ess was continued until or after the filing of the bill contrary to the provisions of 15 U.S.C.A. § 78h(b). Counsel for the defendant has cited numerous cases, illustrating general principles of equity with respect to the issuance of injunctions, to the effect that they will not be issued where a particular isolated transaction has been entirely consummated or terminated before the institution of the suit, or where, by reason of the subject matter, the issuance of an injunction would be futile or entirely unnecessary or the case has become moot, or where the circumstances are such that the chancellor is entirely convinced from the proof there is no likelihood of repetition. I have examined the cases and reviewed generally the applicable principles of equity, but I am not persuaded that such cases are controlling here. Illustrative cases are Bracken v. Securities Exchange Comm. 299 U.S. 504, 57 S.Ct. 18, 81 L.Ed. 374; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 228 U.S. 610, 33 S.Ct. 599, 57 L.Ed. 989; Public Service Comm. v. Telephone Co., 147 Md. 279, 128 A. 39; Rosenthal v. Shepard Broadcasting Service, Mass., 12 N.E.2d 819, 114 A.L.R. 1502 (where the cause had become moot); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444, 40 S.Ct. 293, 296, 64 L.Ed. 343, 8 A.L.R. 1121; Brookings State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, D.C., 281 F. 222 (where the practice complained of had ceased before the suit was filed); Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Otis Co., D.C., 18 F. Supp. 100, and Withington v. Roberts Co., D.C., 22 F. Supp. 460 (where the act had been consummated, and the injunction would have been futile); and see generally 32 C.J. 75, 76, 359. Many of them involve only litigation between individuals relating to personal property or individual rights where the interest of the public was not directly concerned. But here we are dealing with recent Acts of Congress establishing an important policy for the protection of the public in the sale and purchase of securities. Not only the language of the statute but the fundamental purposes of the A
At argument, the parties confirmed the fact that the settlement between ADC and Free State had been consummated and Free State had water and sewage laid on. Nevertheless, ADC continued its efforts to reverse Judge Digges's declaration of the invalidity of Article 9C of the lease and Bowie, abandoning its neutrality, urged strongly in its brief and in oral argument that Article 9C was invalid and that the declaration below should be affirmed. It is apparent that the present controversy has become moot and we take the view that ADC's appeal should be dismissed. Maryland Rules 835 a 2, 835 b (7); Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Telephone Co., 147 Md. 279. We said in Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors of Election of Baltimore County, 206 Md. 36, 43, that the cases we regarded as better considered and better reasoned:
The general rule is that a court should confine itself to the particular relief sought and refrain from deciding abstract moot issues of law which may remain after that relief has ceased to be possible. Lowe v. Lowe, 219 Md. 365, 149 A.2d 382; Banner v. Home Sales Co., 201 Md. 425, 94 A.2d 264; Public Service Comm. v. Chesapeake P. Tel. Co., 147 Md. 279, 281, 128 A. 39. Since we hold that the case is now moot we do not reach the appellant's last two contentions.
Recent Supreme Court cases have applied the same general principle. See Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 367; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 575. For similar holdings in Maryland under comparable factual situations, see Public Ser. Com'n v. Chesapeake Potomac Tel. Co., 147 Md. 279, Lloyd v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 39, and Lake Falls Ass'n v. Bd. of Zon. Appeals, 209 Md. 561, 564. We think the cases cited are distinguishable.
The zoning of the property here in question on December 2, 1947, as "Group Housing" has now been changed to "Cottage Residential". The zoning contested in the case before this Court has been superseded by the zoning authorities. As was said by Chief Judge Bond in the case of Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, 147 Md. 279, 281, 128 A. 39, the general rule is `that the court should confine itself to the particular relief sought in the case before it, and refrain from deciding abstract, moot questions of law, which may remain after that relief has ceased to be possible'."
Zukerberg v. Zukerberg, 188 Md. 428, 431, 53 A.2d 20; Kruse v. Kruse, 183 Md. 369, 37 A.2d 898. During the remaining time between February 17, 1949, when the decree was signed by the chancellor, and April 30, 1949, the case was in this Court on appeal where it was affirmed on March 8, 1950. If a voluntary separation agreement had been made by the parties while the case was pending in this Court, Mrs. Ashman would have no longer been a deserted spouse, this would have been a complete defense to her bill of complaint, there would have been no question left for judicial decision and the case would have become moot. Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 147 Md. 279, 128 A. 39; Velasco v. Potestant Episcopal Church, 200 Md. 634, 639, 92 A.2d 373, 376. We were not informed by the appellant here that any such voluntary separation agreement had been made after September 8, 1948, or while the case was here pending.
The zoning of the property here in question on December 2, 1947, as "Group Housing" has now been changed to "Cottage Residential". The zoning contested in the case before this Court has been superseded by the zoning authorities. As was said by Chief Judge Bond in the case of Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Company, 147 Md. 279, 281, 128 A. 39, the general rule is "that the court should confine itself to the particular relief sought in the case before it, and refrain from deciding abstract, moot questions of law, which may remain after that relief has ceased to be possible. Upon consideration of this and of all the circumstances of the case, we have concluded that the proper course for the Court is to dismiss the appeal.
Munder v. Purcell, 188 Md. 115, 119, 52 A.2d 923; State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 66, 51 A.2d 647; Alleghany Corp. v. Aldebaran Corp., 173 Md. 472, 477, 196 A. 418; Baldwin v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Co., 156 Md. 552, 557, 144 A. 703. The rule is based upon the principle that "the court should confine itself to the particular relief sought in the case before it, and refrain from deciding abstract, moot questions of law, which may remain after that relief has ceased to be possible." Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Co., 147 Md. 279, 281, 128 A. 39. It follows that the court could not properly approve or disapprove the "settlement". The order of dismissal would not indicate that either party had "lost the case", but merely that there was no longer a subsisting controversy as to anything except perhaps the costs.
" In Public Service Comm. v. Telephone Co., 147 Md. 279, 128 A. 39, an injunction had been granted the Telephone Company restraining the effect of an order by the Public Service Commission which preserved existing telephone rates pending in an investigation. Judge Bond said:
Iverson v. Jones, 171 Md. 649, 187 A. 863. Similar decisions as to elections have been made in the Supreme Court of the United States. Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147, 24 S.Ct. 611, 48 L.Ed. 913. Shub v. Simpson, 340 U.S. 881, 71 S.Ct. 198. This court has also held that appeals from interim orders of the Public Service Commission will not be considered after a final order has taken the place of the order appealed from, or the last mentioned order has been rescinded. Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Co., 147 Md. 279, 128 A. 39; Cassel v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Co., 147 Md. 281, 128 A. 40; Munder v. Purcell, 188 Md. 115, 52 A.2d 923. We have also declined to pass upon an order preventing the sale of property on a certain date, when the property was later sold under another order which was not appealed from. Smith v. Warrenfeltz, 116 Md. 116, 81 A. 275. The reason for these, and other similar decisions, is that our courts are established for the purpose of settling actual existing disputes, and we have no authority to give advisory opinions on the law where no such dispute exists.