Opinion
B326647
12-14-2023
Conservatorship of the Person of R.K. v. R.K., Objector and Appellant. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent,
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quinonez, Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. ZE043431, Owen Kaye, Judge.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quinonez, Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
HOFFSTADT, J.
The trial court placed R.K. in a conservatorship and involuntarily committed him to a state hospital after a jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he suffers from a mental illness that rendered him "unable to provide for his . . . basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." (Welf. &Inst. Code, §§ 5008, subd. (h)(1), 5350.) R.K. argues the jury's verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree, and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Criminal Charges and Finding of Incompetence to Stand Trial
The People charged R.K. with (1) murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); (2) possession of an assault weapon (id., § 30605, subd. (a)); and (3) possession of ammunition (id., § 30305, subd. (a)(1)). A trial court thereafter found R.K. to be incompetent to stand trial, and suspended the criminal proceedings.
II. Prior Conservatorship Proceedings
A. Initial conservatorship period
In May 2019, the Los Angeles County Office of the Public Guardian (Public Guardian) filed a petition asking the trial court to impose a conservatorship over R.K. under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act of 1967 (LPS Act) (§ 5000 et seq.). Within two weeks, the court imposed a temporary conservatorship that placed R.K. in a state hospital. In June 2019, R.K. waived his rights and agreed to the imposition of a conservatorship under the LPS Act based upon a finding that he suffers from a mental illness that renders him "danger[ous]." The conservatorship's expiration date was June 18, 2020.
B. First extension of conservatorship
In May 2020, the Public Guardian filed a petition for reestablishment of the conservatorship. In September 2020, R.K. waived his rights and agreed to the continuation of the conservatorship. The new expiration date was June 18, 2021.
C. Second extension of conservatorship
In May 2021, the Public Guardian filed a second petition for re-establishment. In January 2022, the trial court concluded that the Public Guardian had sustained its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that R.K. suffered from a mental illness that rendered him (1) dangerous, and (2) unable to provide for his basic needs.
III. The Present Proceedings (the Third ReEstablishment of Conservatorship)
A. The petition
On May 10, 2022, the Public Guardian filed a petition for re-establishment of the conservatorship over R.K.
These facts were presented during the trial, and are recounted in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Because the jury rejected a conservatorship on the basis of R.K.'s dangerousness, we do not discuss facts pertinent only to dangerousness.
R.K., a 45-year-old man, suffers from mental health issues that exhibit symptoms characteristic of schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. R.K.'s mental illness has manifested three sets of symptoms. First, he suffers from "grandiose delusions." More specifically, R.K. has auditory hallucinations when he talks to imaginary people. He also has several beliefs that are contrary to reality: R.K. believes that he has a military career-as a Navy SEAL and a sniper, as a member of a "special ops" team for the Trump and Biden administrations, and as a colonel for the USSR-and, as a consequence, that he has a "license to kill." R.K. believes that he is paying "billions" in tuition to attend classes at "USC" in (1) underwater welding; (2) psychology; (3) FedEx's practices, which include killing any sex offenders living in the houses to which FedEx drivers deliver packages; and (4) helicopter piloting. R.K. believes that he is a lawyer who makes laws. R.K. believes that he can send money to other people with his mind. R.K. also believes that he has both multiple wives who have borne him 15 children as well as a single "celebrity" wife. Second, R.K. suffers from paranoia. He expresses fears that he is being persecuted and that "the system" is conspiring against him. Third, R.K. suffers from mania. He has "very high" energy and is "very hyperverbal," which means he is "hyper, extremely talkative" and "talk[s] nonstop," and is also "animated" and "emotional[ly] escalated" when talking. The combination of these three clusters of symptoms results in R.K. having "grossly disorganized" thinking and "speech."
Although R.K. is able to maintain his own hygiene, his mental illness renders his "speech" "very disorganized" and "jumbled" because he "jump[s] around" between conversation topics based on "loose associations" between them, and in so doing, "rambles about his delusional thoughts." This prevents R.K. from "engag[ing] in . . . reciprocal communication" and coherent conversations. His jumbled thinking also makes him unable "to plan." He has yet to be declared competent to stand trial because he is unable to plan and communicate with-and hence assist-his counsel in the pending criminal matter.
Starting in November 2021, the state hospital began administering R.K. a medication called Clozaril. Clozaril is a "third-resort" medication-it may be prescribed only after two other medications have failed, and requires intensive blood testing while it is being administered. Once prescribed, however, Clozaril is often regarded as the "gold standard" of medications to treat patients with schizophrenia. Clozaril has resulted in R.K.'s behavior becoming more "stable" and in a "mild improvement overall" in his "ability to . . . communicate."
C. The trial
The petition proceeded to a three-day jury trial in October 2022.
The Public Guardian called three witnesses-the staff psychiatrist who treated R.K. in the past year, the staff psychologist who treated R.K. in the past year, and a court-appointed psychiatrist who independently evaluated R.K. by reviewing his file and interviewing him three times.
All three witnesses noted that they had observed R.K. firsthand, and testified on the basis of their observations. All three witnesses noted that R.K.'s condition has improved while he has been taking Clozaril, but also testified that he has repeatedly disavowed having any mental illness, repeatedly disavowed any need for medication, and unequivocally indicated that he will stop taking his medications if released. On this basis, the court-appointed psychiatrist testified that R.K. lacks "any insight into his mental illness." The witnesses noted that once R.K. stops taking his medication, he would "decompensate" (that is, return to his pre-medicated state) within a month.
