Opinion
14-P-1455
03-31-2016
JOSEPH A. PULEIO v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION & others.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Joseph Puleio appeals from the dismissal of his complaint alleging violations of his Federal civil rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as violations of various Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) regulations. We affirm.
1. DOC regulations. a. Private right of action. Puleio argues that the confiscation of his wedding band and items of clothing under the DOC's inmate property policy, 103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 403.00 (2001) was improper. He contends that the DOC waived the application of this regulation, as he had been permitted to wear his wedding band beginning in 1981, despite advising staff that he was divorced. Puleio's claims fail as he does not have a private right of action under the DOC inmate property policy. The regulation specifically states that it "is not intended to confer any procedural or substantive rights or any private cause of action not otherwise granted by state or federal law." 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.01 (2001). The Supreme Judicial Court has repeatedly held that a private cause of action cannot be inferred from an agency regulation. Loffredo v. Center for Addictive Behaviors, 426 Mass. 541, 546 (1998). Moreover, it is the Attorney General who is directed to "take cognizance of all violations of law . . . and [to] institute or cause to be instituted such criminal or civil proceedings before the appropriate state and federal courts, tribunals and commissions as [s]he may deem to be for the public interest . . . ." G. L. c. 12, § 10. See Attorney Gen. v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 382 Mass. 57, 59 (1980).
The clothing included a black T-shirt and two pairs of socks.
From 1981 until November 23, 2010, Puleio was incarcerated at the Old Colony Correctional Center (OCCC) until his transfer to Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord. At OCCC, he was permitted to retain his wedding band and the clothing in question.
b. Contraband determination. Puleio contends that confiscation of his wedding band and clothing violated the DOC inmate property policy. The policy authorizes married inmates to possess a wedding band. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.10(6)(a) (2001). Puleio self-reported as being divorced. Puleio contends again that the DOC waived application of this regulation, as he was permitted to possess the wedding band while an inmate at the Old Colony Correctional Center. It was upon his transfer to Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord (MCI-Concord) that the items were confiscated as contraband. The regulations do not prevent the receiving institution (here MCI-Concord) from conducting a search and inventory of Puleio's property upon his arrival. See Rasheed v. Commissioner of Correction, 446 Mass. 463, 476 (2006).
Next, Puleio argues equitable laches and that he is exempt from implementation of an ex post facto law. The ex post facto argument fails as a matter of law as the doctrine applies only to laws that impose punishment. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 500 (2000). Here, the purpose of the regulation is to promote institutional safety, not to punish inmates. The equitable laches argument also fails under Rasheed, 446 Mass. at 469-471. In that case, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the designation of certain religious items as contraband under the inmate property policy, despite the inmate's possession of these items for twenty-five years.
c. Due process. As a prisoner, Puleio has certain ownership rights, but he does not have unlimited rights to possess property in prison. See Ford v. Schmidt, 577 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1978). Puleio received all required process prior to the disposal of the property, and the disposal was conducted in accordance with 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.14 (2001). He received two separate contraband notifications and each time failed to respond. The second notice indicated a date certain for disposal of the property. As the disposal of Puleio's property was in accordance with the inmate property policy, he is unable to sustain a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights.
The notices requested that Puleio select one of the three methods of disposal outlined in the property policy, which included the option of having a family member retrieve the items.
2. RLUIPA claim. a. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Puleio claims that the wedding band was exempt from the regulations as it served as a "Native American fertility symbol" and was "integral to [his] religious beliefs and traditions." Puleio failed to submit a request to the DOC's religious services review committee, where he could have sought a designation of his wedding band as a religious item. 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.10(9) (2001). This DOC committee has been held to be an appropriate administrative body for review of inmate religious requests. Rasheed, 446 Mass. at 475-477. As Puleio failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, his claim must fail. See G. L. c. 127, § 38F.
Puleio self-reported that he was Catholic and that his culture was American.
b. Failure to state a claim under RLUIPA. Puleio failed to allege that the confiscation of his wedding band burdened a sincerely held religious belief. He simply alleged that the wedding band held religious significance to him. This is insufficient to support a claim for a violation of RLUIPA. See Rasheed, 446 Mass. at 472; Ahmad v. Department of Correction, 446 Mass. 479, 485-486 (2006).
3. Damages. Where a State official is sued in his or her official capacity, a plaintiff may not recover monetary damages. O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 415 Mass. 132, 140-141 (1993). Accordingly, the defendants, in their official capacities, are immune from suit for damages. Furthermore, claims against the defendants in their individual capacities are barred under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Contrast Gutierrez v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 437 Mass. 396, 403-405 (2002).
To the extent we do not address Puleio's other arguments, "they 'have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion.'" Department of Rev. v. Ryan R., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 389 (2004), quoting from Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Katzmann, Milkey & Blake, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: March 31, 2016.