Opinion
A167372
07-26-2024
Conservatorship of the Person of S.H. v. S.H., Objector and Appellant. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. P15-01375
SIGGINS, J. [*]
S.H. appeals a trial court ruling reestablishing a one-year conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). We dismiss the appeal as moot.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2010, S.H. was charged with attempted murder and causing an elder to suffer, with enhancements for great bodily injury on an elder and use of a deadly weapon. It was further alleged that S.H. was on probation at the time he committed the offenses.
In January 2011, the trial court found S.H. incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the State Department of Mental Health (now the State Department of State Hospitals), pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1370. In July 2015, after five years during which his competency had not been restored, the Department of Mental Health was ordered to initiate "Murphy conservatorship" proceedings (§ 5350 et seq.).
"A conservatorship imposed under the second definition of 'gravely disabled' [(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B))] is 'commonly referred to as a "Murphy conservatorship" after the legislator who sponsored the amendment that added the definition to the [LPS] Act in 1974. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, pp. 3316-3324.)'" (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1376.)
In September 2015, the Public Guardian of Contra Costa County (Public Guardian) petitioned for appointment as conservator for S.H. under the LPS Act. At the hearing the following month, S.H. accepted the conservatorship and the petition was approved. In 2016, 2017, and 2018, the Public Guardian petitioned for reappointment as conservator, which S.H. accepted through counsel.
In 2019, the Public Guardian filed another petition for reappointment as conservator. After requesting the initial hearing be continued, the Public Guardian informed the trial court that it would be requesting a non-Murphy LPS Act conservatorship. In January 2020, the Public Guardian filed the non-Murphy petition, which S.H. accepted through his counsel in February 2020. Later in 2020 and in 2021, the Public Guardian again petitioned for reappointment as conservator, which S.H. accepted through his counsel.
This appeal involves the Public Guardian's petition to be reappointed as S.H.'s conservator in July 2022. S.H. contested this petition and requested a jury trial.
At trial, the conservator testified that S.H. has schizophrenia, a chronic disorder that can be treated but not cured. The conservator, after reviewing S.H.'s medical records and interviewing him, testified that S.H. had limited insight into his illness and poor executive functioning, which could affect his ability to continue taking his medications as prescribed. The conservator also opined that S.H. would not be able to meet his basic needs in the outside world.
S.H.'s sister and brother also testified. They described S.H.'s history of illness and their experience with it. His sister testified that when S.H. was "sick," he would say he was fine and that he did not need his psychiatric medication. She also testified that when S.H. was off his medication, his personality would change and he would become aggressive. S.H.'s brother testified to the same effect.
When asked whether S.H. could live with them, each of the siblings responded conditionally. His sister stated that if S.H. was "completely normal, he is clear, then he can come stay" with her. She stated that she was not offering to take full responsibility of S.H. at that moment "because at this point I don't know if he is fully recovered or not." Similarly, S.H.'s brother testified that S.H. could "always stay" with him, but only if he finished his treatment at his current facility. S.H.'s counsel attempted to ask additional questions regarding their offers of support, but the Public Guardian objected, and the court sustained those objections.
The jury found S.H. gravely disabled. After the verdict, the parties made a record of their discussions regarding the offers of third party support made outside the presence of the jury and off the record during trial. The court stated the offers of support were conditional and did not rise to the type of third party support contemplated by the statute. The court granted the petition and appointed the Public Guardian as conservator of S.H. for another year.
In October 2023, while this appeal was pending, S.H.'s conservatorship expired. The Public Guardian filed a new petition for reappointment in September 2023. S.H. objected and requested a jury trial. In January 2024, the Public Guardian moved to dismiss the 2023 petition, which S.H. did not oppose and the trial court dismissed it.
We grant the Public Guardian's unopposed request for judicial notice of the trial court's minute order from January 17, 2024. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
II. DISCUSSION
The LPS Act "provides one-year conservatorships for those 'gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.'" (Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 703.) A person is" 'gravely disabled' " when, as a result of a mental disorder, that person "is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter." (§ 5008, former subd. (h)(1)(A).)
