Summary
In Puncec v. City County of Denver, 28 Colo.App. 542, 475 P.2d 359 (1970), the referee in a worker's compensation case relied on the claimant's hospital records to deny the claimant's request for medical benefits.
Summary of this case from Copley v. RobinsonOpinion
No. 70-168
Decided September 22, 1970.
Industrial Commission affirmed referee's denial and dismissal of claimant's petition to reopen her claim. Claimant appealed.
Order Set Aside and Cause Remanded
1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION — Industrial Commission — Receive — As Evidence — Hospital Records. The legislature, by C.R.S. 1963, 81-14-3(2)(e), authorized the Industrial Commission to receive as evidence, and use as proof of any fact in dispute, hospital records of an injured employee.
2. Industrial Commission — Not Promulgate — Rules of Evidence — Beyond Authority — Courts. The legislature did not authorize the Industrial Commission to promulgate rules of evidence which courts themselves are without authority to adopt.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE — Rules of Evidence — Relaxed — Administrative Proceeding — Not Disregard — Due Process — Fundamental Rights. Although rules of evidence may be somewhat more relaxed in an administrative proceeding than in a court of law, they cannot be so relaxed that due process of law and fundamental rights are disregarded.
4. TRIAL — Cross-examination — Right — Fundamental — Scope Limited — Cannot Be Denied. Cross-examination is a right, not a mere privilege, and is fundamental to our judicial system; and although its scope may be restricted, within the sound discretion of the court, it cannot be denied.
5. WORKERS' COMPENSATION — Pro Se Claimant — Not Request — Hospital Records — Nor Seek — Cross-examine — Referee's Failure — Offer Cross-examination — Opportunity to Inspect — Improper. Although claimant, appearing pro se, did not request an opportunity to inspect hospital records, nor did she seek to cross-examine on them, referee used the records in arriving at his decision and his failure to offer claimant opportunity to inspect the records was improper as was his failure to advise her of her right of cross-examination.
Appeal from The Industrial Commission of Colorado
L. F. Butler, for petitioner.
Fred B. Dudley, Richard G. Fisher, Jr., for respondents City and County of Denver and State Compensation Insurance Fund.
Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, John P. Moore, Deputy, Peter L. Dye, Assistant, for respondent The Industrial Commission of Colorado.
This is an appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission affirming a denial and dismissal by the referee of appellant's (claimant before the Commission) petition to reopen. Since there is only one issue involved in this case, we will not detail the entire factual situation, but will confine ourselves only to those facts pertaining to the specific issue raised.
At the hearing on claimant's petition to reopen, the referee heard testimony by claimant and by one of her physicians concerning the alleged deterioration of her physical condition resulting from an earlier compensable injury and not anticipated at the time of the initial award by the Commission. In rebuttal, respondents offered as a witness the librarian in charge of hospital records pertaining to claimant's treatment, who testified only that records in her charge were the complete medical records of the claimant's hospitalization. The referee stated that these records could be copied, with the originals to be returned to the witness. No further testimony regarding the content of the records was taken from this witness, nor from any other. These records were never offered into evidence.
Claimant was not represented by counsel at this hearing, and apparently was in no way offered an opportunity to examine the records nor advised of her right to cross-examine on them. The hearing proceeded with cross-examination of her physician on matters not pertaining to the records.
Although the records were not placed in evidence, they evidently remained in the referee's files, and he alluded to them specifically and used them as a basis for his order, which order denied and dismissed claimant's petition to reopen.
The question presented is: Did claimant receive due process of law when not given an opportunity to inspect, nor to cross-examine on, documents which served as a basis for the denial of her petition? We answer in the negative.
[1-3] The legislature, by C.R.S. 1963, 81-14-3(2)(e), authorized the Commission to receive as evidence, and use as proof of any fact in dispute, hospital records of an injured employee. The legislature did not, however, authorize the Commission to promulgate rules of evidence which courts themselves are without authority to adopt. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Washburn, 112 Colo. 430, 149 P.2d 804. Although the rules of evidence may be somewhat more relaxed in an administrative proceeding than in a court of law, they cannot be so relaxed that due process of law and fundamental rights are disregarded.
It has long been axiomatic that cross-examination is a right, and not a mere privilege. Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co., 129 F. 668. This right is fundamental to our judicial system; and although its scope may be restricted, within the sound discretion of the court, it cannot be denied. Carsell v. Edwards, 165 Colo. 335, 439 P.2d 33.
In the instant case, it is true that claimant did not request an opportunity to inspect the hospital records; nor did she seek to cross-examine on them. However, since the referee used the records in rendering a decision against claimant, his failure to advise claimant, who was appearing pro se, of her right of cross-examination was improper, as was his failure to offer her an opportunity to inspect the records before using them against her.
Appellees argue that the referee acted within his power, under Hatterman v. Industrial Commission, 171 Colo. 370, 467 P.2d 820, in which the referee was allowed to consider, in arriving at his decision, certain medical reports which were in his files and which were not offered into evidence. However, that case is distinguishable from the instant case because the referee therein advised the parties, who were represented by counsel, that he would hold a further hearing before announcing his decision, and that he would consider all medical reports which were in the file. Nevertheless, the claimant therein did not attempt to cross-examine the doctor involved, nor otherwise attempt to prevent consideration of the reports. In affirming, our Supreme Court held that claimant could not complain about consideration of the reports, even though not admitted as exhibits at the subsequent hearings, since he had been forewarned that the reports would be considered. There is, however, no such waiver of the right to cross-examination in the case before us.
We accordingly set aside the award of the Commission and remand the case with instructions to hold a new hearing on claimant's petition to reopen.
JUDGE DWYER and JUDGE ENOCH concur.