Pryor v. CCEC, Inc.

17 Citing cases

  1. Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank NA Inc.

    Civil Action 5:22-cv-458 (MTT) (M.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Second, Gordon's allegation that Wells Fargo created a second fraudulent RISC is insufficient to state a claim because Gordon must show that Wells Fargo breached a duty “owed to the consuming public in general.” Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga.App. 450, 451, 571 S.E.2d 454, 455 (2002) (noting that the GFBPA “does not encompass suits based upon allegedly deceptive or unfair acts or practices which occur in an essentially private transaction”) (quoting Lynas v. Williams, 216 Ga.App. 434, 436, 454 S.E.2d 570, 573 (1995)).

  2. Contour Sierra, LLC v. Williams

    No. A23A1079 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2023)

    Because it is well settled under Georgia's impact rule that the physical impact must result in a physical injury, see Holt, 368 Ga.App. at 56, and the plaintiffs' complaint allegations explicitly state that they did not suffer any physical injury, we agree with Contour that the well-pled factual allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint, along with all fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn from the allegations, fail to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on this ground. See Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga.App. 450, 452 (2) (571 S.E.2d 454) (2002) (finding no viable cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress where it was undisputed that the plaintiffs were not physically injured). That, however, does not end our inquiry.

  3. Layer v. Clipper Petroleum, Inc.

    735 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 25 times

    However, the theory of unjust enrichment does not lie where there is an express contract. See Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga.App. 450, 452(4), 571 S.E.2d 454 (2002). Furthermore, the undisputed evidence showed that Clipper Petroleum did not suffer damages under the Cash Advance Agreement since it never paid any cash advances.

  4. Donchi v. Robdol

    283 Ga. App. 161 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 30 times

    See Cox v. Athens Regional Med. Center.Judgment affirmed. Ruffin and Bernes, JJ., concur.Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 450, 452 (4) ( 571 SE2d 454) (2002).Cox v. Athens Regional Med. Center, 279 Ga. App. 586, 593 (3) ( 631 SE2d 792) (2006).

  5. Cox v. Athens Regional Medical Center, Inc.

    279 Ga. App. 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief could not survive where the underlying substantive claim failed

    Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing their claim for unjust enrichment. Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 450, 452 (4) ( 571 SE2d 454) (2002). 4. Appellants contend that the trial court erred by dismissing their claim that ARMC breached a fiduciary duty owed to appellants in setting its prices.

  6. Brown v. Morton

    274 Ga. App. 208 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 13 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 450, 451 (1) ( 571 SE2d 454) (2002). The Browns admitted that they accepted money from Morton while having no intent to do the work for which they were being paid; they assured her the work would be completed even though they had no intention of completing the work; and they refused to repair the damages they caused.

  7. Henderson v. Gandy

    270 Ga. App. 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that certain individual transactions did not violate the GFBPA because they were not the types of practices the Act meant to regulate

    The actions Henderson complains of, i.e., Atlanta Cardiology Group's policy of allowing the WOCNs to perform treatment and the notations that Dr. Gandy authorized the treatment when he did not, were not actions introduced into the stream of commerce. Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 450, 451 (1) ( 571 SE2d 454) (2002). The policy affected only the internal practices of the group, and the notations were in Dr. Henderson's private medical records and presumably other patients' private medical records. By their very nature, the contents of these records are intended to be private and confidential, and not revealed to the general public.

  8. Fuller v. Lakeview Academy

    583 S.E.2d 282 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)

    As the evidence, including Fuller's own testimony, supports the court's findings, Fuller has not shown any breach of contract giving rise to a return of tuition or justifying reimbursement for amounts paid to Sylvan Learning Center. See Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 450, 452(3) ( 571 S.E.2d 454) (2002). Thus, under the "any evidence" standard, we affirm.

  9. Serv. Corp. Int'l v. Stericycle, Inc.

    20 C 838 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2021)

    See also, e.g., Stonebridge Collection v. Carmichael, 791 F.3d 811, 822 (8th Cir. 2015) (Arkansas); Pryor v. CCEC, 571 S.E.2d 454, 455 (Ga.Ct.App. 2002) (Georgia); Bhatia v. 3M, 323 F.Supp.3d 1082, 1102 (D. Minn. 2018) (New York); Khoday v. Symantec, 858 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1017 (D. Minn. 2012) (Minnesota); Triple 7 v. Intervet, 338 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1087 (D. Neb. 2004) (Nebraska); Princeton Healthcare v. Netsmart New York, 29 A.3d 361, 365 ( N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2011) (New Jersey); Feeley (South Carolina); Michael v. Mosquera Lacy, 200 P.3d 695, 700 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (Washington)

  10. Eagle 6 Tech. Servs. v. Victor Nat'l Holdings, Inc.

    4:20-CV-183 (CDL) (M.D. Ga. Sep. 1, 2021)

    “An unjust enrichment theory does not lie where there is an express contract.” Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 571 S.E.2d 454, 456 (Ga.Ct.App. 2002). Eagle 6's unjust enrichment claim, however, is clearly an alternative to its breach of contract claim, and it is set out in a separate count in the amended complaint.