Opinion
January 13, 1972.
May 25, 1972.
Appeals — Timeliness — No notice of order of court below received by counsel for either party — Failure of court officials to mail counsel of record copies of opinions and orders — Appeal within prescribed statutory period after receipt of notice.
1. In this case, in which it appeared that the court below held that the Commonwealth was liable for interest on an overpayment of inheritance taxes; that appellee contended that the order of the Supreme Court permitting the Commonwealth's appeal nunc pro tunc was improper, in that the appeal was filed more than two years after the decree of the court below; and that the parties filed a stipulation that counsel for neither party had received any form of notice from any source whatever that the court below had entered an order until appellee's counsel first learned of the order of the court below almost a year after its entry; it was Held that the facts of the appeal warranted appellate review.
Taxation — Inheritance taxes — Overpayment — Liability of Commonwealth for interest on overpayment.
2. A sovereign state is not liable for interest in any case except where, expressly or by reasonable construction of a contract or statute, it has placed itself in a position of liability. [442]
3. In this case, in which it appeared that the executors of a decedent's estate overpaid the inheritance tax; and that after the death of the life tenant the executors claimed as a credit on the inheritance tax not only this overpayment but also the legal interest on the overpayment; and that the overpayment had not been solicited by the Commonwealth; it was Held that tho court below erred in holding that the Commonwealth was liable for interest on the overpayment.
Argued January 13, 1972. Before JONES, C. J., EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Appeal, No. 18, Jan. T., 1972, from decree of Court of Common Pleas, Orphans' Court Division, of Delaware County, No. 228 of 1956, in the matter of the estate of William C. Purdy, deceased. Decree reversed.
Appeal from denial of protest by Pennsylvania Department of Revenue.
Decree entered sustaining appeal, opinion by SWENEY, P. J. Commonwealth appealed.
Vincent X. Yakowicz, Deputy Attorney General, with him J. Shane Creamer, Attorney General, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Edwin B. Barnett, with him Joseph P. Mullen, for appellee.
William C. Purdy died testate on October 5, 1954, leaving a life estate to his widow with an unlimited power of consumption and the remainder, if any, to his nephew. As of February 24, 1956, the executors of William C. Purdy's estate overpaid the inheritance tax by the amount of $4,824.30. After the death of the life tenant, the executors of William C. Purdy's estate claimed as a credit on the inheritance tax not only this overpayment but also the legal interest on the overpayment, to wit, $3,200.85. While crediting the overpayment, the Commonwealth disallowed the interest claim and the estate filed a protest with the Department of Revenue. The protest was denied and an appeal was taken to the Orphans' Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. That court held that the Commonwealth was liable for interest on the overpayment and this appeal followed.
Initially, it is argued that our order of April 19, 1971, permitting the Commonwealth's appeal nunc pro tunc was improper. Since the decree of the court below was entered on February 24, 1969, more than two years before this appeal was filed, the appellee argues that the statutory appeals period is mandatory and that this Court is powerless to extend the time. E.g., Dixon, Estate, 443 Pa. 303, 279 A.2d 39 (1971); Hanna Estate, 367 Pa. 337, 80 A.2d 740 (1951). Although we agree with this principle, we believe our previous order was correct.
Along with appellant's petition for leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc and answer thereto, the parties filed a stipulation which stated, inter alia, "[n]either attorney received any form of notice or notification from any source whatsoever that [the court below] entered all Order dated February 24, 1969 until [appellee's counsel] first learned of said Order on January 18, 1971." Although it was further stipulated that the clerical staff of the court below "would testify that it was their usual practice . . . to mail to counsel of record copies of Opinions and Orders," we believe the facts of this appeal are sufficiently analogous to Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256, 198 A. 154 (1938), and its progeny as to warrant our review.
The appellant's counsel in Nixon was not informed by the Superior Court Prothonotary of the decision of that Court and this Court allowed an appeal nunc pro tunc: "appellant should not be made to suffer for the prothonotary's neglect to notify him of the order affirming the judgment." 329 Pa. at 261, 198 Atl. at 158. See, also, Peter Adoption Case, 176 Pa. Super. 6, 107 A.2d 185 (1954).
Addressing the merits of this litigation, the specific issue presented by this appeal is whether the Commonwealth, in the absence of any contract or statute, is liable for the payment of interest on the overpayment of inheritance taxes. The court below relied on an adjudication by the same court in Willcox Estate, 14 Fiduc. Rep. 314, 319-20, 33 Pa. D. C.2d 349, 354-55 (O.C. 442 Del. 1964): "[I]f an inheritance tax is not paid when due, the Commonwealth imposes a penalty equivalent to interest charges. Justice and equity require that where there has been a prepayment of part, but less than all, of the tax due at some future date, the taxpayer should be entitled at the time of final assessment to credit not only for the dollar amount of the prepayment, but also interest thereon." (Emphasis added)
Initially, it should be noted that we are not bound by Willcox Estate. Moreover, the appellee ignores an operative fact: the Commonwealth did not solicit such overpayment. Lastly, the appellee ignores the well-settled rule that a sovereign state is not liable for interest in any case except where, expressly or by reasonable construction of a contract or statute, it has placed itself in a position of liability. See, Marianelli v. General State Authority, 354 Pa. 515, 516, 47 A.2d 657 (1946); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v. Smith, 350 Pa. 355, 362, 39 A.2d 139, 143 (1944); Culver v. Commonwealth, 348 Pa. 472, 474, 35 A.2d 64, 65 (1944); Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 276 Pa. 12, 14, 119 A. 723 (1923). See, generally, Annot., 88 A.L.R. 2d 823 (1963). Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the decree of the court below was clearly erroneous.
Decree reversed. Costs to be equally divided.