{¶12} The common pleas court overruled Duncan's "Motion to Vacate Postrelease Control" on the ground that it had no authority to grant the relief sought. Citing State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, the court insisted that, because the judgment of conviction "include[d] language that made postrelease control a part of [Duncan's] sentence, it fell [to] him to challenge the imposition of postrelease control in an appeal." And the court cited Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, to hold that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider [the] motion," because "an action against the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections" was "the appropriate vehicle" for challenging the imposition of postrelease control after Duncan had been released from his 2003 prison term for voluntary manslaughter.
In its June 8, 2011, decision and entry denying Appellant's motion to vacate the post release control portion of the sentence, the trial court essentially determined that Appellant had waived the error related to the imposition of post release control by failing to file a direct appeal from the 2004 decision, and that because the 2004 sentencing entry mentioned post release control, Appellant was sufficiently put on notice and should have filed a direct appeal. The trial court relied on State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (2010), 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, in reaching this decision. It is from this decision and entry that Appellant now brings his timely appeal, setting forth two assignments of error for our review.
It must also be noted that sentencing errors, such as post-release control issues, are not jurisdictional and are not remediable by extraordinary writ. State ex rel. Davis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4728; State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722. Thus, Judge McGinty possesses no duty to re-sentence Williams.
{¶ 5} We affirm the court of appeals' judgment, although we do so for reasons different from those expressed by the court of appeals. SeeState ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 1. Mandamus and prohibition
[Ohio St.3d 162]{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of habeas corpus requested by appellant, Terrance Quillen. His June 2001 sentencing entry “sufficiently included language that postrelease control was part of his sentence so as to afford him sufficient notice to raise any claimed errors on appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.” State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 4;McGee v. Sheldon, 132 Ohio St.3d 89, 2012-Ohio-2217, 969 N.E.2d 262, ¶ 1. The sentencing entry “constituted a final, appealable order, and he had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his claims.”
In addition, McGee's May 2008 sentencing entry “sufficiently included language that postrelease control was part of his sentence so as to afford him sufficient notice to raise any claimed errors on appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.” State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 4. The sentencing entry “constituted a final, appealable order, and he had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his claims.” State ex rel. Castro v. Corrigan, 129 Ohio St.3d 342, 2011-Ohio-4059, 952 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 3.
{¶ 4} Finally, Agosto's sentencing entry “sufficiently included language that postrelease control was part of his sentence so as to afford him sufficient notice to raise any claimed errors on appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.” State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 4; State ex rel. Castro v. Corrigan, 129 Ohio St.3d 342, 2011-Ohio-4059, 952 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 3. Judgment affirmed.
In addition, Shepherd's sentencing entry “sufficiently included language that postrelease control was part of his sentence so as to afford him sufficient notice to raise any claimed errors on appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.” State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 4. Shepherd's sentencing entry “constituted a final, appealable order, and he had an [Ohio St.3d 362] adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his claims.” State ex rel. Castro v. Corrigan, 129 Ohio St.3d 342, 2011-Ohio-4059, 952 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 3.
{¶ 2} Richardson's sentencing entry “ ‘sufficiently included language that postrelease control was part of his sentence so as to afford him sufficient notice to raise any claimed errors on appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.’ ” State ex rel. Tucker v. Forchione, 128 Ohio St.3d 298, 2010-Ohio-6291, 943 N.E.2d 1006, ¶ 1, quoting State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 4. {¶ 3} And “the remedy for a failure to comply with Crim.R. 32(C) is a revised sentencing entry rather than a new hearing.”
{¶ 2} Richardson's sentencing entry "`sufficiently included language that post-release control was part of his sentence so as to afford him sufficient notice to raise any claimed errors on appeal rather than by extraordinary writ.'" State ex rel. Tucker v. Forchione, 128 Ohio St.3d 298, 2010-Ohio-6291, 943 N.E.2d 1006, ¶ 1, quoting State ex rel. Pruitt v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 402, 2010-Ohio-1808, 928 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 4. {¶ 3} And "the remedy for a failure to comply with Crim. R. 32(C) is a revised sentencing entry rather than a new hearing."