Effective January 1, 2024, the language of subdivision (h)(1)(A) of section 5008 now reads as follows: "A condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, a severe substance use disorder, or a co-occurring mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care."
However, "a person is not 'gravely disabled' if that person can survive safely without involuntary detention with the help of responsible family, friends, or others who are both willing and able to help provide for the person's basic personal needs for food, clothing and shelter." (§ 5350, former subd. (e)(1); Conservatorship of Johnson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 693, 698.) The statute requires the party offering help to "specifically indicate in writing their willingness and ability to help." (§ 5350, subd. (e)(2).) This writing requirement may be satisfied when the prospective caregiver testifies that they are willing and able to help. (Conservatorship of Johnson, at p. 699, fn. 5.)
Effective January 1, 2024, the language of subdivision (e)(1) of section 5350 now reads as follows: "Notwithstanding subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (h) of Section 5008, a person is not 'gravely disabled' if that person can survive safely without involuntary detention with the help of responsible family, friends, or others who are both willing and able to help provide for the person's basic personal needs."
The Public Guardian argues this appeal is moot because the period of conservatorship at issue ended and the succeeding conservatorship petition was dismissed in January 2024. S.H., by contrast, argues we should exercise our discretion to reach the merits even though the conservatorship has expired because the consequences of S.H.'s conservatorship continue beyond the appeal and the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review.The Public Guardian has the better argument.
S.H. also argues we should reach the merits of this appeal because the conservatorship expired before the record was prepared and, as a result, S.H. is not at "fault" for the mootness. "Dismissal of appeals for mootness is not uncommon in LPS Act conservatorship cases" and there are ways to expedite such appeals. (Conservatorship of K.Y. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 985, 989-990.) Here, S.H. did not attempt to expedite the appeal. Additionally, S.H.'s reliance on In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, is inapposite. In D.P., the court noted that "Courts of Appeal have understandably opted to exercise their inherent discretion to decide certain challenges to juvenile court jurisdictional findings, notwithstanding mootness. In exercising that discretion, courts have properly considered a variety of factors," which do not have a bearing in conservatorship cases. (Id. at p. 285.) Thus, we find this argument unpersuasive.
"When a challenged conservatorship has ended, the appeal of that conservatorship is 'technically moot.'" (Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 903.) Even though an appeal is technically moot, when there may be a recurrence of the same issue between the parties and it has been fully litigated, a reviewing court has the discretion to reach the merits of an appeal. (St. John of God Retirement &Care Center v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 638, 648-649.) In the conservatorship context, courts have exercised this discretion to address important issues" 'capable of repetition but likely to evade review.'" (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142, fn. 2.) Additionally, the "continuing stigma of wrongful commitment . . . is grounds for entertaining an appeal." (Conservatorship of Carol K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 133.)
This appeal does not present any important issues which are capable of repetition but will evade review, either between the parties or generally for future conservatorship proceedings. S.H.'s conservatorship has ended. So, it is unlikely there will be future proceedings between the parties.
Moreover, the challenged issues here are fact specific and therefore have no significant precedential value. S.H.'s argument, despite being styled as a due process violation, boils down to an abuse of discretion challenge to the trial court's evidentiary ruling to prohibit additional testimony regarding his siblings' offers of third party support. Whether S.H.'s counsel should have been permitted to ask follow-up questions of his siblings turns on their specific testimony and must be evaluated in context. S.H. has not persuaded us that this issue will frequently arise in other conservatorship proceedings brought on different factual records. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 215 [declining to exercise jurisdiction where resolution of issues presented "would be unlikely to provide guidance" for future disputes because the issues "are essentially factual in nature and therefore require resolution on a case-by-case basis"].)
Finally, any continuing stigma to S.H. due to wrongful commitment does not convince us to reach the merits. S.H. was under a conservatorship from 2015 until 2021, when he last willingly accepted a conservatorship. This challenge to the 2022 conservatorship petition, even if granted, could not undo the stigma associated with his commitment from 2015 to 2022. Additionally, any consequences of commitment identified by S.H. will also persist due to his history of commitment, even if the trial court's ruling was reversed. Therefore, we decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of this appeal.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
WE CONCUR: HUMES, P. J. BANKE, J.
[*] Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.