On appeal, this Court is not bound by the district court's Rule 54(b) certification, and we will review the district court's decision, employing the abuse of discretion standard, to determine whether certification was improvidently granted. Choice Fin. Group, at ¶ 7; Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 7, 663 N.W.2d 186. A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Martin v. Trinity Hosp., 2008 ND 176, ¶ 17, 755 N.W.2d 900; Choice Fin. Group, at ¶ 7.
Olson v. Job Serv. N. Dakota , 2013 ND 24, ¶5, 827 N.W.2d 36, 40. "Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears ...." N.D. Cent. Code § 1-02-02. We must also "interpret[ ] statutes to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence," avoid adopting "a construction which would render part of the statute mere surplusage," Sorenson v. Felton , 2011 ND 33, ¶ 15, 793 N.W.2d 799, 803, and "presume the Legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences," Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wimbledon Grain Co. , 2003 ND 104, ¶21, 663 N.W.2d 186, 193. Only one published North Dakota state court case involves section 35-24-04.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Minnesota Grain, Inc. , 2008 ND 184, ¶ 9, 756 N.W.2d 763. The primary objective in interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent, as that intent is expressed in the language of the statute. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co. , 2003 ND 104, ¶ 20, 663 N.W.2d 186. Statutory provisions and all proceedings under those provisions "are to be construed liberally, with a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice." N.D.C.C. § 1-02-01.
When engaging in statutory interpretation, this Court has consistently recognized that it must be presumed the legislature intended all that it said, said all that it intended to say, and meant what it has plainly expressed. E.g., Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC, 2011 ND 183, ¶ 14, 804 N.W.2d 55;State v. Dennis, 2007 ND 87, ¶ 12, 733 N.W.2d 241;Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 28, 663 N.W.2d 186;Little v. Tracy, 497 N.W.2d 700, 705 (N.D.1993). Under the clear and unambiguous language of N.D.C.C. § 38–18.
[¶ 8] We review a district court's Rule 54(b) certification under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Brummundv. Brummund, 2008 ND 224, ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d 735; Choice Fin. Group v. Schellpfeffer, 2005 ND 90, ¶ 7, 696 N.W.2d 504; Public Service Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 7, 663 N.W.2d 186; Hansen v. Scott, 2002 ND 101, ¶ 8, 645 N.W.2d 223; Symington v. Walle Mut. Ins. Co., 1997 ND 93, ¶ 5, 563 N.W.2d 400; Krank v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 456 N.W.2d 125, 127 n. 1 (N.D. 1990); Janavaras v. National Farmers Union Prop. Cas. Co., 449 N.W.2d 578, 580 (N.D. 1989). A district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned decision, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.
" Dimond v. State Board of Higher Educ., 2001 ND 208, ¶ 8, 637 N.W.2d 692. Legislative intent must initially "`be sought from the statutory language itself, giving it its plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.'" VanKlootwyk v. Baptist Home, Inc., 2003 ND 112, ¶ 12, 665 N.W.2d 679 (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 20, 663 N.W.2d 186). [¶ 8] Under N.D.C.C. § 39-03-09(11) and (12), the general powers of highway patrol officers extend over violations of law committed on state property or upon any highway or highway right-of-way.
[¶ 10] "`Issues involving the application and interpretation of statutes are questions of law fully reviewable by this Court.'"Guardianship of Shatzka, 2003 ND 147, ¶ 5, 669 N.W.2d 95 (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 20, 663 N.W.2d 186). In construing statutes, it is the Court's duty to ascertain the Legislature's intent.
This is an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wimbledon Grain Co. , 2003 ND 104, ¶21, 663 N.W.2d 186, 193 ("We presume the Legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences.").For these reasons, section 35-24-19 is not ambiguous, and we need not consider OGT’s public policy arguments.
Further, because we conclude N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(3)(a) unambiguously allows for recovery of the risk penalty out of production from the pooled spacing unit, we do not defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05 ("When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit."); Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 28, 663 N.W.2d 186 ("Because the challenged statutes are unambiguous, we give no deference to the Commission's interpretation of them.").
Symington, 2010 ND 56, ¶ 10, 780 N.W.2d 676. "We have also held that a district court does not abuse its discretion in granting a Rule 54(b) certification if the issues raised in the appeal will not be mooted by future developments in the district court." Id. (citing Public Service Comm'n v. Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 12, 663 N.W.2d 186; Hansen v. Scott, 2002 ND 101, ¶ 15, 645 N.W.2d 223; Symington v. Walle Mut. Ins. Co., 1997 ND 93, ¶ 8, 563 N.W.2d 400). PLS Servs., at ¶ 10.