The court-appointed psychiatrist opined that R.K. was "presently gravely disabled"-that is, "unable to provide for his basic food, clothing, and shelter"-"due to his mental illness." In support of this conclusion, the expert noted that R.K.'s "disorganized thinking" precludes him from "plan[ning]" and from "really communicat[ing] adequately" "to get what he needs," including food, shelter, and clothing. The expert further explained that R.K.'s "lack of understanding of his mental illness" means his condition will worsen if released because he will immediately stop taking his medication. He observed that R.K. has previously been unable to secure shelter, and that the same "at the very least [may] happen again" if he is released given his present condition.
The jury returned a verdict finding that R.K. suffers from mental illness rendering him gravely disabled.
D. Appeal
R.K. filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
R.K. argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that he is "gravely disabled."
As pertinent to this appeal, the LPS Act authorizes a trial court to appoint a conservator over a person-who may then be civilly committed for treatment-if that person (1) "is gravely disabled" (2) "as a result of a mental health disorder." (§ 5350.) Again, as pertinent to this appeal, a person is "gravely disabled" if a "person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A); Conservatorship of Carol K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 134-135 (Carol K.) [inability to provide for food, clothing, or shelter is sufficient; need not show inability to provide all three].)
Applying these definitions, a person is "gravely disabled" if their mental disorder renders them "incapacitated" or "otherwise" "unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival" (Carol K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 134; Conservatorship of Smith (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 903, 909 (Smith)), but not if the mental illness merely causes behavior that brings the person "into conflict with the community" when the person can otherwise still provide for their own necessities (Smith, at pp. 907, 910). And a person is "gravely disabled" if they "lack insight about their mental illness" and "would not take [their] medication without the support of a conservator," and "could not provide for themselves without medication." (Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 54 (S.A.); Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577 (Walker); Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 442, 445-446.) The need for strict adherence to the requirements of the LPS Act is critical because conservatorship often leads to involuntary confinement, and thus implicates a fundamental liberty interest-namely, freedom from confinement. (Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 250-251 [LPS Act should be construed so "'only those truly unable to take care of themselves are being assigned conservators . . . and committed to mental hospitals against their will'"]; Smith, at p. 908 ["The clear import of the LPS Act is to use the involuntary commitment power of the state sparingly . . ."].)
A conservatorship under the LPS Act lasts one year, but may be re-established. (§ 5361, subds. (a) &(b); Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 703, 710 (K.P.); Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1009.) Like the initiation of a conservatorship, a person's conservatorship may be reestablished only if the Public Guardian proves to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is presently gravely disabled. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1); K.P., at pp. 709, 710; Conservatorship of Deidre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312.)
We independently review whether the record supports the jury's finding of grave disability. We do so by asking whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value-to enable a reasonable trier of fact to find grave disability beyond a reasonable doubt. (Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1577.) "The testimony of one witness may be sufficient to support such a finding." (Carol K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 134.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that R.K. was gravely disabled at the time of his re-establishment trial. All three witnesses testified to their personal observations that R.K. lacked the ability to plan and to engage in "coherent" and "reciprocal" conversations due to his "very disorganized" and "jumbled" thought processes as well as his interjection of delusional facts into conversation. This inability to plan and to communicate directly translates into an inability "to carry out the transactions necessary for survival" (Carol K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 134), such as arranging shelter as well as buying food and clothes. This is precisely what the court-appointed expert opined. What is more, R.K. is in this state even while taking Clozaril, and given his lack of insight and effective promise not to continue taking Clozaril if released, his inability to plan and communicate-and hence arrange for shelter, food, and clothing-is only likely to render him even more gravely disabled if released.
R.K. makes what boils down to three arguments in response.
First, he argues that the court-appointed expert's opinion is a "bare opinion" with "no facts to support" it. He is wrong. All three witnesses the Public Guardian called were both witnesses offering expert opinions and fact witnesses; they were fact witnesses because they testified to their personal observations of R.K. as he displayed very real difficulties in thinking and communicating. (Accord, S.A., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 55 [explaining how expert's opinions "were based on her observations" of the potential conservatee].) R.K. relatedly argues that the Public Guardian did not introduce evidence that he had previously failed to care for himself. This is both incorrect (because a jury could have reasonably inferred that R.K.'s prior incident of homelessness constituted just such a prior incident) and irrelevant (because there is no rule requiring proof of a prior inability to provide for shelter, food, or clothing before a person can be found to be "gravely disabled," as predictive evidence can suffice).
Second, R.K. makes several "consequential" arguments- namely, that the jury's verdict effectively deems every homeless person to be "gravely disabled" and effectively deems every person suffering from schizophrenia to be "gravely disabled." That sky is not falling. Here, the evidence established that R.K. suffers from schizophrenia, and that his symptoms led directly to a severe inability to plan and to communicate that translates into an inability to arrange for and organize food, shelter, and clothing. R.K.'s homelessness was not treated as the sine qua non of being "gravely disabled" but rather as proof that what has happened before (a lack of shelter due to R.K.'s mental illness) may happen again, which is entirely permissible. (Carol K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 135 [past loss of community housing relevant to show grave disability].) Also here, schizophrenia is not the sine qua non of being "gravely disabled" because the experts here testified to the disease's severe disruption of R.K.'s ability to plan and to communicate in this case; even if such disruption is often a symptom of schizophrenia, disruption to the degree seen in this case is not an inevitable consequence of schizophrenia.
Third and lastly, R.K. argues that the Public Guardian focused most of its evidence and witnesses on proving he was dangerous rather than unable to provide for shelter, food, and clothing. This is irrelevant. What matters to substantial evidence review is not what other evidence could or should have been presented, but whether the evidence that was presented is sufficient. Here, it is.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J., CHAVEZ, J.