Opinion
A167188
03-15-2024
Conservatorship of the Person of Ryan L. v. RYAN L., Objector and Appellant. PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. P2201896
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1, reciting only those facts necessary to resolve the issue raised.
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
Ryan L. appeals a February 2023 trial court ruling establishing a one-year conservatorship of his person under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) and ordering placement in a locked mental health rehabilitation center (MHRC). We dismiss the appeal as moot.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. The LPS Act "provides one-year conservatorships for those 'gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.'" (Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 703.) If grave disability is found, the trial court must determine the least restrictive appropriate placement. (§ 5358, subds. (a)(1)(A), (c)(1).)
In November 2022, the Public Guardian of Contra Costa County (Public Guardian) filed a petition for appointment of a conservator under the LPS Act. The petition alleged Ryan was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder and sought authority to detain him in a facility pursuant to section 5358. Ryan elected to proceed with a jury trial.
At trial in January 2023, a psychologist testified Ryan suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. She opined Ryan would stop taking his medications if he were not in a structured setting. The trial court admitted Ryan's county hospital records. The jury found Ryan gravely disabled due to a mental disorder (§ 5350). Thereafter, the court granted the petition, appointed the Public Guardian as conservator of Ryan's person for one year, and ordered him placed at a MHRC as the least restrictive appropriate placement.
Ryan appealed. He challenges the trial court's placement order and seeks a remand for further proceedings to determine the least restrictive placement. While the appeal was pending and before it was fully briefed, Ryan's conservatorship expired by its own terms in late January 2024.
The Public Guardian contends, and Ryan acknowledges, the appeal is moot because the conservatorship has expired and a reversal would have no practical effect. (See Conservatorship of K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 705, fn. 3 [when a challenged conservatorship has expired, the appeal of the conservatorship is rendered "technically moot"]; Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574 [case is moot if reviewing court cannot grant effective relief].)
While the appeal is technically moot, we nevertheless have discretion to decide the dispute on the merits. (See Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 161, fn. 2.) We may exercise that discretion if the appeal "raises issues that are capable of repetition yet avoiding review. [Citation.] In addition, the continuing stigma of wrongful commitment, which continues even after the commitment has ceased, is ground for entertaining an appeal." (Conservatorship of Carol K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 133.) Ryan urges us to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of his appeal, contending it raises issues which are capable of repetition yet avoiding review and should be entertained due to the continuing stigma of wrongful commitment. (See ibid.) We disagree.
This appeal does not present issues which are capable of repetition yet avoiding review. Ryan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's placement determination. The court found "by clear and convincing evidence that an MHRC is the least restrictive" placement. The decision was fact-driven and, as the court explained, was ultimately "based on the need for medication and [Ryan's] readiness to take it." Ryan has not persuasively argued the same issues will arise in another placement hearing in a separate conservatorship proceeding brought on a different factual record. (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 654 [declining to exercise jurisdiction to address "fact-specific questions" in moot appeal]; MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 215 [issues presented were "factual in nature" and required "resolution on a case-by-case basis"].) If the Public Guardian petitioned again for a conservatorship, it would constitute a new and independent proceeding at which the conservator must establish that Ryan remains presently gravely disabled. (See Conservatorship of Deidre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312 [reestablishment of a conservatorship has the same due process rights and burden of proof associated with the initial establishment].)
Nor does the continuing stigma of wrongful commitment warrant entertaining Ryan's appeal. (See Conservatorship of Carol K., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) Ryan challenges only the placement determination, not the establishment of the conservatorship. Thus, there is no claimed wrongful commitment.
We decline to reach the merits of Ryan's appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
WE CONCUR: HUMES, P. J., BANKE, J.