In such case it is the duty of this court to determine and hold that the verdict is excessive and to remand the cause with directions to grant a new trial unless proper remittitur is filed by plaintiff. See Chicago R.I. P. v. Brooks, 155 Okla. 53, 11 P.2d 142, and Public Service Co. v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, and the authorities therein cited. Upon thorough review of this contention we are convinced that the ends of justice require that we hold this verdict to be excessive insofar as it exceeds $30,000, plus medical and hospital bill of $700.
Also, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for physical pain and suffering directly resulting from the wrongful acts of the defendant, and future pain and suffering on the part of the injured person in consequence of the injury constitute a proper element of the damages which may be allowed. 15 Am.Jur., Damages, §§ 71, 72, and 73. In a proper consideration of these elements, as said in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783: ". . .
We cannot say that the verdict of $2,999 was excessive, or that the amount awarded clearly shows that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. See Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272. 149 P.2d 783; Denco Bus Lines, Inc., v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P.2d 560; Oklahoma Railway Co. v. Kelley, 204 Okla. 268, 229 P.2d 182. Judgment affirmed.
She would then have further opportunity to establish the monetary value of any proper losses suffered by reason of her husband's death in addition to his contributions to her from wages. As to the effect of jury's ignorance of proper rule or measure of damages, see 2nd paragraph of syllabus in Public Service Co. v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783. Therefore, in conformity with the precedent followed in Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504, and other cases, the judgment is affirmed, on condition that plaintiff file within ten days a remittitur of the judgment in the amount of $21,774.89, the excess over $48,225.11.
We have no right to place limitations upon the amount of damages returned by a jury, unless we are convinced that the amount of recovery bears no relation whatever to the evidence, or that it was induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783. A new trial should not be granted on the sole ground of excessive damages unless the amount awarded be so flagrantly outrageous and extravagant as to clearly show that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality or prejudice. Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Bagley, 173 Okla. 188, 47 P.2d 87. There is no fixed rule or standard whereby damages for pain and suffering can be measured, and the amount of damages to be awarded for pain and suffering must be left to the judgment of the jury, subject only to corrections by the courts for abuse and passionate exercise.
"`In a suit for damages for personal injuries, before a verdict of the jury will be set aside as excessive, it must appear that the verdict is so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous and such as manifestly shows the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption.'" Again in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, 789, this Court quoted from Producers' Refiners' Corporation v. Castile, 89 Okla. 261, 214 P. 121: "`* * * we have no right to place limitations upon the amount returned by the jury unless we are convinced that the amount of recovery bears no relation whatever to the evidence or that it was induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury.'"
Under the circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the verdict for $65,000 and judgment based thereon is excessive to the extent of $25,000, and that the ends of justice require that a new trial be granted unless the plaintiff files a remittitur; otherwise, the judgment is sustained by the evidence and the law. Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, 790. Therein it was said:
We cannot sustain this theory. In Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, 784, we held: "When a verdict is attacked on the ground that it is excessive, this court will not disturb the same unless the jury has committed some gross and palpable error, or acted under bias, influence, or prejudice, or has totally ignored the rule of law by which damages are awarded, but when the amount awarded as damages is so excessive as to indicate that the jury was actuated by bias, prejudice, or passion, it is the duty of this court to hold the verdict to be excessive and to remand the cause with directions to vacate the judgment and grant a new trial unless the plaintiff files a proper remittitur."
"We have no right to place limitations upon the amount of damages returned by a jury, unless we are convinced that the amount of recovery bears no relation whatever to the evidence, or that it was induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783. A new trial should not be granted on the sole ground of excessive damages unless the amount awarded be so flagrantly outrageous and extravagant as to clearly show that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality or prejudice. Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Bagley, 173 Okla. 188, 47 P.2d 87."
See the annotation at 93 A.L.R. 500, 505, 506. Respondent argues, in substance, that the word "or", as it appears between sections 134's various phrases describing the county in which "an action * * * against a corporation created by the laws of this state may be brought * * *", is disjunctive, rather than conjunctive (citing principally Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783) thus allowing such an action to be brought in any county answering any of said descriptions. The principal weakness in respondent's argument is that it does not demonstrate how Canadian County answers any of these descriptions. He does, in effect, say that having extended its boundaries into Canadian County, the City taxes residents of that County and has assumed to furnish municipal services to a portion of said County, and its residents; but he does not claim that its principal office, or place of business, is in said County, or that any of its principal officers reside there; and, obviously under the agreed facts, Vera C. Moore's alleged cause of action in Cause No. 20874, supra, "* * * or some part thereof * * *" did not arise there (unlike that of the plaintiff in the action involved in City of McAlester v. Fogg, Okla., 312 P.2d 867).