Opinion
No. 3-144 / 02-0988
Filed March 26, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, David E. Schoenthaler, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in her negligence suit based on an alleged fall in a Hy-Vee store. AFFIRMED.
Robert Tappa of Spector, Tappa Nathan, Rock Island, for appellants.
Cameron Davidson and Troy Venner of Lane Waterman, Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Plaintiffs-appellants, Cathy Puffinbarger and her family, appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in her negligence suit based on an alleged fall in a Hy-Vee store. She contends the court erred in granting summary judgment because an issue of material fact exists as to the cause of her fall. We affirm.
Appellant apparently fell in a Hy-Vee store in Davenport. Although she was unable to state the cause of her fall, she noted a key chain on the floor near where she fell and posited she slipped on the key chain. Defendant-appellee, Hy-Vee, moved for summary judgment, arguing Puffinbarger (1) did not know what caused her fall, and (2) even if the key chain caused her fall, Puffinbarger could not prove it was on the floor long enough to show Hy-Vee knew, or should have known, it was on the floor. The district court granted Hy-Vee's motion for summary judgment on the second ground.
Our review is for correction of errors of law. Alexander v. Medical Assocs. Clinic, 646 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Iowa 2002). In order to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show not only that the defendant was negligent, but that the negligence was the actual and legal cause of the plaintiff's damages. Rieger v. Jacque, 584 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 1998). In other words, "there must be some causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the injury or event for which damages are sought." Hasselman v. Hasselman, 596 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Mo. 1993)). "When a jury is left to speculate on whether the defendant's conduct in fact caused the plaintiff's damages, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of proximate cause." Id. at 546.
Plaintiff was unable to state whether or not she slipped on the key chain. Because she is entitled to every legitimate inference from the evidence, the district court determined summary judgment was not appropriate on that ground. Plaintiff also was unable to demonstrate how long the key chain might have been on the floor. She had the burden to prove Hy-Vee breached a duty — to keep the premises safe for their intended use. Wiesler v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 540 N.W.2d 445, 449-50 (Iowa 1995). This duty is based on a property owner's superior knowledge of hazards. Bartels v. Cair-Dem, Inc., 255 Iowa 834, 840, 124 N.W.2d 514, 518 (1963). If an owner did not cause the hazard, a plaintiff must demonstrate the hazard must have "existed for such time defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of it." Ling v. Hosts Inc., 164 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1969). Without such proof, the jury would be left to speculate or theorize, which cannot be the basis for a finding of proximate cause. See Randal v. Roe Enters. Inc., 524 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1994). We conclude the district court correctly granted summary judgment because, on the undisputed facts, the plaintiff could not prove an essential element of her claim.