Opinion
115723/04.
Decided December 8, 2004.
Bruce Newborough, P.C., Brooklyn, New York for the plaintiff; McDonell Adels, P.C. (Lisa E. Hechler), Garden City, New York for the defendant.
The verified complaint alleges that Arthur Scott was injured in a car accident on March 20, 2003 and received treatment from plaintiff to whom he assigned his rights to benefits under the No-Fault Insurance Law § 5101 et seq. Plaintiff brings this action, as the assignee of Mr. Scott, to recover $1,340.30 in first party no-fault benefits. Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff engaged in a pattern of fraudulent billing practices and has failed to verify its billing for the instant claim. Plaintiff failed to oppose defendant's motion. Therefore the Court will decide this matter solely on defendant's moving papers and annexed documentation.
Defendant maintains that it is issued a timely denial because it received the bill at issue on June 16, 2003, issued a request for additional verification on June 27, 2003 and, after receiving no response from plaintiff, ultimately denied plaintiff's claim on December 1, 2003. However, defendant's moving papers do not include any proof of mailing of its request for verification ( S M Supply, Inc. v. Geico Ins. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 51192[U] [2d 11th Jud Dists 2003]). The affidavit of Ms. Dawn Madalone an Investigator employed by defendant's Special Investigations Unit does not establish mailing because Ms. Madalone does not state in her affidavit that she has personal knowledge that the requests were sent to plaintiff ( Presbyterian Hosp. v. Maryland Casualty Ins. Co., 226 AD2d 613 [2nd Dept 1996]). Nor does the Madalone affidavit create a presumption of mailing because it does not describe the standard operating procedures plaintiff uses to ensure that its verification requests are mailed ( S M Supply, Inc. v. Geico Ins. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 51192[U] [2d 11th Jud Dists 2003]). Consequently, having failed to establish that it mailed the requests for verification, defendant has failed to show that its denial of plaintiff's claim was timely. The fraud which defendant is claiming as a defense to payment of this claim is fraud by the plaintiff medical provider. Although an untimely denial permits a defendant to assert a defense of fraud by the assignor, a claim of fraud by the assignee must be asserted in a timely denial ( Melbourne Medical, P.C. v Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [2nd Dept 2004]). Consequently, defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
Even if this claim were not barred by the late denial, defendant would not be entitled to summary judgment in its favor. In order to satisfy its burden on a motion for summary judgment, defendant "must show that the accident was a deliberate event or a part of an insurance fraud scheme." ( A.M. Med., P.C. v. NY Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 NY Slip Op 50298U, *2 [Civil Ct, Queens County 2004]). This is higher than the standard when the defendant is merely opposing a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based on a fraud defense; in that event, defendant must submit "facts, in admissible form and with the requisite particularity, to create triable issues of fraud" ( A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 130A (App Term, 2d and 11th Jud Dists 2004), such as an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge of the facts at issue ( Melbourne Medical, P.C. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 92 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2004].
In support of its contention, defendant submits the transcript of the Examination Under Oath (EUO) of Dr. Patricia Garel, in which Dr. Garel states that she never provided psychological services to any of plaintiff's patients although plaintiff submitted claims to defendant seeking reimbursement for psychological services allegedly rendered by her. However, the transcript of Dr. Garel's EUO is not executed in accordance with CPLR 3116. CPLR 3116[a] provides that the transcript must be submitted to the witness so that the witness can read it and make any changes to it that are desired. If the witness then signs the transcript under oath, the transcript may be utilized. "Unsigned depositions do not suffice as proof requisite to defeat a motion for summary judgment." ( Pathmark Graphics Inc. v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 53 AD2d 531 [1st Dept 1976]; see also Lo Cicero v. Frisian, 150 AD2d 761 [2nd Dept 1989]). This principle applies equally to an examination under oath taken by an insurance company. ( Krupp v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 103 AD2d 252, 263 [2nd Dept 1984]).
In order to use a transcript that is not signed by the witness, if the witness is a nonparty, or, if a party and the transcript is not signed by the witness or certified, it is the burden of the party proffering the deposition transcript to show that the transcript was sent to the witness to be reviewed for any corrections, and that sufficient time to do so has passed ( see Siegel, 1993 Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3116:1, 1997-1998 Pocket Part, at 94). A party seeking to use an unsigned deposition transcript must show that the witness was given the opportunity that CPLR 3116 (a) provides to the witness to make sure that the transcript is correct in form and substance. This procedure is necessary to insure that the proponent of the transcript is not relying on an inaccurate transcript ( Palumbo v. Innovative Communications Concepts, 175 Misc 2d 156, 157-158 [Sup Ct, NY 1997]). In this case, defendant annexes a copy of a letter dated October 21, 2003 addressed to Dr. Garel's attorneys requesting that she sign the transcript and have it notarized, but defendant does not proffer an affidavit of a person with personal knowledge that this letter was in fact mailed. Consequently, defendant has not shown either that the transcript was properly executed or that the opportunity that CPLR 3116[a] affords the depondent for execution has passed. Therefore, the Court cannot consider the EUO transcript of Dr. Garel because it does not constitute evidence in admissible form under CPLR 3212 (See Reilly v. Newireen Assocs., 303 AD2d 214, 220 n. 2 [1st Dept 2003]).
In further support of its fraud claim, defendant again relies on the affidavit of Ms. Madalone who states in her affidavit that defendant properly denied plaintiff's claim based on overwhelming indica of fraud. Ms. Madalone states that her knowledge of the case comes from:
1. Her "review of the file which she maintained," 2. Her investigation into plaintiff's billing practices; 3. A New York State Insurance Department press release concerning the indictment of Dr. Michael Ferrato, Ph.D of Ferrato Psychological Services, P.C. (FPS) 4. Claim forms submitted to defendant by PSG and FPS for various unidentified patients other than plaintiff's assignor; 5. The transcripts of EUOs of Darcy Greenidge and Allan Gaskin; and 6. The Examination Before Trial (EBT) transcripts of Henry Johnson and Aida Ellis The Court cannot rely on any conclusions reached by Ms. Madalone which are based on unidentified documents in defendant's investigative file since those documents are not before the court in admissible form ( see CPLR 3212[b]; Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Assoc. Fur Mfrs., Inc., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067). The Court also cannot rely on the press release concerning the indictment of Dr. Ferrato since it is not in admissible form. Even if it were in admissible form, Ms. Madalone has failed to establish the relevancy of the indictment to this case since Dr. Ferrato did not treat the assignor in this case. Defendant also annexes to its moving papers reams of redacted documents which the Madalone affidavit contends proves that FPS submitted bills to defendant for the exact same services as those claimed by PSG for the same patient just days apart from the date when PSG claimed to have rendered services. However, since the name of the policy holder, the patient's name, gender and address are redacted from the documents, there is no way for the Court to make an independent determination as to whether the documents in fact support defendant's contention. More importantly, the documents are not in admissible form since they are not adequately identified ( A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Misc 3d 130A (App Term, 2d and 11th Jud Dists 2004). Therefore, the Court cannot rely on Ms. Madalone's conclusion that these documents prove fraud.
Finally, like the transcript of the EUO of Dr. Garel, the transcripts of the EUOs and EBTs of Ms. Greenidge, Mr. Gaskin, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Ellis cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment, since they are not executed and the defendant has failed to show that the deponents were given an opportunity to execute the transcripts.
Consequently, all of the documents relied on by Ms. Madalone cannot be considered by this Court in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment because the documents are not in admissible form. Therefore, defendant failed to satisfy its burden to submit facts in admissible form and with the requisite particularity to establish fraud. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.