A moratorium statute is not intended to enable a debtor to drive a sharp bargain with his creditors, but to protect one, in distress financially, who is unable to meet terms of his contract. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brown, 221 Iowa 31, 265 N.W. 153; Young v. Weber, 175 A. 273. CHRISTIANSON, J.

[2] We have repeatedly held that under the plain wording of the statute and the rule established by our decisions the defendants, as a matter of law and equity, are entitled to a continuance unless good cause is shown to the contrary, and this burden is upon the plaintiff. Reed v. Snow, 218 Iowa 1165, 254 N.W. 800; Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Roth, 218 Iowa 251, 254 N.W. 918; Mudra v. Brown, 219 Iowa 867, 259 N.W. 773; Augustana Pension and Aid Fund v. Nagle, 219 Iowa 1337, 261 N.W. 771; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brown, 221 Iowa 31, 265 N.W. 153; Anderson v. Fall, 221 Iowa 24, 265 N.W. 165; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Merrick, 221 Iowa 585, 266 N.W. 279; Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 221 Iowa 591, 266 N.W. 282; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Van Alstine, 221 Iowa 763, 266 N.W. 514; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Kilpatrick, 221 Iowa 993, 267 N.W. 688; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bridson, 221 Iowa 1302, 268 N.W. 25; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Riddle, 221 Iowa 1313, 268 N.W. 45; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Jelsma, 221 Iowa 1191, 268 N.W. 76; Replogle v. Ebert, 223 Iowa 1007, 274 N.W. 37; First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Albers, 224 Iowa 865, 277 N.W. 451. We are inclined to the conclusion under this record that with the promising years of 1937 and 1938 and the situation and circumstances shown in this record, that the defendant will be able to either refinance and re-establish the indebtedness upon his farm or sell the same for an amount in excess of the indebtedness and tha

This being true, the plaintiffs will sustain no financial loss, and it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that appellees may not be able to sell or refinance in the interim. As bearing on this point see Prudential Insurance Company v. Brown, 221 Iowa 31, 265 N.W. 153. While the agreement entered into between plaintiffs and J.P. Myers, whereby he represented himself to be the title holder, and whereby he waived his rights under the moratorium statute at the time the decree of foreclosure was obtained, if such agreement was binding upon O.F. Myers as administrator with the will annexed, and the other legatees under the will who joined with him in this application for extension, would no doubt be sufficient showing as to "good cause" and also as to lack of "good faith" on the part of the applicants, yet we are unable to see how the court could find anything therein which would operate as a waiver or estoppel as against the administrator, especially since under the will of Alice Myers there was an equitable conversion of the real estate into personalty and the title passed to the administrator, and not to the heirs.