A conviction for violation of OCGA § 16-8-7 may be sustained if the evidence shows that the defendant received, disposed of, or retained stolen property which he knew or should have known was stolen, and the offense may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396, 397 ( 283 S.E.2d 625). Under our law, motions for a directed verdict of acquittal should be granted only when there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law (OCGA § 17-9-1 (a); Taylor v. State, 252 Ga. 125 ( 312 S.E.2d 311)); on appeal a reviewing court may consider all the evidence in the case ( Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 375 ( 219 S.E.2d 743)), and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
"`(R)etention of stolen property which a person knows or should know is stolen without intent to restore it to the owner will sustain the conviction even where guilty knowledge at the time of the acquisition of the stolen property is not shown. (Cit.)' [Cit.] `"After the fact knowledge" . . . will sustain a conviction.' [Cit.]" Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396, 397-398 (1) ( 283 S.E.2d 625) (1981). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was that the truck was observed being driven past officers who had the Wal-Mart under surveillance and then out of sight to the rear of the Wal-Mart.
`"(G)uilty knowledge may be inferred from circumstances which would excite suspicion in the mind of an ordinary prudent man. (Cits.)" Watts v. State, 157 Ga. App. 214 ( 276 S.E.2d 884) (1981).' Pruiett v. State, [ 159 Ga. App. 396 (1), 397 ( 283 S.E.2d 625)]." Abner v. State, 196 Ga. App. 752 (1), 753 ( 397 S.E.2d 36).
Knowledge that goods were stolen is an essential element of the offense of receiving stolen property. See Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396 ( 283 S.E.2d 625) (1981). Therefore, defendant was entitled to directed verdict on the three counts relating to the Oldsmobile and the items found within it.
This evidence, along with evidence showing that stolen merchandise is often traded for illegal drugs and evidence that defendant Joe Owens, Jr. was guilty of trafficking in cocaine, was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding, under the standard of proof required in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, supra, that defendant Joe Owens, Jr., was guilty of theft by receiving stolen property beyond a reasonable doubt. See Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396 (1) ( 283 S.E.2d 625). However, there was insufficient evidence to show that defendant Garland Tard was guilty of theft by receiving stolen property.
]' `"Unexplained possession of recently stolen goods can be used in conjunction with other evidence to infer guilty knowledge." [Cit.]'" Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396 (1) ( 283 S.E.2d 625) (1981). Evidence of appellant's possession of the recently stolen car, coupled with the fact that appellant did not have any papers evidencing ownership of the car or a key to the vehicle, was sufficient to authorize the jury to infer that appellant knew or should have known of the stolen nature of the car.
Under those circumstances appellant has no right to contest the omission of the instruction. Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458 (1) ( 265 S.E.2d 796) (1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 988 (100 SC 2975, 64 L.Ed.2d 847); Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396 (2) ( 283 S.E.2d 625) (1981). Judgment affirmed. Banke, C. J., and Pope, J., concur.
[Cit.]" Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396, 397 ( 283 S.E.2d 625). From the testimony elicited at trial, there is sufficient evidence to support the state's contention that appellant came into possession of the stolen computer and that he and his co-indictee had gone to Miami with no intention of ever returning it to the owner, but rather to attempt to sell the computer.