Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins

14 Citing cases

  1. Currens v. Hampton

    939 P.2d 1138 (Okla. 1997)   Cited 10 times

    Because of the advanced age of the plaintiff, and what the Court characterized as a satisfactory recovery, the Court determined that $23,500 of the $35,000 award would have had to be attributable to pain and suffering and permanent injury. The Court concluded that verdict was excessive. The Court cited Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, 784 (1944) for the rule that this Court will not disturb a verdict on the grounds that it is excessive unless the jury has committed some gross and palpable error, or acted under bias, influence, or prejudice, or has totally ignored the rule of law by which damages are awarded. The Hawkins case continued that when the amount of damages awarded is so excessive as to indicate that the jury was actuated by bias, prejudice, or passion, it is the duty of this Court to hold the verdict excessive and to remand the cause with directions to vacate the judgment and grant a new trial unless the plaintiff files a proper remittitur.

  2. Green v. Burns

    230 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1951)   Cited 3 times

    We cannot say that the verdict of $2,999 was excessive, or that the amount awarded clearly shows that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. See Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272. 149 P.2d 783; Denco Bus Lines, Inc., v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P.2d 560; Oklahoma Railway Co. v. Kelley, 204 Okla. 268, 229 P.2d 182. Judgment affirmed.

  3. Doughty v. Martin

    1973 OK 40 (Okla. 1973)   Cited 1 times

    Our previous holdings support the trial judge's ruling on this point. In paragraph 2 of the syllabus in Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, this Court stated: "Within the meaning of such section such corporation may be sued in any county wherein it regularly maintains an office or place of business, with servants, employees or agents engaged in conducting and carrying on the business for which it exists, although it has its principal office or place of business in another county."

  4. Chris Well Servicing Co. v. Coryell

    435 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1967)   Cited 2 times
    In Chris Well Servicing, I expanded upon the history and gave further reasons why I would decline to hold that § 134 was a specific venue statute governing over the general venue statute, 12 O.S. 1961 § 139[ 12-139].

    Chortaw County and this Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court of Oklahoma County which dissolved a temporary injunction against the Sheriff of Oklahoma County from levying execution under such transcripted justice court judgments and dismissed the action by Western Paving, because the original causes of action upon which the justice court judgments were based had arisen in Choctaw County); Katschor v. Eason Oil Co., 185 Okla. 275, 91 P.2d 670 (where this Court reversed the action of the District Court of Logan County in sustaining domestic corporate defendant's special appearance and motion to quash service of summons because its principal place of business was in Garfield County, on the ground that the cause of action arose in Logan County where such defendant was sued); see also the Owens v. Clark and Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Dixon cases, supra, hereinabove cited in a slightly different connection, (of similar effect on the point presently being considered); and the case of Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783 (where the action from which the appeal was taken had been filed in Coal County; where by its charter the domestic corporate plaintiff in error had been authorized to do business in two places in that county; and where referring in its syllabus to section 134, supra, this Court there said: "Within the meaning of such section such corporation may be sued in any county wherein it regularly maintains an office or place of business, with servants, employees or agents engaged in conducting and carrying on the business for which it exists, although it has its principal office or place of business in another county.")

  5. Oklahoma City v. District Court

    429 P.2d 791 (Okla. 1967)   Cited 5 times

    See the annotation at 93 A.L.R. 500, 505, 506. Respondent argues, in substance, that the word "or", as it appears between sections 134's various phrases describing the county in which "an action * * * against a corporation created by the laws of this state may be brought * * *", is disjunctive, rather than conjunctive (citing principally Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783) thus allowing such an action to be brought in any county answering any of said descriptions. The principal weakness in respondent's argument is that it does not demonstrate how Canadian County answers any of these descriptions. He does, in effect, say that having extended its boundaries into Canadian County, the City taxes residents of that County and has assumed to furnish municipal services to a portion of said County, and its residents; but he does not claim that its principal office, or place of business, is in said County, or that any of its principal officers reside there; and, obviously under the agreed facts, Vera C. Moore's alleged cause of action in Cause No. 20874, supra, "* * * or some part thereof * * *" did not arise there (unlike that of the plaintiff in the action involved in City of McAlester v. Fogg, Okla., 312 P.2d 867).

  6. Carraco Oil Company v. Morhain

    380 P.2d 957 (Okla. 1963)   Cited 10 times
    In Carraco the court held that there was no basis for the jury to assess future medical expenses for the cost of an operation when the plaintiff did not present any testimony that he would have to undergo the operation.

    "We have no right to place limitations upon the amount of damages returned by a jury, unless we are convinced that the amount of recovery bears no relation whatever to the evidence, or that it was induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783. A new trial should not be granted on the sole ground of excessive damages unless the amount awarded be so flagrantly outrageous and extravagant as to clearly show that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality or prejudice. Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Bagley, 173 Okla. 188, 47 P.2d 87."

  7. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Kilgore

    1961 OK 261 (Okla. 1961)   Cited 8 times
    In St. Louis-San Francisco Railway v. Kilgore, 366 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1961), the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 in a personal injury action as a result of a train-automobile collision.

    We cannot sustain this theory. In Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, 784, we held: "When a verdict is attacked on the ground that it is excessive, this court will not disturb the same unless the jury has committed some gross and palpable error, or acted under bias, influence, or prejudice, or has totally ignored the rule of law by which damages are awarded, but when the amount awarded as damages is so excessive as to indicate that the jury was actuated by bias, prejudice, or passion, it is the duty of this court to hold the verdict to be excessive and to remand the cause with directions to vacate the judgment and grant a new trial unless the plaintiff files a proper remittitur."

  8. Hembree v. Southard

    1959 OK 91 (Okla. 1959)   Cited 20 times

    Under the circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the verdict for $65,000 and judgment based thereon is excessive to the extent of $25,000, and that the ends of justice require that a new trial be granted unless the plaintiff files a remittitur; otherwise, the judgment is sustained by the evidence and the law. Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, 790. Therein it was said:

  9. Y Y Cab Company v. Smith

    289 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1955)   Cited 4 times

    "`In a suit for damages for personal injuries, before a verdict of the jury will be set aside as excessive, it must appear that the verdict is so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous and such as manifestly shows the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption.'" Again in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783, 789, this Court quoted from Producers' Refiners' Corporation v. Castile, 89 Okla. 261, 214 P. 121: "`* * * we have no right to place limitations upon the amount returned by the jury unless we are convinced that the amount of recovery bears no relation whatever to the evidence or that it was induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury.'"

  10. Tulsa City Lines v. Geiger

    1954 OK 263 (Okla. 1954)   Cited 15 times

    We have no right to place limitations upon the amount of damages returned by a jury, unless we are convinced that the amount of recovery bears no relation whatever to the evidence, or that it was induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 149 P.2d 783. A new trial should not be granted on the sole ground of excessive damages unless the amount awarded be so flagrantly outrageous and extravagant as to clearly show that the jury was actuated by passion, partiality or prejudice. Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Bagley, 173 Okla. 188, 47 P.2d 87. There is no fixed rule or standard whereby damages for pain and suffering can be measured, and the amount of damages to be awarded for pain and suffering must be left to the judgment of the jury, subject only to corrections by the courts for abuse and passionate exercise.