Pugh v. Porter Bros. Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Irwin v. Pacific Fruit Produce Co.

    188 Wn. 572 (Wash. 1936)   Cited 6 times

    We find nothing in the contract itself which is inconsistent with a bailment. A similar question was considered by the supreme court of California in the case of Pugh v. Porter Bros. Co., 118 Cal. 628, 50 P. 772, which concerned a consignment of raisins to a commission merchant who guaranteed a minimum return. Concerning this phase of the case, the court, referring to the consignee, said:

  2. Hitchens v. Thompson Nat'l Props., LLC

    Civil Action No. 12-cv-02367-LTB-BNB (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Under California law, a guaranty agreement is a contract. See Pugh v. Porter Bros. Co., 118 Cal. 628, 50 P. 772 (1897). Here, the Subscription Agreement represents the original agreement and the Guaranty Agreement is its own contract. Thus, I analyze Plaintiffs' breach of guaranty claim under contract law.

  3. Moulton v. Williams Fruit Corp.

    218 Cal. 106 (Cal. 1933)   Cited 3 times
    In Moulton v. Williams FruitCorp., 218 Cal. 106 [ 21 P.2d 936], this court affirmed judgment against the surety on a bond filed under the Produce Dealers' Act (Stats.

    The presence of the guaranty did not alter its essential features. Title to the goods did not pass until sale was made by the factor ( Pugh v. Porter Bros., 118 Cal. 628 [50 P. 772]). The guaranty was but an inducement to the grower to enter into the contract.

  4. Mackenzie v. Hodgkin

    126 Cal. 591 (Cal. 1899)   Cited 23 times

    (Whelan v. Lynch, 60 N.Y. 469; 19 Am. Rep. 202.) Prices in Fresno were not admissible. (Pugh v. Porter Bros.Co., 118 Cal. 628; Durst v. Barton, 47 N.Y. 167; 7 Am. Rep. 428; Cahan v. Platt, 69 N.Y. 348; Nickerson v. Soesman, 98 Mass. 365; Gregory v. McDowell, 8 Wend. 435; Jones v. St. Louis etc. Ry.Co., 53 Ark. 27; 22 Am. St. Rep. 175; Nelson v. Morgan, 2 Mart. (La.) 256.) H.H. Welsh, and George E. Church, for Respondent.

  5. Glantz v. Freedman

    100 Cal.App. 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929)   Cited 18 times
    In Glantz v. Freedman, 100 Cal.App. 611 [ 280 P. 704], it was held that a principal's remedies against a factor for unauthorized dealing with fruits include an action for damages for breach of contract or in tort for conversion, or, by waiving the tort, assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, in which case his action is on a contract implied by law arising upon a waiver of tort, citing 3 Cal.Jur. 377, 380.

    "In many cases . . . the principal may treat the unauthorized sale not merely as a breach of contract, but as a conversion of the goods." (Mechem on Agency, 2d ed., sec. 2529; Pugh v. Porter Brothers Co., 118 Cal. 628, 633 [50 P. 772].) "It is well settled under the authorities that when one's goods are wrongfully taken and used by another, he may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit for their value, as for goods sold and delivered."

  6. Estrella Vineyard Co. v. Butler

    125 Cal. 232 (Cal. 1899)   Cited 10 times

    " There was evidence tending to show that there was a market value for raisins at Fresno, and several witnesses testified what that market value was. The evidence presents a different case from that of Pugh v. Porter Brothers Co ., 118 Cal. 628, relied upon by defendants, in which the raisins were sold to be marketed at Chicago.          5.

  7. Pollok v. City of San Diego

    118 Cal. 593 (Cal. 1897)   Cited 4 times

    This court disposed of the objection by saying: "The latter in our opinion is the equivalent of the former"; and in Hellman v. Shoulters, supra, under similar facts, the court said: "An ordinance is also a resolution, or, at least so far as this statute is concerned, they are equivalent," and cited the Waldron case. In all these cases there was the power to act in some mode, and the intention [50 P. 772] to act so as to effectuate the purpose in view.          In the case at bar, there was clearly no intention to act by resolution in making the alleged contract, and, as an ordinance was necessary to enable them to perform the contract if one had been made by the resolution, we conclude that when the ordinance was vetoed the common council did not intend to enter into a contract they could not perform without the concurrence of the mayor.