evidence and considered as the evidence on application for an additional award. We are of the opinion, and hold, that there is competent evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the State Industrial Commission that the disability that petitioner has is not the result of the accidental injury of July 21, 1938. Although the court has held that where the circumstances of the case are such that a finding is had that the injuries are only temporary and it later develops that the injuries are permanent an award for permanent disability may be made, see Williams Bros. v. Addison, 163 Okla. 264, 21 P.2d 1047; Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779, we have held that the cause and extent of the disability resulting from an accidental injury are questions of fact for the determination of the State Industrial Commission and that the findings will not be disturbed if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to sustain the order. The burden was on the petitioner to establish that he had a permanent disability as a result of the accidental injury on July 21, 1938. Cook v. State Industrial Commission, 186 Okla. 157, 96 P.2d 1038. The petitioner stipulated that the record of the evidence on the former hearings should constitute the evidence before the State Industrial Commission. There was no attempt by the petitioner to introduce any other evidence of any disability resulting from the accidental injury of July 21, 1938.

However, payments made for a period of temporary total disability, or any part thereof, or an order of the commission entered therefor, does not start the statute of limitation running. See New State Ice Co. v. Sanford et al., 167 Okla. 435, 30 P.2d 708; Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779; Fournier Stucco Plastering Co. et al. v. Greer et al., 187 Okla. 589, 104 P.2d 423; and the other cases to the same effect. The limitation provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act, supra, does not start running until an order is entered by the commission for permanent partial disability or it is determined by the commission that no permanent disability exists.

We think it clear from the wording of the order that the State Industrial Commission was under the impression that the order of June 14, 1939, was, in effect, res judicata. The State Industrial Commission should make it clear that it considered the evidence and denied an award either on the ground that there was no permanent disability as a result of the accidental injury (see Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779), or that there was no evidence of a change of condition, if it is its intention to find that he has no disability as a result of the accidental injury of July 21, 1938. On the other hand, it should make an award if it finds from the evidence that there is a disability occurring since the last prior award.

By the plain terms of section 4, ch. 29, S. L. 1933, amending section 13367, supra, the limitation is on the application for additional permanent disability by reason of a change in condition. Pure Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 181 Okla. 176, 72 P.2d 779; New State Ice Co. v. Sanford, 167 Okla. 435, 30 P.2d 708. As was said in Patrick Tillman v. Matkin, 154 Okla. 232, 7 P.2d 414, the filing of a stipulation and receipt on Form 7, whether approved or not, is a substitute for the original claim; if the claim is filed, the State Industrial Commission thereafter has a continuing jurisdiction to enter an award for temporary total, permanent partial and further permanent disability on a change of condition on account of the accidental injury sustained, limited only by the restrictions contained in the amendment of chapter 29, S. L. 1933, supra.