Opinion
1:22-CV-00140-SPB-RAL
06-26-2024
MARKESE DELQUAN PULLIUM, Petitioner v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondent
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
ECF NO. 4
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for habeas corpus, ECF No. 4, be denied and that no certificate of appealability issue.
II. Report
A. Introduction
Petitioner Markese Delquan Pullium, an inmate formerly in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). ECF No. 4. Petitioner is challenging the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's (“Parole Board”) calculation of his maximum sentence date. Id. Because it appears that Petitioner was subsequently granted parole and released from incarceration, his petition will be denied as moot.
B. Background
On May 31, 2017, Petitioner was sentenced in state court to 1 year, 1 month, and 17 days to 4 years of incarceration on drug and probation violation charges. ECF No. 8-2. Petitioner was released on parole on April 28, 2018. Id. On July 7, 2020, he was arrested by the Pennsylvania State Police and charged with additional drug offenses. Id. Based on that arrest, the Parole Board revoked Petitioner's parole and recommitted him as a convicted parole violator. Id. The Board calculated his maximum violation date to December 16, 2023. Id.
A search performed on the Pennsylvania Inmate Locator website on June 14, 2024, indicated that Petitioner is currently listed as a “parolee” rather than an “inmate” in the DOC's tracking system. Further investigation revealed that, while this habeas action was pending, the Parole Board granted parole and released Petitioner from custody on September 15, 2023. The Court may take judicial notice of these facts because the state court docket and the orders and filings entered therein are matters of public record. See, e.g., Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, 716 F.3d 764, 722 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Hoffert, 2018 WL 4828628, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2018) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of relevant prior court orders, including orders in other cases.”) (citing Mina v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Penn., 710 Fed.Appx. 515, 517 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2017)).
C. Analysis
It is a well-established principle that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an issue unless it presents a live case or controversy as required by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). “‘To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'” Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). “The case or controversy requirement continues through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate, and requires that parties have a personal stake in the outcome.” Id. (citing Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Thus, if developments occur that eliminate a petitioner's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant effective relief, the case must be dismissed as moot. Id. at 147-48; Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013).
In many habeas cases, the crucial issue with respect to mootness is whether “some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole” might still be amenable to remedy. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. In other words, there still may be a case or controversy before the court - even if the injury that a complaining party seeks to remedy through litigation no longer exists - if there is a “collateral injury” that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477); Burkey, 556 F.3d at 14751. This is not the case, however, in the context of a parole denial or calculation. Rather, because the only relief that a court can grant in such circumstances is a new parole hearing, a subsequent hearing held by the Parole Board renders an inmate's challenge to the prior parole decision moot. See, e.g., Henderson v. Brookes, 2017 WL 6497358, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2017) (“Given that the Board issued a decision on June 19, 2017 granting Henderson the relief sought in his petition, Henderson's petition challenging the Board's [prior] denials has been rendered moot.”); Alex v. Gavin, 2015 WL 8012825, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2015) (“As noted, the only relief we can grant would be a new parole hearing and since Alex admits he received a new hearing . . . since the filing of his habeas petition, his challenge to the denials of parole before the March 2015 decision is now moot.”); Coles v. Folino, 2014 WL 5685547(W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2014) (“Because the appropriate remedy in this case would be a new hearing before the Board, and because Petitioner has had a new hearing since the time he filed this petition, any claims challenging the denial of parole prior to [the most recent hearing] are moot.”).
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that this matter is indeed moot. Since the Parole Board granted parole and released Petitioner from state custody, there is no longer any habeas relief that this Court can provide. See, e.g., Henderson, 2017 WL 6497358, at *2; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18 (“[M]ootness, however it may have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.”). As such, Petitioner's habeas petition should be dismissed, with prejudice, and this case marked closed.
III. Certificate of Appealability
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Petitioner's claims should be denied as untimely. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability should issue.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).